GALLIPOLI COMMISSION

Marlborough Express, Volume LIII, Issue 273, 20 November 1919, Page 5

GALLIPOLI COMMISSION

THE SECOND REPORT

RISKS OUTWEIGHED CHANCES

OF SUCCESS

[PHESS ASSOCIATION-]

Australian and N.Z. Cable Association

x(Received Nov. 19, midnight). LONDON, Nov. 18. The second report.. of. the Gallipoli Commission declares:

From the outset the risks, of the -expedition's failure outweighed the chances of success. The problem was .never fully investigated by experts. No correct appreciation of the difficulties was arrived at. The naval operations in November, 1914, and February and March, 1915, led to a strengthening of the Turkish positions. There was undue delay in considering the situation after the^aiiure of the attacks following the first landing. The plan of attack at Suyla . was open to criticism. The attack was not pressed as it should have been. General Stopford did not secure sufficient information of the progress of the operations. He and his staff were partly responsible for the failure of the water supply for the troops. The Commission thought that General Stopford's. difficulties were increased by Sir, lan Hamilton's intervention. Sir lan Hamilton's personal gallantry and energy were recognised, but the Commission considered that he should have examined r/'ore critically the situation disclosed by the first landing and should have weighed the possibilities of success or failure more impartially in the light oV the resources at his disposal, and should have submitted a comprehensive statement to the , Secretary vfor War for and against a continuance of the operations. 'Hie report, reviews at length the formulation of the project for the Dardanelles attack, which Lord Kitchener considered would counteract a possible stalemate on the Western front and require 150,000 men. Ihe Dardanelles and Serbia were generally regarded as the likeliest theatres of success. It was expected that at would be possible to unite the Balkan countries against the Central Powers.

The Commission was satisfied that ho general plan of operations on Galm>oli was formulated. Sir lan Hamilton understood that his force was secondary to the Navy, the guns ot wnich, however, were unable to ■ <l llP ose« bf the T"rkish defences. After General Monro's advice to based on his conclusion that excepting the Australian and A eir .Zealand Army Corps, the troops on the Peninsula were unequal to a sustained effort, owing to their inexperienced officers and lack of traming—which was confirmed by .Lord Kitchener, Cabinet should have t;iken prompter action. -The Commission finds that the food •supply on the whole was satisfactory, and the medical supplies were ade^. quate,.except,in the ease of the Australians and New Zealanders, who were short, of ordinary medicine and variety of food for the sick. Sir Thomas Mackenzie's supplementary report states the belief that the Dardanelles" could have been forced if the authorities had approached the problem adequately. They should only liave launched a combined attack-■ar-ter proper preparation. 'bir Thomas Mackenzie believes that the vital period for determining the iwif Wt S l^ Uvesn August 6tlt and 10th, when General Stopford and liis officers threw away a golden oppor%s&<£?* Save the Turks tin!? to