THE PROSPECTS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XII, Issue 704, 6 August 1859, Page 3

THE PROSPECTS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

(From the ' Times,' May 11.) "_ Yesterday the Emperor of the French left his capital to take the command of his army." When these words were read by our fathers some halfcentury ago, everyone knew there was thunder in the air, and that the bolt would soon fall. They know also that the crash of sacked cities and the cries of broken armies would soon be heard. It is not quite with the same certainty of havoo that we follow the flight of the tamer eagle of the Bonaparte family. He has taken all his precautions; he has left the Empress all the functions of Regency, and has weighted them with those proper restrictions which he thinks necessary to prevent the operation of amiable weakness or female irresolution in matters of State. In his absence he has left her " orders and instructions" to guide her, and his photograph, newly taken, to console her. If we look back for a precedent for an event of this courtly importance, we must rest upon the magnificent ceremonial which accompanied the departure of the uncle of the present Emperor in the . month of May, in the famous year 1812. Then, also, an Emperor of France recommended to the protection of his people his wife and his one child, and went forward in a plenitude of magnificence which even Napoleon 111. cannot yet emulate, to take,the command of half-a-million of men in arms, and to direct the thunders of 1,300 guns. Even the huge armies now on foot are not to be compared to such tremendous armaments, nor will there interpose between Paris and the seat of war any so magnificent a delay as that which drew together half the Sovereigns of Europe to do homage to the great Napoleon at Dresden, and showed the world four kings and a crowd of princes waiting in the Imperial ante-chamber, and an Empress of 'France treating with somewhat contemptuous condescension the Imperial Archduchesses, her German relatives.

If we thus recur to history, it is that the events of the last few years seem to ha^e brought the great wars of the First Napoleon nearer to our own time. In the forgotten days of peace, some seven or eight years ago, the present generation felt itself divided as by a gulf from the tremendous conflicts of the Eepublic and of the Empire. We could scarcely imagine that in the streets of Paris we walked about surrounded by the children of those who had seen tumbrils full of unfortunates go to the guillotine, and had formed part of armies of a quarter of a million, operating along a line of two or three hundred miles. But these mighty events now seem less strange and less foreign to our own experience. We have become accustomed to the rumours of wars and alliances, the despatch of regiments and ships, the news of successful sieges and hardly-won fights. We turn to our histories to find that the armies marshalled under the banners of rival states are now vastly more numerous, expensive, and well equipped than those which fought at the outset of the great war. The vessels which contended at the" Nile and Trafalgar were mere nut-shells in comparison with the stupendous bulks which will be brought into action, should the only two "great naval powers which remain in Europe oppose each other in war. These facts may seen common-place, but still it is of the utmost importance to recollect that the struggle into which the European nations may now be drifting is on quite as large a scale as that which i exhausted their energies at the beginning of this [century. True, as a recent speaker observed, a ■great French revolution does not happen every fifty years, and any war of the present day may want the fierceness and enthusiasm which pro- • longed a former one for twenty-two years. But ruin may come just as well from a war unwillingly commenced and languidly prosecuted as from one which engages the passions" of every peasant. The burdens of war, the horrors of war, may be as terrible when both sides are wishing for peace and asking the reason of the fight, as when a revolution is battling with kings, or a crowned soldier placing his relatives and his comrades on the thrones of Europe. Let us, then, consider by the light of history the preparations which are now being made by France and Austria for the conduct of the present-war. iThe campaign which began by the entry of French troops into Piedmont, and by the passage of the Ticino by the Austrians, is on a scale which very far exceeds any former struggle in those countries. In the long wars of the first Napoleon it may. be observed that the armies continually increased in number, while, it is said, the genius of the commander and the prowess of the individual soldier diminished. The brilliant campaigns of Napoleon's youth were made at the head of a few thousand men. Marengo itself was gained by 28,000, but the war of 1805 actively employed about 150,000 French, while in the campaigns of Wagram, Moscow, and Leipsic. we have incomparably larger armies brought into the field on both sides. Now, the war of 1859. begins on the colossal scale of the later empire, and the armies employed may attain dimensions such as no single state has hitherto been capable of producing. Presuming the struggle to be confined to France and Austria, and.to the field of Northern Italy, we shall have the spectacle of a combat in closed lists such as the world has never before vwitnessed. If both the antagonists fight well and stubbornly, the conflict will be as interesting to the military critic as grievous to the philanthropist. Both France and Austria will be able to march almost all their enormous forces to the seat of war. Germany will, while the war is confined, to Italy, be sufficiently the Ally of Austria to guarantee her from any attack in the rear from Russia, but not sufficiently to disturb France by any demonstration on the Rhine. It may be said that, for some time to come at least, the influence of Germany will have the effect of leaving both sides free to use all their strength against each other. That they will use it there ia no doubt. The seat of war adjoins the territory of each, railways and steamers transport their troops easily, and most of the long marches/which enfeebled and. diminished armies in the days of Napoleon will be avoided. Enormous masses of armed men can be taken to the country ■they are to fight in, as comfortably as if they were merely niaking a change of quarters. With this facility of transport; and this power of using the whole of their great standing armies, we must expect to. see two hosts gathered together on the plains of Italy such as no two single stntes ever yet opposed to each other. The numbers we do not pretend even to guess at. The French are pushing troops over the Alps, and loading their ships of war with soldiers for Genoa. The supply of food will be the only limit to the number which can thus be brought into the field. The French probably have their information aboub the Austrian army, as the Court of Vienna has its own about French proceedings. But Englishmen are allowed to know little about the matter. There is, however, no doubt

that the power wliicb/ sent.'a -quarter of a million of men to Sebastopol within eighteen months will be cable to send that .number into Northern Italy. Considering that the whole of Italy, with 27,000,000 .people, may shortly be in insurrection, and that Sardinia has' some 80,000 troops oJF^lier own already, it may be reckoned without exaggeration that more than 300,000 men may in the next two months be put in line to drive the Austrians from their carefully chosen and now famous positions in Lombanly. On the other, hand, Austria can, and will, no doubt, bring an equal force into the field. She does not want men, for the empire contains 33,000,000 souls, without counting the Italian Provinces. If the o^!f Mmister can find the money to keep 300000 men on foot in Italy, General Gyulai will find work for them all. They will not be men to fight Ayith the spirit and dash of Frenchmen, but they will be fine steady troops, superior in phisique to their enemies; they will have all that science has achieved in the way of perfect weapons of destruction, and they will be commanded by officers who know that they must fight now for the very existence of their Empire. These are the prospects of the campaign, and certaintly, as far as man can divine, they promise a most obstinate contest. : The combatants are fairly matched. France, with Italy at her back and. a less impoverishedexciiequer, may be expected to have the superiority of numbers. But the Austrians, on the other hand, will probably, after their raid into Piedmont, fight a defensive battle, and then they will beon ground of which" they know every inch; they will be holding their own military works, at which they have laboured for forty years, and which they have declared to be masterpieces of -science. _ If on such conditions they are not able to hold their ground, Europe will come to the conclusion that it is of very little use to help them. With, every inducement to a desperate struggle, they ( must be changed from Avhat they were in the old times if France is easily victorious or Lombardy free at'once. Such considerations as these make us look with apprehension for the future of Europe, especially in financial matters. We read that the French loan of £20,000,000 is being easily raised, and this is not a matter for surprise, as the lender will get 5 per cent, for his money, and the payment* of instalments is to extend over no less than IS months. But these £20,000,000, which are to come m at the slow rate of a million a month, will be soon spent, probably before the sixth monthly, instalment is forthcoming. And then what is to be done? Is there to be another loan, extending over a further term of 18 months, or an income-tax, or additional customs duties ? If one'or two brilliant victories dispose of the Austrians all may be well, and the £12,000,0Q0 (Pj" sterling'which the Minister of Finance says he has in hand, added to ■ the produce of the loan, may give Napoleon 111. the glory he covets at a comparatively cheap cost. But suppose the troops of Francis Joseph to be tougher enemies than is counted upon, how longwill the cost of aggressive war be borne cheerfully even by the French people? As the duty of Englishmen is to fight for -neither party, so common prudence commands them to'hold, their pursestrings when despots ask funds for such an enterprise as this Italian War.