TACTICS IN AFRICA.

Manawatu Standard, Volume LX, Issue 215, 9 August 1940, Page 7

TACTICS IN AFRICA.

BACKGROUND OF CAMPAIGN. POSSIBLE WAR OF ATTRITION. LONDON, Aug. 7. Commenting upon the background of tlie campaign, an officer of the Genera] Staff said that war in Africa is very different from war in France and Belgium. There were four main frontiers in Africa on which the war was being fought, he said. The first was the frontier between Egypt and Libya. Then there was the frontier between the Sudan and Abyssinia. There was also the frontier running east and west between Abyssinia and Kenya, and lastly there was the frontier between Somalilaiid and Abyssinia. The total length of those four frontiers was about 3800 miles. It was an enormous distance, and that factor of distance should be remembered, as it naturally had a great influence on operations.

SO-CALLED SUCCESSES. Since the war with Italy began the enemy had claimed striking successes on these frontiers. It was true that they had occupied several villages inside British territory on the Sudan frontier and the Kenya frontier, and people were apt to ask, “Why did we lose these posts? Why did wc not hold them more strongly?” The officer said that he would endeavour to give an answer by explaining in general' terms the principle in which a war of this kind was fought. The length of the frontiers was 3800 miles, and a great force would be required to hold a continuous line of defence of that length. It would be futile, for the enemy might concentrate at a particular point and break through where there would of necessity be a thin stream, and ho might be able toi penetrate and reach an objective. The problem for the British commander was how to defend an area so vast with an inferior force. The Italians had bigger armies in North Africa than the British had. In Abyssinia they had to maintain a large force in peace time to crush any rebellion among the Abyssinians, and in British territory the peace-time garrisons were naturally very small. NO DRAWBACK. The first thing to remember was that a political boundary was not necessarily the best place to make the defence. In Northern Kenya the area inside the British boundary was waterless desert. In these undeveloped countries there were no main military objectives of real value, and the general in command would have to decide what objectives the enemy would choose and then he would have to make his plans to use his troops to cover those military objectives. The abandonment of territorv in which lie could not operate would be no drawback, and it might be an advantage if the enemy could be forced to operate in it. The speaker expressed the opinion that in the campaign the commander was unlikely to adopt a military passive defence. Tn this kind of fighting it was not the occupation but the defeat of the enemy that counted, and it did not matter on which side of tile frontier that took place. It might be more easily achieved by the enemy advancing. To some extent the war in Africa might be a war of attrition. The enemy could not replace men or materials and his losses in advances or withdrawals counted. The advance or withdrawal was merely calculated in the end to defeat the enemy in the field.