Nelson Evening Mail. MONDAY, MAY 29, 1916. FEATURES OF THE WESTERN FRONT.

Nelson Evening Mail, 29 May 1916, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. MONDAY, MAY 29, 1916. FEATURES OF THE WESTERN FRONT.

WHETHER, the Allies are strong enough in both men and munitions to carry out a great offensive in the West this summer or even if theyi contemplate anysuch, mpvement on. that front at all. is at the present time uncertain, however much opinion may incline in one direction or the other. Whatever happens it may be concluded that the Allies will not use pp their man-power in driving the enemy out of France and'- Belgium, for such, an achievement would still leave t'hem at the mercy of the Germans, Austrian's, Bulgarians and Turks, provided their military power he not broken. As is well the fundamental objective in warfare is the destruction of the enemy's forces, and the acquisition of territory may count for very little. If, for instance, the Allies determine to force the* Germans hack out of Northern France and Belgium by a land attack, they must; break through heavily fortified lines and,seriouslyi threaten- German communications to the -Rhine bases. .Unfortunately., the enemy is supplied with an elaborate network of railwa2-'s that enable him to hold his line with comparatively few troops—in fact, it is thought that there are not more than 1,500,000 men in the German lines- from Nieuport to Verdun. 'Most people have a general idea concerning the nature of these defences, hut it is well to bear in mind how formidable they really are.. There is an outer first line close tip to the Allied lines, a second line, from 500 yards to half- a-mile behind it, and a third, the .main position, a further mile or more to the rear.~ The trenches evenof the (first line -sometimes go to a depth of 30 feet or 40 feet in order to provide shelter from a severe bombardment. The second line' is similarly constructed, while the third, the strongest of all, necessitates a fresh artillery concentration hefore it can he bombarded. The grcund v between the lines, and especially between, the second' and, third lines, is also fortified and usually provided not only with entanglements, hutalso with ingeniously constructed! redoubts and little" fortresses, where the attacking infantrvi can he enifiladed. These have all! 4|o be taken .before the third line can be assaulted., and the ground, ■between the lines can, of course, be swept toy the fire o ! f defending field and heavy artillery. And further than behind the third line there is, as a rule', open country for some mires, sometimes many miles, before the next prepared position with, its triple lines is-come to. ■Behind this position there may be, again, a third! prepared position. As has been pointed out previously; it is the aim of the attackers in a .grand offensive -to break through the first triple line on a wide, enough front —30 miles is said to toe necessary to force the enemy to fight a manoeuvre battle. Whilst this great offensive is in- course of operation attacks -would also be made on other sections of the .front<to prevent the enemy forces on the crucial sector being reinforced. •

It-'is well knpwn that the British hold that portion of the front beginning a little north of Ypres to the neighbourhood of Frise, near the river Somrae. The Ypres salient, the' positions between Armeritieres and the Bethune-La Bassee Canal, -where, directly facing Lille, are the •battlefields of Neuve 'Chapelle and Festubert; the Hiilluch-Loos and the Souchez-Vimy positions are all. difficult to hold, and exceedinglyi importantsectors of t'he line. Mr E. F. Allan points out that there are always large concentrations of German troops at-these places, because they are points to be Avon in an offensive aiming at the Channel ports, and' partly 'because from them a forward movement of the Allies would menace the railway centres, firstly of Lens, Lille and Douai, and secondly of Ghent and Valenciennes. These centres, Mr Allan reminds its, are vital to the German system of communications in Flanders, and their fall would! 1 involve a German retreat at least to the Antwerp-Brussels-TVlanbenge line, thus entailing the abandonment of Ostend and Zeebrugge. From Arras to Frise, t'he southern portion of the British 'front and on the French front from" Frise, by lloyc,

Noyon, and Soissons, to the north of Rbeims, the German line, he says,. is lightly held, owing to the hilly nature of the country. .-From Hheims eastward to Verdun both the 'Germans and' the .French are in great force, for the Champagne countryt is comparatively open down land. Of the possibilities of a French attack here, Mr Allan explains that the piercing of the German line would expose to French attack a series of lateral railways servility the German front further west. A wedge would bo driven between the Grown Prince's array in the Argoime and round Verdun and the western German armies, nnd if the advance could be continued' in the region to the north, it would cut off the western German forces from railway connection with the Rhine, save by the northern line through Maubeuge and Liege. This, it is pointed out, would endanger the retreat of all the 'German armies west of a line through Antwerp and Rheims. Whilst the difficulties are many, it will be seen there are great possibilities before big. British and French offensives on chosen portions of the line.