BUS SERVICES

Northern Advocate, 18 July 1933, Page 6

BUS SERVICES

APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT HOSPITAL AND MAIRTOWN RUNS. LICENSING AUTHORITY UPHELD. (Special to “Northern Advocate.”) AUCKLAND, This Day. A decision of the No. 1 District Transport Licensing Authority was the subject of an appeal in the Supreme Court yesterday before Mr Justice Smith.

The plaintiffs wore F. B. Smith and T. E. Woodman, trading as Hamilton and Company, motor bus proprietors, of Whangarei (Mr A. H. Johnstone and Mr Turner). They applied for a writ of certiorari against the Licensing Authority (Mr Meredith and Mr McCarthy), to remove their application for a license to the Supreme Court, *and they also sought a. writ of prohibition to prevent the Licensing Authority from interfering with the right they claimed to carry on certain bus services.

Mr Johnstone said that the No. 1 District Transport Licensing Authority, in April, .1932, issued two licenses to the plaintiffs to carry on motor bus services from Whangarei to Whangarei Hospital and from Whangarei to Mairtown. In February last the plaintiffs put in an application for renewal, and this was heard by the Authority on May 30. The plaintiff Woodman and his solicitor, Mr Trimmer, were, present at tho proceedings, and Mr Trimmer argued for the renewal of the license.

Objection was taken to the renewal by a rival company, and no evidence was called for. The application was considered by the Licensing Authority in committee. On June 2 Mr Trimmer heard casually that the application had been refused, and immediately made inquiries. The same day notice to this effect was received.

Mr Meredith said the plaintiffs’ proper remedy was appeal and they had appealed. The appeal would be heard next Thursday. His Honour: ‘‘lt seems to me on the face of it as if the appeal would acknowledge the validity of the proceedings below. You either appeal or you do not.”

Mr Johnstone said an appeal could be abandoned or proceeded with. The position in connection with the appeal was that they wanted to preserve the whole of their rights. His Honour said it had been decided that an appeal was a recognition of the validity of the proceedings from which appeal was made. Legal Argument.

Mr Johnstone said that an act of appeal did'not imply an election between the two remedies, and both were still open to them. He submitted that whether a motor bus service was necessary or desirable was purely a matter of fact. Prima facie, these services wore necessary and desirable on May 30, otherwise a license would not have been in existence for them. Nothing to the contrary was hinted at during the sitting, and two of the three members of the Authority had no personal knowledge as to the position of the services. No evidence was called, and the Authority must have acted either on its own knowledge or on knowledge conveyed to it from an outside source. •It was a court of justice, bound to hear both sides. If it thought the plaintiffs’ services unnecessary or undesirable, it was its duty to give them an opportunity to be heard on their own behalf. The principles of natural justice had clearly been defied. Mr Turner discussed the degree of proof required of an applicant for .1 license, and said less proof was required for a renewal than for a new’ license. It was claimed that this license had been refused “in the public interest,” but the questions asked by members of the Authority showed they had already decided that the service was necessary and desirable. \ Power of Procedure. Mr Meredith said every licensing authority had power to regulate its own procedure, the only restriction being that if they accepted an adverse representation the person affected should have due notice.

There were 12 buses operating in the area in question, so it was obvious that the renewal could not bo taken for granted. If the plaintiffs came with nothing to support their application, they could not complain if they did not get a decision in their favour. In any event, certiorari was discretionary.

Authorities were quoted by Mr McCarthy to show that the Licensing Authority had power to adjudicate oven without evidence. His Honour said the Authority had the claims of the competing companies put before it, and how could he interfere with the decision? The parties must have known that it was their duty to tender such evidence as they thought fit, and it was quite plain that the Licensing Authority was entitled to come to the conclusion that it did. The plaintiffs had not discharged the n nus of proof, and it was unnecessary for him to go into the technical questions that had been raised. He would dismiss the .motion with costs.