WAR NOTES FROM LONDON.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CVI, Issue 12557, 19 July 1901, Page 2

WAR NOTES FROM LONDON.

‘ [From Ottr ConRKsroMDEXT.]

LONDON, June 8. BOER VERSION OF THE CONFER-

ENCE BETWEEN THE COMMANDERS.

“What! no snap? so- be died and she very -imprudently married the 'barber ; and they roll fell to playing the game -of catch a* catch can, till the 'gunpowder ran out at the heels of their boots.”' This quotation comes involuntarily to the lips on the perusal of the account given at Haarlem of the peace conference between Kitchener and Botha by Dr Bierens de Haan, who had charge ©f the ambulance at Botha’s hr ad quarters. “ The last bit of soap in the camp,” says the doctor, “was used to clean down Botha’s white horse before he set out for Midd'leburg. But in the Boer camp “What! no soap?” could hardly be expected to lead to the tragedy narrated by Foote, although at Middlcbur-g th ( ere was present the great panjandrum himself, ■and after the negotiations had failed they did very truly all full to playing the .gams of catch as catch- can, and it is hoped most of the gunpowder has by this time run out of the’beels of the Boers’ boots. Many of the Boers, Dr de Haan tells us, go-barefoot, and only put on their shoes at the commencement of a. light, and the only clothes they have are uniforms stripped off the English. Nevertheless, they are. determined t-c- fight to the last. The doctor is at pains- to point out that the negotiations came from the British, and that—(l) The meeting took place- at Kitcheners request; (2) no further meetings took place ; (3j an armistice was never concluded ; (4) Botha never thought of surrendering, and told Kitchener this plainly ; (5) the Government of the South African Republic, as well as Stern and De Wet, fully agreed; with Botha’s views, -and the statements mads by him to Kitchener; (6) that the Commandant-General had a meeting, near. Vrede with De Wet, who declared that the conclusion of peace on Lord Kitchener’s conditions was impossible. All commandants, field-cornets and burghers are of the same opinion.

Dr de Haan gives the following version of the interview between the two commanders ;—“At headquarters, Botha was received by a staff officer. Kitchener approached and shook hands, took his ami, and led him into a room. Botha summoned his two- secretaries, but Kitchener was alone. Botha declared that the independence of the Republic must- be placed in •the foreground of the discussion. Kitchener said that the English Government- would never consent to this. Kitchener further declared that Sir Alfred! Milner had been appointed Governor.of both Republics, ;;nd that it would be a good thing if Botha had an interview with Milner. Botha answered that he 'had no desire fod such a meeting. ‘ But he is a pleasant man,’ said Kitchener. Bc-tha answered: ‘ That may be, but I won’t have anything to do- with him. I know the history of South Africa,, and know more than you do about the action of Sir Alfred Milner. _ All Afrikanders have lost confidence in this man, who, more than anybody else, has helped to work our ruin. I can’t understand how the English Government could make such a great political mistake as to send this man, who has always sown hatred and -discord between the two peoples, as its highest representative to Pretoria.’ '“ Botha complained of the bad treatment of the 80-er women, and mentioned names and dates. Kitchener said that he would make an inquiry into these cases. In certain instances he had given no orders. He saw no chance of ending the war without taking away the women- -and children, aa every house was a Boer magazine. The burning of the farms had taken place in many cases without cause. Officers, not .officially responsible, were to blame. . The bad treatment of women and children taken prisoners was also discussed. Kitchener asked why Botha and other Boer Generals were so hard towards the members of the Peace Committee. He had learnt to know and respect one of them. Botha declared that this man had always refused to go on active service during this war, would only take lucrative pasts, and finally laid down his arms. ‘lt is possible that you respect him for this. I cannot-.’ ‘No more do- I any longer,’ Kitchener said- simply. Botha remarked: ‘You cannot expect me to negotiate for peace with a traitor to- the good cause.’ Kitchener said nothing, -but seemed to -agree with Botha on this point. Kitchener is a regular soldier—straightforward —but -no politician. “ Botha further complained about the English • arming Kaffirs. Kitchener answered straight out that tins was by Ids orders. The British troops were not sufficiently acquainted with the country.' Botha said that he thought that the troops had been long enough in the country to know the ground. After the conversation., which ended with Botha’s refusal to consent to Kitchener’s proposals, an excellent lunch was served. It tasted better than mealies, porridge and biltong, Botha said.” LIEUTENANT JOSS’S PETS. In a recent letter from tire front, Mr Burleigh writes;—“The New Zealanders Contingent had a cyclist corps of fifty men, wonderful fellows, under a ma-rvel-io-us lea-dlsr, Lieutenant Winyard Joss, who, when hot cycling over impossible treks and careering for three -score miles in a day, devoted his leisure to trapping insects and reptiles. I do net mean, thesmaller class of insects, they are easily obtained, but gigantic locusts, grasshoppers, with beetles and tarantulas as big as ei’ickc- tiballs. He has made a discovery that-the babodn is’ inordinately fond of the tarantula. The monkeyified) creatures seize them with avidity, tear the spider demon's hairy legs off, and devour the body as a great dainty. I Have- seen Lieutenant Joss with a pet chameleon upon- his wideawake, a tame tortoise upon a string, and a stock of d&ad and live ‘ snakes stowed away upon his person or in his cart. These cyclists of his used to carry despatches daily between Plumer’s camp and the thirty-five miles distant post of Conmrqssie Drift. I can cycle a hit myself, but I would not attempt what they did. The first -bicycle made use of in war was ridden by me in the Ashanti campaign. Never have I -seen such a body of determined trundlers as those who followed Piumer’s column from Pretoria to Pietersburg and back. Sand, rocks, boulders, scrub, veldt, they tried them all, bucking at no obstacles, from kopjes to rivers. In this wild, impossible, trackless country they achieved marvels. About twenty bicycles and their tattered and torn riders Survived the road encounters. Day by day men upon cycles, wilted, succumbed, disappeared from the track, yea, even from the tow-paths behind carts.' And this is a secret: some of them have been known to let their ma- ' chines fall in frfint of ox-wagge-n wheels, and when the poor bicycle has been all crumpled up, with the over it of the Ivea-vy vehicles, been overheard to cry, ‘Thank God! that bike’s done for forever,’ and thereafter cheerfully tailed afoot with the convoy.” * A TRAINING GROUND FOR AN ’ ARMY.

SIR JOHN COLOMB’S SUGGESTION. Consolidate and organise the British fighting power, not of England only, but of the whole Empire that now lies dormant, and while we yet have peace with our Continental neighbours, make our command 1 of the seta so -dominant and Our Imperial Army so mobile and ready that our position will be impregnable. _ So wise counsellors tell us without cessation, but the opportunity that the South African war has given us seems to be gradually slipping away, and, so far as English statesmen are concerned, our preparation for Imperial defence being confined to England, The bogey of invasion seems to be leading our Government to forget that so long as we command the seas an is impossible, and that once our naval supremacy is gone no army concentrated in Great Britain alone could save us. To make tho Empire invulnerable what do we require? First and foremost, the command of the sea. Then a mobile and-well-

equipped army, ready to go( anywhere at a moment's notice, and to strike a rapid blew at the enemy in his own territory, and not to sit down and await- his arrival in cur own. Such an army would be most conveniently located in the centre of the Empire. Thirdly, a-n effective organisation and co-operation of the voluntary forces of th-e daughter nations -and -those of the Mother Country's, with a char -programme as to the number and nature of the troops that- each will supply if the ..Empire be threatened bv a foreign power. VV hen Lie foe is knocking at our gates, it will be too late to extemporise a. scratch army. Mr BrodricVs scheme- proposes to concentrate and train cur Army in the thicky populated United Kingdom, w-nere it, is almost impossible to procute large areas (.1 country for manoeuvres except at-.piohun-bive prices, where there is little variety of topographical features to bo found at our principal camps and where private inteictos and private property hamper Lie ensemeness of the operations- of the troops ay every turn. The big camps grow into military towns, and Tommy Atkins is exposed to an accumulation of temptations, -tiiat even plaster saints could scarcely be expected to resist, with results most prejudicial to the health of the Army. And our mobile- force, the Imperial Yeomanry is not liable to service outside the_ Un.ted ■ Kingdom! The policy of training our Army at Home-, says Sir John Golomb, is frightfully costly, and has failed to prc-auce in the field what we want. t) , Sir John propounds in the “Times a simple course that has already found favour with many thinking men. ' Conso.'-date,_ he says, the- Imperial Army in Boutu Africa. “ With the sea safe, an- army corps in transports- in Simon’s Bay commands the free exercise of application of its power at any point in either hemisphere with certaintv and in space of time counted, by davs.” The advantages of South Africa are its" strategic -position, its climate favourable to the promotion of physical development, the huge areas available as training grounds for the troops and the variety of manoeuvring grounds obtainable at- a low cost, and the ea.;e with which long ranges for rifles and guns alike could be provided. The sous of England and the colonies alike, willing to serve with the Imperial Army, wcu.cl go to this Imperial school by water. They would learn the much-needed lesson that British military effort -depends upon freedom of sea. transit and- also to rsocustom themselves to ships, a fundamental • necessity in a British mobile army, which cannot go anywhere or do anything unless it first crosses the sea The establishment of such a system of training our Army would ■ involve the creation of a squadron of transports- adapted to the conveyance of troops. That in itself would be of advantage to the Empire.” The abolition of the insular theory is, says Sir John, “the first step necessary to banish from the minds of tho colonies that mistrust of . the Mother Country created and nurtured by.our clinging too long to that ■ theoiy. Possibly by coming into frank conference over arrangements for British security in war, the. territories of South Africa, which all British communities have baptized with their blood, may be found to be from every point of view the real and best site on which to create by joint effort the primary school of war training for Imperial military voluntary service.” But when is that frank conference for Imperial defence coming off? COLONIALS AND THEIR HORSES. The veteran campaigner and correspondent, Bennet Burleigh, who has been accompanying Plumer’s column up north, finds a word of fault with- the Queenslanders and New Zealanders in that column. “Horses,” he says, "being cheap and readily procurable in the colonies, they, as a rule, are careless masters. Whilst the troopers have lost, since we. came here, from 15 to 20 per cent of -their horses, the batteries have not lost an animal. Out of 500 mounts, Colonel Jeffreys has less than 550 left, so- that many of his men must march afoot, unless fresh horses are brought into- camp. It is* much the same with Colonel Colvin’s command. The New Zealanders’ horses were but new, unacclimatised arrivals, brought over with- the last contingent. Still I have seen the Aig, tipodeans neglect all that experience- teaches for the care of horses in. this region. They should not be allowed to drink or graze before 9 a.m., when the sun is well up, and never after sunset or when tli-s dew lies upon the grass. Hfc is better also when camping out that their nose bags be left on all night. But though our colonial brothers are a free-and-easy crowd about camp, they are ardent fighters. And they are respectful without being subservient, alert and obedient in the performance of their military duties. If the day ever was when the officer's hob-nobbed and drank with their men, that time has quite gone by, nor left any trace of a practice-, which, to British ideas, is so subversive of ail discipline,” Mr Burleigh’s testimony docs not seem at all in accordance with what wo have hitherto, heard as to the treatment of their horses by colonials. So far all the evidence rather went to show that- while the colonials spared and nursed .their horses in every, way, often getting off and walking to give their beasts a rest, seeing that their saddles fitted and so on, it was the regular cavalryman who was careless of his steed. What Mr Burleigh • -means is .probably that the colonials do not- take the precautions which the peculiarities of the South - African- climate render essential. REGULAR AND IRREGULAR OFFICERS. The irregulars and -their officers in South Africa form the theme of an article indited by the- “Times” special correspondent at Pretoria, while waiting for something in the shape of copy to turn up. He- utters a warning against the national danger of 'our believing that we can. enlist, equip and make trustworthy regiments out of war material in a month. While he comes to the conclusion from his study of the colonial forces in- South Africa that halftrained and raw men of the right class can be rapidly turned into efficient soldiers when .well led, yet he insists that the training of the officers who make and lead these men must be complete, if the nation is to depend upon its Volunteer resources to , defend it against a disciplined enemy. In other words, the irregular force, to be thoroughly efficient, must, he thinks, be led by the despised Imperial officer. “What,” he asks, “has been wrong with the Imperial Yeomanry all through the campaign? What has, prejudiced the success of the colonial corps, and the name of the latter is legion. . . . The officers have not known their work. , . Every man that is a thinking man, especially among the Australians and New Zealanders, though they loathe discipline as it is understood by the King’s regulations, has an admiration for the British professional soldier which he has no wish to- conceal. At the commencement of the campaign the Regular and Irregular officers did not understand each other. The one had to learn . to what degree rigid discipline can be relaxed with independent men, the other that success in war does not lie altogether in the initiative of the individual. They understand each- other now, and the combination is magnificent; in its results. Here is a, hard fact. The colonial corps which have reaped/the largest measure of success, and have suffered the least disaster, are those which, have had the- largest leaven of Imperial officers in their official ranks. The most dismal failures—and they are more numerous than the public believes, especially so at the present stage of tb® operations —are those which have vaunted the tactless creed, “ We will have no Imperial officers 1 There is another hard fact and that is this: The corps that have suffered the greatest disaster and surrendered en masse with, a comparatively light proportion- of casualitdes, were those not only composed entirely of Imperial troops, but commanded entirely by Imperial officers. I mention this hard fact not for the purpose , of decrying, the properly? trained Impoua*

officer, but because I think the “Times correspondent pushes his arguments just a little 100 far. The keen Imper.al officer, who loves his profession and inspires his men with a devotion to him, is unequalled by any officer in the world as a. leader of men. What he has accomplished is recorded for all time in the pages of history. All Australasians, I feel sure, well agree with the statement of the “ Times ” correspondent that the- professional soldier will .beat the amateur nine times out of ten. They admit as much by obtaining whenever they can the professional soldier to train ami lead their uTegular forces, and by sending Home, as several of the colonies do, their artillery officers -to go through the long course of gunnery. But the crusade against the British officer referred to by the correspondent, was a crusade against- the practically untrained British officer, who did not know his work—tho man who looked upon the army as an athletic club and disdained all “shop.” Rome such officers there undoubtedly were in South Africa, and wonder if the colonial irregular officer, who had taken up soldiering with enthusiasm in his spare time, on coming into contact with such men, and finding that, he, the amateur, really knew his work, hotter than such a professional, was grievously disappointed with the Imperial from whom lie expected to- learn. And among the irregular forces there were many good amateur officers who had really Vorkid at their hobby of soldiering, and were -better than . bad professionals, who were, in reality professional sportsmen and amateur soldiers. “We have,” says the “Times” correspondent, “ the material for a very magnificent colonial auxiliary force, but, unless this force is put upon some- sort of permanent footing, which will allow for the training of the officers, the country will be again rocked in a false security.” Precisely. But who proposes that the force should be put on a permanent footing? The colonies themselves. And what has been the fate of Mr Seddon’s proposal for a real Imperial Yeomanry? What inducement is offered to the colonial youth to enter the Imperial army? How many good men all over the Empire are forced to remain volunteer soldiers because.they do- not possess the private income that still remains the main- essential for the professional soldier? So long- as the army is confined to the rich, so long will there be found among our colonial and irregular amateur soldiers. officers equal in all respects, if not superior, to a large proportion of the professional soldiers.