THE BALTIC STATES

King Country Chronicle, Volume XXXIII, Issue 4813, 21 July 1939, Page 3

THE BALTIC STATES

A POLICY OF CAUTION. BETWEEN RUSSIA AND REICH. UNEASY NEUTRALITY. All serious obstacles, it seems, in the way of an Anglo-French-Soviet pact have now been removed, with one exception—the Soviet demand for a guarantee of the Baltic States; and for the first time the dilemma which has been confronting these small Succession States for twenty years has become a matter of general interest to the British public, wrote Elisabeth Pares in the Manchester Guardian on June 9. For Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (only to a lesser degree Finland) have always been faced with the problem of how to avoid becoming either the battleground between two hostile Great Powers or the victims of a partition between two friendly ones.

Up to a year ago they still clung to the policy of collective security (unlike the Scandinavian States, which had virtually jettisoned sanctions as early as 1936). In the early post-war years, too, various schemes for its reinforcement by a defensive block of the smaller Powers from the Baltic to the Black Sea were discussed. But too many conflicting interests, and, above all, the Lithuanian-Polish quarrel over Vilna, stood in the way of their realisation, and the EstonianLatvian defensive alliance was the only solid achievement in this direction.

Between a guarantee from both Germany and Russia was out of the question the Baltic States might have chosen to accept at least what could be got in the way of protection from one of them. But that is the one policy which they have steadfastly refused to adopt. And this for two quite understandable reasons. To begin with, they are afraid that acceptance of promises of assistance from either Power would bring down on them the wrath of the other. (And here we must remind ourselves that while Great Britain is still the best customer of all three Baltic States Germany is now running a close second, while her share of the Estonian and Latvian markets is actually greater than that of Great Britain). In the second place, they are perhaps even more afraid that Soviet troops, let us say, once allowed to war would break out. Again, in such enter their territory to render assistance against Germany might be re-

luctant to withdraw and difficult to eject. It is worth while, in view of those genuine and deep-rooted fears, to glance at the past records of the U.S.S.R. and Germany in their dealing with these little States.

To take Russia first, it is important to remember that Finland and the three Baltic States proper (except for the Memel territory, which was German) were actually Russian provinces until the war, and had to fight to expel the Bolshevik troops..

Academic Argument.

It is arguable that the whole problem is somewhat academic. After all, if Germany did attack Lithuania or one of the three States contiguous to Russia, Poland would almost certainly consider her vital interests threatened, in which case the guarantee of the Western Powers would have to be implemented and a general an event Russia's own interests —her communications and trade with the West, the potential threat to her fleet in the Gulf of Finland, and the vulnerability of Leningad and Moscow to a landward approach from Estoniamight well tempt her to take action, guarantee or no guarantee.

Academic or not, however, there remains the immediate and urgent need to find a formula which will satisfy all parties. Franco-British assurances that no troops rendering assistance should remain in Baltic territory longer than was absolutely necessary might have fruitful results, while it is tempting to believe that Poland, who is less enthusiastic about "absolute neutrality" than she was in 1938 and apparently has now reconciled herself to the prospect of limited Soviet assistance, might use her influence to remove some of the misgivings of the Baltic Governments.