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STALIN’S POLICY

DEFENSIVE CUSHIONING. GERMANY DISTRUSTED. NEW YORK, July 2. When opportunity offers, after Hitler lias become deeply involved in his campaign against England, M. Stalin may move against tile Dardanelles—the strait that unites the Sea of Marmora with the Aegean Sea. This is the opinion of a high American authority who is exceedingly well informed on Russian affairs, and who has recently returned to the United States from Moscow. COVERING LEFT FLANK. With its centre pivoting on the River Bug and the right Hank protected by the incursion into the Baltic, Russia is now protecting her lelt flank in Bessarabia, according to the American authority, who will shortly return to Moscow. Although these are the spoils guaranteed to Russia by the Russo Gennan understanding, he states, they are defensive, and not offensive.. This and the probable move against the Dardanelles are the essential points ot Russia’s present policy. “M. Stalin is a realist.” the authority stated, “and his thinking, like that of Hitler and Mussolini, is free from wishful thinking. He. was surprised l>v the rapid disintegration of France and hence decided' to obtain very quickly what was promised to him by the Russo-German agreement. STRONG MILITARY POWER.

“Since he sees the need for a cushioning of his territories against the time when Hitler may turn against him, Stalin feels that the Baltic and the Balkans would be sufficient ground on which to hold off the Germans for probably two months, and since little more than two mouths’ good weather exists in these areas tor a large-scale military attack, fhc winter weather would also work for the Russians. “It is a mistake to under-estimate Russia’s military power. It is the strongest after that of Germany. The Finnish campaign was composed of six weeks of. mistakes due to Starnoff’s decision that Leningrad’s garrison oi 270 000 men could handle the Finns, and another six weeks in which Russia concentrated her mechanised iorces in a manner demonstrating their true strength, and easily defeating the Finns. '' ' ■ . “The Russians would give the Germans a colossal struggle. It is essential not to put the military pattern of the last war over this war. there is no graft in Russia now. Its supplies are abundant and most efficient. There would be no Tannenbergs. CAUSES FOR CONFLICT.

“Three things might bring a conflict between Russia and Germany. First, a Russian incursion into the Carpathians, which is not provided for in the Russo-German agreement, and which Stalin thinks he needs to round off the left Hanks of his cushioning territory. , , “Secondly, Germany’s need for food. It is an open secret, and the Department of State’s foreign service authorities all agree, that, no matter what happens in the contest between Britain and Germany this winter, the Continent of Europe is going to be desperately hungry. “In spite of Germany’s victories, the German populace, is being progressively starved. Experts agree that the best crops of all in Europe are available in tho Ukraine. The Balkan crops, incidentally, being failures, hard need may drive Hitler to seek food in the Ukraine which lie is unable to get elsewhere. “Thirdly, whilo the position of Russia at the mouth of the Danube is also provided for in the Russo-G crump, agreement, any interference by Russia with Germany’s vital supplies that way would compel German military remonstrance. SUPPLIES FOR GERMANY. “Regarding supplies, it is a myth that German technicians are going in largo numbers into Russia to exploit the natural resources. The Russians are most suspicious of all foreigners, particularly Germans. Russia’s promise of supplies in tho Russo-German agreement was 950,000 tons of petrol. 1,000,000 tons of cattle fodder, 200,000 tons of cotton, and 100,000 tons of manganese. These are being delivered, but with reluctant slowness, because Russia is reluctant to arm an ally who overnight might change to an enemy. “One of the most remarkable things about Russian policy to-day is its enormous flexibility. Stalin is prepared for anything.”

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/MS19400805.2.14

Bibliographic details

Manawatu Standard, Volume LX, Issue 211, 5 August 1940, Page 2

Word Count
657

STALIN’S POLICY Manawatu Standard, Volume LX, Issue 211, 5 August 1940, Page 2

STALIN’S POLICY Manawatu Standard, Volume LX, Issue 211, 5 August 1940, Page 2