CAN WE TRUST OUR REASONING?

Manawatu Times, Volume XLVI, Issue 2693, 11 July 1923, Page 7

CAN WE TRUST OUR REASONING?

NEED Foil CAUTIwiY. W.E.A. LECTURE. The' usual weekly lecture under the W.E.A. schomo was given sit Spooner's Buildings last evening, there being a good attendance, over which Mr Morrison presided. His task that evening:, said the lecturer (Mr A. Ernest Mandor), was to inquire into the amount of reliance which we were justified in placing upon the results of our reasonng. It was, he thought, one of the most important subjects on the syllabus for the session. At the present time there was a tendency to exalt tile reason, to place an absurdly exaggerated amount of faith in the results of reasoning - . * But modern psychology was now giving- scientific confirmation to the old saying that "the wish is father to the thought/' Much of our so-called reasoning, said the lecturer, was mere rationalising—that is, the finding or manufacturing of "reasons" to justify a conclusion which has already been adopted. THE MIND'S OWN CENSORSHIP. "The fact of the mind's own censorship," Mr Mandor said, "was one of the corner-stones of the whule system of modern psychology. 1 want to j make sjure that you get this proposition accurately. You know that any wish or desire may bo stimulated and strengthened by certain ideas. You know that, on most of the issues of life, we have conflicting motives, one of which in each case gels the upper hand (becomes dominant), while the other is defeated and repressed. Now this is where tho censorship comes in; there is a distinct tendency for the dominant motive—whatever it may bo —to prevent us from thinking such thoughts as would ' stimulate and strengthen, the opposition. "Sometimes we are conscious of this censorship. 1(, for instance, I am trying to give up smoking, and it I realise that the very thought of tobacco lends to intensify my craving for it, then 1 shall consciously 'refuse' I even to. think about tobacco. Of if a I man is tempted to some dishonest action but lias a staronger motive to overcome his temptation, then he will resolutely 'shut his mind' to every idea, which might strengthen the temptation. Sometimes, then, this censorship is something that we are aware of. But nine times out of ten we are quite oblivious to what is happening. "One of the best examples of the mind's own censorship is found in the old saying, 'i.ovu is blind.' This means that if a man is in love with a woman, and if tho love-motive is strongly] dominant, then he will nut be able to recognise any of her faults and defects. The censorship explains this; the dominant love-motive represses all ideas which would arouse any opposition to itself. The same thing is true of anger; if anger is dominant, then it will censor and repress—prevent us from recognising—any of the good points about the person with whom wo are enraged. DARWIN'S CONFESSION. "Charles Darwin placed on record the fact that lie was obliged to make full and explicit written notes of every case he came across which appeared to clash with the theory he appeared to establish. He could trust his unaided memory for the favourable cases, ihoso which supported his theory, but he found that ho had a strong tendency to forget (that is, unconsciously to. censor and repress) the facts which conflicted with it. This tendency to forget facts which clash with our dominant wish—this is censorship in action." Tho lecturer gave numerous other facts and arguments to prove the existence of this censorship of ideas within the mind itself. "It is clear," the speaker continued, "that this censorship and repression of such ideas as don't hap-1

pen to suit our ruling motives—this fact must vitiate much of our sc-called reasoning. It seems that in the Court of Reason, many of tho cases aro tried on the evidence of one sifte alone; the ideas which do not suit the dominant motive are very often kept out of Court altogether. "This explains many things which would otherwise be inexplicable. Some people cannot understand how it is possible for men of equal intelligence ami equal knowledge to differ so widely in their conclusions about various political, religious, economic and scientific questions. There are for example men of equal intelligence and equal knowledge on both sides of Parliament; and they may be all perfectly sincere in their convictions. But their dominent sentiments and wishes aro different, and so each of them 'sees' a different set of facts from the others. Mr Holland sees one sot of facts, and Mr Massey another set; and each reasons from such facts as he has been able to accept. The reasoning itself may be valid in both cases. SOLDIER AND CO. "Or, take the case of two men on the outbreak of war. One immediately joins the army, the other becomes a conscientious objector. Both put up some sort of claim to have reasoned out. their decision. What really happens? Tho dominant motive of the soldier may be tho herd instinct, the overwhelming impulse to respond to the call of the pack. His dominant motive (which depends upon instinct and not upon reason) is to go with his herd into the war, and, therefore, he adapts his reasoning to make it fit his decision. But what about the conscious objector? Is his reasoning any more reliable? It is not. His dominant motive to keep out of the war may be the herd instinct (attaching himself to his pacifist herd), or the simple instinct of self-preservation. But he, too, will rationalise his conduct, he will find all sorts of 'reasons' which aro perfectly satisfying (to him), which justify him in keeping out of tho war. Now, the soldier and the CO. may be men of equal thinking power and equal knowledge, but in each case the wish is the father to the thought, or, as an American writer puts it, 'instinct reasons by the nose,' The amusing feature is that each—the soldier and the pacifist—each is absolutely convinced that he is acting in a rational manner, while he sees clearly that the other is moved by pure instinct. It is easy to sec through somebody else's motives, But it is not easy, except for a person trained in psychology, to recognise one's own." Our conclusion must be, then, that we can never reason against our ruling motive. There is always a tendency for us to repress and forget the facts which do not harmonise with our dominant sentiments and wishes. When we reason in such a case, therefore, although the actual reasoning itself may be perfectly valid, yet we cannot trust it because there is a probability that we are reasoning on only half the facts —the half we have been able to see. We can trust our reasoning absolutely only when we have no interest whatever in the result, when no instinct is involved either way, and when our sole desire at the moment is to get at tho truth.