Mussolini’s Blunder DANGER IN ALBANIA

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume LXXIII, 4 December 1940, Page 9

Mussolini’s Blunder DANGER IN ALBANIA

In the situation in Albania there are all the makings of a great military (lis- I aster for the Italian forces. It is, perhaps. a little early to describe the dis- I orderly retreat as a rout, but the captures of large numbers of prisoners and materials indicate that the Greek counter-offensive already has assumed the proportions of a considerable military victory. It is reliably reported that the Italian resistance is completely broken at some points, and that their troops are abandoning positions without making any serious attempt at defence. Mussolini's rash venture has won him no Littorio or Vittorio Veneto and present events make it probable that a second Caporetto may be written into the military annals of Italy. Italy’s Difficulties If the Italian armies in Albania do not make a stand they will soon be between the devil of the victorious Greeks and the deep sea of the Adriatic. A note of caution against too rosy expectations must be sounded: but it canrtot be denied that the bril-liantly-led Greeks still bold tbe initiative and/ heartened by their sustained victorious advance, are exploiting tbe situation without any respite to the sorely-tried enemy. The frequent hearv.v air attacks by tbe R.A.F. on Brindisi and Bari in Italy, the continuous threat to their

sea communications and the inadequate facilities for troop and supply convoys ia the Albanian coastal ports (which are also frequently bombed from the air) must make the problem of rein- : forcing and supplying the armies in the field a most difficult one for the Italian High Command. Help From Britain When Italy opened her ill-starred advance against Greece a month ago, Great Britain pledged all the help in her power for her new ally and that promise is in rapid progress of fulfil-1 incut. Valuable aid, mainly in the air, j has been given to the Greeks; and now that the Italian offensive is in rapid j reverse, it can confidently be assumed I that British supplies of guns, equip- j ment and munitions of all kinds are be- ! ing rushed into Greece. It would appear that aid in material ; rather than in troops is what Greece . mostly needs at present. Given a fur- j ther Italian retreat in the southern coastal sector of Albania, the opportunity for a bold and powerful coup by sea through the Strait of Otranto would be open to the British naval forces and would greatly assist the Greek campaign. Mussolini’s Mistake i The dramatic developments in Albania during the last month indicate clearly that Mussolini and his High Command made a grave miscalculation when they attacked Greece. Seeing that they were already committed j to a major overseas campaign on the Lib.va-Egypt front, it is difficult to be- 1 lieve that the Italians would have made ! war on Greece if they had expected j any serious resistance after crossing | the Albanian frontier. Whatever Great Britain’s difficulties j may have been when France collapsed | in June and Italy sneaked into the war | by the back door, it cannot be pre- ! tended that Italy held command of the sea in the Mediterranean. The actual relative strengths of the British and Italian fleets in Mare Nostrum in June has not been disclosed, but the enemy most certainly then had a considerable numerical superiority in ships. The bold British stroke at Oran early in July denied the Italians any hope of securing the major part of the French fleet in the Mediterranean, and at no time during the last six months has the Italian fleet contested Britain's virtual mastery at sea in the Mediterranean. This being so, Mussolini’s commitment of his country to two major overseas campaigns—in Libya and Albania —must be regarded as a colos- ;| sal military blunder. In face of the facts, it can only be assumed that the ! Italians anticipated a “walk-over” in | the case of Greece—an expectation '! that certainly has been falsified by the I events of the last month. Sea Communications Unsafe ) The great army commanded by Mar- ; sbal Graziani in Libya has been quiest cent since its advance to Sidi Barrani s in September, and is confronted by the ) ever-growing strength of the British. When and if Graziani will strike, if ever, is best known to himself; but it T can be said that every week corrects the balance in favour of Britain. 1 Graziani’s lines of communication between Libya and Italy have always 1 been in danger of interruption and re--1 cent events in the Mediterranean have rendered them precarious iu the ex- • i treme. ’ As is pointed out by the “Manchester •! Guardian” it is no longer possible for ’ the Italians to maintain their lines ’ | of communication with their armies overseas. By attempting to withdraw ‘ i the main fleet from Taranto to Cag- . liari, resulting in the recent action off j Sardinia, the Italian naval command j committed a major blunder. The Italian attack on Greece permitted the British naval, air and military forces to establish advanced bases in Crete, which lies nearly half-way between Alexandria and Taranto. Thus i our naval and air forces are within much easier striking distance of the j flanks of the Italian sea communications. both with Albania and North f Africa, f Dangers Ahead In Libya, whose ports and coastal ' land communications are open to cou- ' stant attack at closer range by sea and " air, Marshal Graziani is faced with the " problem of feeding, reinforcing and 1 supplying his army by sea from Italy. - The same applies to the Italian armies 1 in Albania. Moreover, a considerable part of the water required by the Libyan forces has to be transported : from Italy by sea, for which purpose j a fleet of special tankers is employed. I Italy is finding that her present overi seas campaigns in the face of Britain’s ! sea power in action are a very different problem from her Abyssinian adventure . of four years ago. ,f It only remains to be said that if the a Greek counter-offensive in Albania is n pushed to a successful conclusion, the Italians will be faced with the alternatives of surrender or an attempt at It evacuation. In the, latter case there e will certainly l>e no Italian “miracle ‘i* of Dunkirk.” There are indications 1 that the Greek advance up the coast ie already threatens Valona. the soutli>f ern port of Albania. In the event of its capture, there would remain to the Italians only Durazzo and San Giovan- " ni di Medua in the north, and neither of these possesses good facilities for handling large ships.— (S.D.W.)