Auchinleck’s Desert Dispatches

Northern Advocate, 16 January 1948, Page 3

Auchinleck’s Desert Dispatches

LONDON, Thu. (10 a.m.).—When the British forces fell back to El Alamein in 1942 the Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, General (Now Field-Mar-shal) Sir Claude Auchinleck, was concerned about the Bth Army’s weakness and in one appreciation of the position referred particularly to ‘‘the weak New Zealand Division.”

The War Office has now published in the London Gazette his despatches relating to the period from November 1, 1941 to August 15, 1942, when he handed over to General Sir Harold (now Field-Marshal Viscount) Alexander.

His appreciation of July 27, 1942, discussed the possibility of attacking the Germans and Italians before they were able to build up strength to go on to the Nile Delta. “None of the formations of the Bth Army is now sufficiently well trained for offensive operations,” he said. One of the problems of devising an attack was how to find the troops.

ATTACK ON SIDI EEZEGH “The only formation which might be used is the weak New Zealand Division.” he added. “Failure would make this division unfit for further operations for a considerable time.

“Having in mind the weakness in numbers and training of this division the chances of success can only be rated as 80 —40.

“This attack seems hardly advisable.” Sir Claude Auchinleck, in his review of the offensive in 1941,” described the .New Zealand Division's attack on Sidi Rezegh and how the New Zealanders incurred heavy casualties.

He said the Germans reacted strongly and that the sth South African Brigade, which through no fault of its own lacked training, arrived too late to assist the New Zealanders who had to retire in the face of powerful attacks.

"Two-thirds of the New Zealand Division had been cut to pieces and had to be withdrawn to refit.” he said.

The despatches decribed how the withdrawal of two Australian divisions from Syria and Palestine to the Pacific affected his strategy when he was hoping to resume the offensive from Cyrenaica onward into Tripoli.

SITUATION WORSENS He also referred to this withdrawal in speaking of the need to secure his northern flank from the German thi-eat through the Caucasus. After the Australian divisions were withdrawn the situation became much worse, he said. Describing how he was obliged to “replace" the Bth Army Commander, General Sir Alan Cuningham, Sir Claude Auchinleck said on November 23, 1941, that General Cuningham w r as perturbed by the general situation which he considered critical owing to the small number of tanks in running order.

If he continued to attack as he had been doing since November 19, he might, he said, find himself without any serviceable tanks at all and Egypt s safety might again be endangered. “I was never in doubt about the right course because it looked as if the enemy was hard pressed and stretched to the limit and I at once instructed General Cuningham to continue the offensive,” Sir Claude stated.

RITCHIE APPOINTED “General Cunngham accepted the decision loyally, but his anxiety undoubtedly grew when the enemy on November 24 put in a powerful countei stroke. “When I returned to Cairo on Novc mber 25, I considered the whole question and concluded that in so critical a situation I could not retain a commander in whose ability to carry out my instructions I had not complete confidence.” He added that he selected MajorGen oral N. M. Ritchie to succeed General Cunningham, ordering him to take over the command at once and receiving the Government’s immediate approval of his decision.

LITTLE LIGHT ON TOBRUK When Mr Churchill told General Auchinleck that it had been decided that an offensive must be launched in Cyrenaica as early as possible, General Auchinleck pointed out that if British armoured forces were destroyed the Bth Army would be compelled to retire to El Alamein, and, in effect, this occurred.

General Auchinleck threw little light on the collapse at Tobruk when Rommel’s offensive was resumed, but made it, clear that he had, throughout, instructed that a second investment of Tobruk must be avoided. He said that exact and reliable accounts of the fighting, which led to the collapse of the South Africans in Tobruk, were not obtainable.