HELP TO SPAIN

Manawatu Standard, Volume LIX, Issue 161, 9 June 1939, Page 7

HELP TO SPAIN

ITALY’S BIG BOAST. FEAR IN MEDITERRANEAN. NAVAL ACTIVITY. (United Press Association—By Electric Telegraph—Copyright.) Deceived June 9, 9.15 a.m. ROME, June S. The newspaper Armed Forces says that 40 Italian warships participated in 226 naval actions during 1 the Spanish War, including - the occupation of Ibiza Island, and the defence of Majorca in 1936, and the disablement of the Republican cruiser Miguel do Cervantes, and the destroyer Churruca. The article boasts that Italian submarines spread fear in the Mediterranean, while the fleet of armed mo-tor-boats torpedoed various enemy vessels off Sicily and in Spanish waters. A total of 149 Italian ships was placed at General Franco's disposal. War material supplied included 4370 lorries. Four hospital ships transported 14,858 wounded and sick to Italy in the course of 29 voyages. The article has received official blessing. Signor Mussolini, toasting the representative of General Franco. Scnor Saner, at a State banquet, said: “Fascist Italy felt irom tho beginning of your insurrection that it constituted a decisive trial not only for Spain’s future, but the future of European civilisation. Wo therefore did not hesitate to give you openly all our assistance from the first day till the finnl victory. Neither we nor our valiant comrades in arms, the Germans, ever doubted General Franco’s full triumph.” ANGLOTfAIJAN PACT. MR CHAMBERLAIN'S VIEW. MAIN PURPOSE SERVED. (British Official Wireless.) RUGBV, June 7. In a long answer in the House ol Commons to-day regarding the military material left in Spain by the Italians, the Prime Minister (Mr Chamberlain) said that, taking all the circumstances into account, Britain did not propose to make representations to Italy unless the situation should be materially altered by any new developments. He mentioned that during the course of the negotiations preceding the signature of the Anglo-Ilalian Agreement, mention was made of the possibility of material lieing sold or given away after the end of the civil war. It was not against such an eventuality flint Britain especially desired to guard. On the other hand, the information available showed that the main objective of the agreement had been achieved with the withdrawal of the Italian troops a.nd the war material still in Italian hands—that objective was to ensure against the possibility that at the end of fhe war the Spanish Government might ho induced to afford bases where quantities of war ] material might be under Italian military control. HERR HITLER'S MOTIVES. GERMAN TROOPS IN SPAIN. .IXTER VENT lON SILEX CE. (British Official Wireless.) RUGBV. June 7. The Daily Telegraph, commenting on Herr Hitler’s recent address to the German legionaries returned from Spain, asks what was bus motive for his previous silence concerning their participation. “Was it that ho could not feel quite sure of his' country’s approval of the remote and hazardous adventure till lie was able to boast of an accomplished victory P Or was it that silence was a useful diplomatic counter in the argument as to who was doing most of fhe intervention ?” the newspaper asks. “Whatever part the first motive mayor may not have played, the operation of tho second seems beyond doubt. From the start to the finish of the war the controlled Nazi Press was perpetually fulminating against tjie wickedness of other people’s intervention, real or imaginary, while sedulously concealing Ihe German share. “Even Britain, the European great Power which indisputably maintained strict neutrality, was not excluded from these charges. On the contrary, every scrap of information which could plausibly l>o represented as inculpating her* was displayed beneath bold headlines. “The exultant disclosures now made about the real part that Germany played in the Spanish conflict from July. 1936, onward are not likely to improve Herr Hitler’s reputation for candour.”