RUSSIAN GAINS

Manawatu Standard, Volume LIX, Issue 253, 25 September 1939, Page 7

RUSSIAN GAINS

SUBJECT OF SPECULATION HITLER’S TASK. DIFFICULTIES FORESEEN. (United Press Association —By Electric Telegraph.—-Copyright.) (British Official Wireless.) Received Sept. 25, 11.20 a.m. RUGBY, Sept. 24. At the end of the third week of the war two questions are uppermost i in the public mind, and the Sunday papers make a feature of both. The surprise at the- Russian move in Poland has given place to speculation as to its effect on the situation. ' Mr J. L. Garvin, in the Observer, largely devotes himself to -the consideration of this, and arrives at the conclusion that, so far the “fourth partition” of Poland has worked very much to the Russian advantage. He points out that Russia has advanced “to a line north and south which, on the average, is 150 miles from the former frontier.” Mr Garvin adds that thus, between the Baltic States and the Middle Carpathians, the Russians hold “all the strategic and political points famous in old and later wars as commanding the rivers, roads, railways, and disputed areas.”

In addition, the desired Carpathian oilfields are lost to Herr Hitler, who is left with the task of “incorporating in liis mixed empire some thirty million Slavs who are unsubd liable in soul. In the long run, they will give him and his system moral wounds.” Although Moscow may give supplies to the Germans, they will not be to the degree of Nazi expectation. The Soviet is working for herself and is likely to follow the advice of the Russian statesman, Gortscacoff: “Not to labour on behalf of the King of Prussia.”

Remembering the epic stories of the mass fighting which occurred in the first few weeks of the last war, many people comment on the lack of reported movement and incident in the opening of the present campaign. ALLIES’ POLICY. . “Scrutator,” in the Sunday Times, opportunely devotes an article to the elucidation of the Allied war policy. He frankly admits that the rapid collapse of Poland was a great disappointment, and suggests that, had Russian not intervened and had the Poles been .able to bold on for another month, as there seemed every prospect of their being able to, do, the Polish Army might well have been able to turn the “notorious Polish mud” to good account against an immobilised German mechanical army.

In a tribute to the Polish Army bo says: “’Whoever is to blame for the Polish collapse, it is certainly not the common soldier. The resistance at Warsaw and elsewhere shows of what splendid military material he is made.”

Turning to the British and French policy, “Scrutator” says: “The foundation' of victory is our;,complete corm ma-nd of the sea.- ; . *

“Germany has made no secret of her fears. She wants a short war,, and is anxious not to be drawn into a long military struggle. Her present prol>lem is the reverse of 1914. Then she had to force the lines in order to win; now she hopes to win merely by defending her own and forcing us to attack.” /

“Scrutator” suggests that the Siegfried Line, although not so strong or favourably placed as the Maginot Line, is far stronger than any German fortified position in the last war, and points out that it can only ho breached as a result of long and careful preliminary work. Anv policy of a mass frontal attack would be exactly what Germany would wish, but would he unlikely to lead to victory quickly or slowly. “Victory in war consists not in inflicting a loss on the enemy or even in the ratio of losses inflicted and received. but in convincing the enemy that he cannot possibly win,” adds the writer.