THE THREE BANKRUPT POWERS.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XII, Issue 704, 6 August 1859, Page 3

THE THREE BANKRUPT POWERS.

(' Times,' April 29.) - ' Jjet our readers note as a fact which it may be interesting to remember, and almost incredible to tell 'twenty years hence, that this great European War- is commenced by three destitute, necessitous, and almost bankrupt Powers. The last \vord is scarcely tpo harsh to apply to Governments who are asking for the loan of immense sums, liappily in vain. Russia, wlrose Four-and-a-Half per Cent. Stock stands at 87, has lately been inviting the British capitalist to lend her twelve millions; France, whose Three per Cent. Rentes have fallen to-day to 62f. 65c, announces a loan of twenty millions, when .a loan of much less amount had been raised with difficulty; and Austria's Five per Cents, stand at 49. These figures represent the financial condition to which England might be reduced after carrying on with increasing energy a war in the Crimea and another in India for ten years, without stinting herself of any other luxury. As these three Powers cannot keep the wolf out without continual begging and borrowing, and can only discharge their old obligations by contracting fresh ones, their bankruptcy is a question/of time. But, with a perfectly "empty Exchequer and a blasted credit, they set about the costliest of all human operations; for, happily, nothing costs so much as killing one's fellow-creatures. That this should be done once would be a marvel, had not the marvel been so often repeated as to be a marvel no more. v As most great battles have been fought by armies in a state of physical exhaustion, so most great wars have been commenced with empty treasuries. It is a truth with which statesmen are only too familiar. When Prince Felix Schwartzenberg was appealed to by a deputation of merchants to consider the hopeless state of Austrian ■ credit, he observed that till a country was bankrupt it never knew the extent of its resources. Money, he was aware, was a good thing, but it was sometimes quite as well to have no money at all, though it was not to be denied that the measures necessary under those circumstances might be burdensome to the people. It may, then) be rash to assume that these three Powers now rushing into the fray will find any insurmountable difficulty' in carrying on the war. Austria may as well feed her army upon as upon Lombardy, and France has always found it convenient to quarter her soldiers on her' neighbours. Then; even our own commercial experience may have taught us, that insolvency often takes refuge in extended operations. It is natural to escape lesser liabilities by undertaking greater; and the sequel seems to justify the wisdom of the process, for a discerning public evidently thinks a great bankruptcy less discreditable than a small one. To fail for a thousand pounds is ridiculous; for fifty thousand tragic and magnificent. We do not venture to prophecy the value of French, Russian, or Austrian stock after a seven years war; but war will always be possible so long as the majority of mankind look to the interest rather than the security of a loan, and are always able to flatter themselves that the worst is over, and that this is positively the very last addition to the debt.

! /Yet, let it be understood what sort of a financial stage we are entering upon. If the war does go :onj then we venture to predict that British capitalists will be able to purchase French, Russian. and Austrian stock much cheaper five. years hence! They had better, therefore, use their money for domestic purposes at present, and invest in the funds,.if they are so minded, at the end of those five years. Almost any investment is better than, lending.to a State which is plunging into an endless war. It wants everything. It wants men; it wants all the material of war; it wants credit for daily transaction; and for all .these purposes it must borrow more and more still. Already all kinds of corn are rising rapidly; coal of every sort is caught up for conveyance to this or that place; and freight is again in request. So, here we have that golden age of high prices which 'the agriculturists and some merchants remember with delight, but which a statesman cannot contemplate without the utmost concern. War is a disease which turns into one huge sore all the alijments which should supply strength to the body, and which is more exigent, of supplies than tlie most robust and industrious state of health. The belligerents will want everything, and they will be ■delighted to obtain from us the means of our own destruction or humiliation. Perhaps we cannot refuse them materials. It will rest with individuals to lend their money as they please; but nobody will pity those who are ruined by too eagerly grasping this opportunity of a private gain at the cost of their country. To those who wish to think a little before they'lend foreigners the means of indefinite mischief, it may be as well to suggest that war is daily becoming a question of money. It will be fought as much in the dockyard and the laboratory as on the sea or land. .

Oar City Intelligence supplies some curious hints as to the way in which a confiding country may be made to fabricate instruments against itself. There are now building in the Thames 27 gunboats of very light "draught, besides vessels of larger size, .for the Spanish Government. What can that Government want with, the apparatus for landing armaments and pushing up creeks and harbours r What is the proposed scene for these interesting operations ? By a singular coincidence Spain also wants a complete set of our Admiralty charts. She is not usually adventurous. She has not much to gain in our waters, or in any waters frequented by our shipping. But there still survives a tradition that Spain can throw herself into the service of France, and has not always been able to resist the attractions of that service. Indeed, she is hardly a free agerit'in the matter. France holds aa a sort of State secret, that Spain must always be either her property or her accomplice, and that whatever belongs to' Spain is at the command of France. Thus, we see all around the mysterious evidences of a grand preparation, for what we know not. For objects so great as those she may have, in view, France can afford to wait, to hesitate, and even to withdraw. That, we are told, is the purport of the last intelligence from Paris. Bat is not delay itself worth something to France at'this moment, when Austria is two or three days ahead of her, and when the season is full early for the Alpine passes p Austria had made an effort, not to say a

sacrifice of appearances to strike the first blow. If France now at last listens to reason, jind pretends to negotiate, how shall we know that it is not to put herself on a strategical equality with Austria? All must be distrust where there has been so much hypocrisy; and we feel that what we have to look to is the actual movements of the French armies, not the professions of the French Government. So long as half-a-dozen corps d'armde .are converging upon Piedmont it matters little what is, said at Paris; for Napoleon 111, himself could hardly prevent a collision between a French and Austrian army if they found themselves face to face.