ALDERSHOT V. ACTUALITY.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CVI, Issue 12587, 23 August 1901, Page 6

ALDERSHOT V. ACTUALITY.

THE DRILL TEXT-BOOK CONDEMNED. [From Our Correspondent.] LONDON, July 12. The main feature, of the " United Service Magazine " for July is the number of articles devoted to the futility of our theoretical musketry drill when put into practice on tlhe field of battle, and to the -advocacy of 'some system which will encourage each man's individuality. A Canadian "Bluenose" contributes a delightful letter in which he declares that the present system of drill and discipline knocks all confidence out of a man and gives him the idea that ho must always wait for some command before he can act. "If he sets about taking cover and shooting on his own- hook when he sees, a- chance, like our colonials did, your discipline steps in and says, 'No; wait till I direct you.' Thus while somei officer is thinking out the proper Aider-shot mode of getting, his men a la drill into regulation attitudes, the men are shot, the damage is done. The instincts of the sheep come in, and they run. I saw an instance the other day with some regular soldiers. A class of instruction was going on, and the men were extended in two line's, opposite each; other, imparting the usual detail of 'stand at ease' by numbers, 'or how to plaoe the toe of the right foot on the left heel in turning about. There was a shed about a hundred yards away; a sudden thunder shower came on. The officer in command, in the regulation way, formed them in two ranks —'told them off, formed fours, with two or three 'as you were's,' and finally marched to the shed with ' break into double time,' 'double'.' By this time they were wet. Now the primitive Boer, or colonial, would have been under cover with a dry shirt, but I suppose his .discipline would be ruined. Now 1 call a system which necessitates an officer behaving like this a d——d rotten one. .'....--

' " Tate another instance. Supposing a regiment was marching along a roadi in fours, and they were suddenly fired on from somewhere, what would "the commanding officea- do? According to your system -he would perform certain movements in order to get into whatever position, his Strategical mind decided' on. Tlbe primitive man would give the command 'On the right or left take cover,' and they'd get there. So would_ your men, if they were allowed to practisa it a bit, and there is a darn sight anore discipline in a man flat on his belly behind a hedgei or fence than there is in one being inarched about with bullets hissing about his _ ears. You mdgfat just as well expect some cricketer to defend his wickets under the instruction of an officer's word of command as to hopa that a soldier can defend his life." "Bluenose" rightly says the conundrum that is agitating craonials is "When will some of your generals get down to business and overhaul the tesrrible drill-book, with 'a view to making Tommy Atkins feel that Jib is a human being with brains and not a doughnut?" Precisely the same idea is worked out bv a regimental officer writing from South Africa in reply to " Vinculum'," who advocated mass fire directed- and controlled by individuals. The former draws a striking contrast between ■ the theoretical and thie practical. Here is his .picture of an Aldershot field-day'on the approved War'Office lines:—"A larger open < plain' stretdhing to the horizon is covered with two armies who have met for battle. 'Vinculum' and his company arc extended one pace interval, the two paces between* sections is carefully ■ observed, the captain is on his knee, field-glass in hand, observing the enemy, the subalterns and section-commanders an ttheir proper places, hanging on their captain's words. The range-finders stand up boldly against the.sky. The men are on tlho knee, xilles at the ' rest,' and steadily looking to the front, the flanks can lock after themselves. And now the captain has decided what to shoot at, toe loudly gives the cautionary order, tthe subalterns repeat it, the section-commanders .give the executive commands, the men strain their eyes to see what tihey are to fire at, there is much adjusting of sights and loading of rifles, officers and non-commissioned officers up and dowro'to see all is correct, .and at last, in five minutes, more or less, the rattle of musketry tells us that the company has commenced to shoot. Eagerly we gaze towards the foe, the splendid frrecontrol of the company has done its work and numbers of tho enemy lie dead and dying, while a shattered remainder scatter panic-stricken to - tie irear. How beautiful it all sounds, and how simple to smash an enemy, provided you have fire-control! The enemy of course will always be well in view, and his fire will be harmiless. Your men's nerves must not 'be disturbed by bullets falling among them 1 ; they of course must be close together, or the captain's directions cannot be heard. _ They must also be allowed to sitand up, if (necessary, to see what they are to fire at, and of course all long .grass, rocks and bushes must be removed beforehand, so that there will be nothing to obstruct the view when called on to fire or to impede the beautiful regularity of 'their advance. During the advance, too, the enemy must not be so rude as to fire, as of course it would ba staking an unfair advantage. It is his business to be killed and retire while 'Vinculum's' company, in possession of such splendid fire discipline and control, need only shoot aad advance. And now the actual. The country is broken, traversed by streams with deep banks, rocky hills here and there., fields of corn and meadow land meet the eye, banks and walls surround tmalil woods 'in 'the foreground, and the air is filved with the hum of bullets,. and the roar of bursting shells. A company trained according to the Bow method, scattered here and there wlwever an atom of shelter can be found, extend in an irregular lire over quite 500 yawls of ground, fhough they only muster 'just fifty man. That patch of rocks, .has ■eight mm, the meadow holds about twenty extended about ten to fifteen paces; the quarry-hole has six, and the remainder have got cover behind-the little wallaway on the right. The officer in command is about the centre, flat on his stonM/ch near that tree, telescope glued to his eye, rifle by his side, trying to make out where the enemy is. Are they in the cornfield 300 yards in front? Yet tho hedge 1000 yards to the right front looks likelier ground, but the fire' is sor. deadly 'they must be closer. What about that little stream 800 yards away, the glitter of a rifle-barrel on its banks tells him where at least some of them are, and putting down his telescope, he .opens fire on the spot where the enemy has just shown. At the same time he tells the men on his right and left what ho has seen, and they act accordingly. The men in the. quarry hole he knows cannot see the banks of. the stream', and those in the meadow are firing steadily at something, no doubt, they have found out for themselves. The men behind the wall, have evidently also found an object, as the N.C.0.. down there is firing volleys steadily and well. Not a man is moving about, all. have thrown themselves under cover after ineir last advance, have crept forward on their stomachs when necessary to where they could get some sort of view of the enemy or places likely to hoid him, and now are intelligently and persistently engaged in making the enemy s ground too hot for liirn, buforc they any further move forward. They don t expect an officer or N.C.O. to walk round, telling them what to do; good men are soiree, nnd to get on one's knees would . probaly inswi a bullrt through one m an - ,_ L l . cl anrT-«™ Mll g?*°*™*°™^

instant, they know their officer is about, that he has brought them with little loss to where they are, that he will let them know if he wants anything particular done, they have fair cover, an object to fire at which they have located and ranged for themselves, and they are content to wait where they are till the advance is resumed. And now watch the advance, there is a lull in the enemy's fire, and the officer seeing his chance, makes a bolt for a bib of cover in front. A few men here and there follow his example, and gradually the whole lot singly or by twos and threes, work forward into new ground to their front. There is no shouting of 'Cease fire,' no moving to the front of officers and section-commanders preparatory to an advance a l|v Hythe and Aldershot method, those in year fire over, the heads of those in fronb if able to do so, a thin stream of men keeps working to the front, a glance tells them where their comrades are, and here and there dropping under cover, they carry on the same tactics as before."

But this officer, who thus jeers at Aidershot metkeds is one of the few who have taken to heart the lesson of the war. I have been much in military company of late and I have discovered to my great surprise tliat the majority of officers do not view the happenings of the South African war as a condemnatory criticism of our jregulation fighting methods, and many of them whilst giving every credit to the colonials and volunteers generally for the excellent work they have done in South Africa hold firmly to the belief that in a, war against any European Power these auxiliaries would be found next door to useless! They do not seem to recognise that even if the "conditions under which hostilities were carried on. were vastly different from those existing in South Africa the men who adapted themselves to one style of fighting would with equal readiness adapt themselves to another, nor do they appear to grasp the fact that tactics which proved so eminently successful against our Aldershot method trained battalions would probably prove equally disconcerting if adopted by ourselves to our enemies.