BRITAIN AND EGYPT.

Manawatu Standard, Volume LVI, Issue 63, 12 February 1936, Page 2

BRITAIN AND EGYPT.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR TREATY. THE MILITARY ASPEQTS. ■ Since it has been decided that the pending Anglo-Egyptian negotiations will first deal with military aspects, the British Cabinet is receiving full advice fioin the services on strategical considerations. It is expected that the Cabinet will have a preliminary discussion on the negotiations this week, and the negotiations will probably open in Cairo oil February 15 (says a London report). The Egyptian general election is fixed for May 2, which leaves three months for tfie military discussions, on which the Government hopes to reach agreement before undertaking the final negotiation ot a formal treaty later. Discussions will probably bo held in London once the basis of negotiations is accepted. For the first time for many years Britain will negotiate with an entirely representative Egyptian delegation, supported by •public opinion, and selected in accordance with the wishes of King Fuad of Egypt. Opinion in London is that not since the late Mr Arthur Henderson and Nahas Pasha nearly reached an agreement six years ago has there been such ground for hope of a settlement of differences. More Egyptians are appreciating the safeguard represented by the British Army in Egypt, and more Britons are realising that the existence of a large, wellarmed Egyptian army, with Egypt as an ally, would remove many anxieties from Britain, connected with the Suez Canal and the route to India; but while the massing of Italian troops in Libya has decreased Egyptian hostility to the presence of British regiments, naval and air activity at Alexandria is not welcomed. NEW BASIS URGED.

The military correspondent of the Daily Telegraph (Major-General Temperley) says that an examination of the earlier draft treaties showed that the British case had been steadily whittled down, and the Egyptians only had to continue their former tactics to reduce it further. The time would come when an entirely fresh start should be made in the light of the new and unforeseen situation. The military clauses of the 1930 draft were conceived for an entirely different set of circumstances, namely, local defence of the Suez Canal; yet it was a fallacy now to suppose that the defence of the canal could be assured by placing a small force on its hanks. The ability to defend depended on communications in the rear. No general could risk troops at the canal with a hostile force or government at Cairo. Therefore, the 1930 draft should never have been agreed to, even provisionally. It was no longer a question of holding the canal, but of defending the country from invasion. Even •'now, there were 70,000 or 80,000 Italians troops in Libya, and Egypt, for many, years, would have a powerful and possibly a hostile, neighbour. Thus, Britain and Egypt should now draft a new treaty in quite a different spirit, with the British forces as forces of a friendly Power stationed in Egypt, determined to cooperate with the Egyptian army for a safeguard of independence. The Daily Telegraph, in an editorial article says: “Even if Egypt’s western frontier is cleared of a potential menace, there could be no idea of reverting to the 1930 proposal of all the British forces concentrated west of the canal in the neighbourhood of Ismailia.”