WINNING THE WAR.

Hokitika Guardian, 14 April 1923, Page 3

WINNING THE WAR.

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG’S ( OMAIAXD. There are three outstanding controversies among the many wl.i'-h the war produed in Britain, and the echoes of which still reverberate. There is the Kitchcncr-Freneh controversy, in which the question is incidentally in iced whether Kitchener was really ugreat as he loomed in popular imagination. There is the Jutland controversy. Was Lord .foll i< < ■ right in breaking off the action when darkness began to fall cm that fateful summer night!' or should lie have disregarded the risk of submai inos and gone adheaci to administer a coup de give" to the German fls'-f ? And there i> the eouiroversy with regard to the events which led in 101 A to the establishment of a united command. anil to the degree of "i id erferem e" to which lie politicians subjected tin* soldiers. 3he latest contribution r.i the last mentioned debate is “sir Douglas Haig's Command ' bv .Mr George . Dewar, a-. Eteri by Lieut. Col. .!. 11. Rorastou. When tin's nook made it- appearance in Flighted a few weeks ago the cablegrams reported tnat it caused a profound .-ens.ation. It was strongly condemned in certain quarters, not because it attacked Air Lloyd (George, fbe was fair game), hut because it belittled the efforts of the French. D has recently reached Australia, am! most readers will probably led that 1 1 1 - eriteism w?, scarcely iusi. Ihe intention of the hook is not to disoarag" the French, hill to vindicate the- part .played by the British in genrial. and Sir Don das HaigTn parii(•uldr. The authors are com iuced that llie British eomniaiel has received less ;ha n it . da u To . I oldish the ir case they lave found it n '• -.iry m 'bov. that French strategy and Frci.ah !• a lei's were* not always inlel'ihle. But lliev yield to none in their admit al ion of the splendid services of mir ally. (Hum in the past liriti'h enmmaudors have suffered at the hands el •‘meddlesome” politicians with amateurish notions ol strategy, as .Marlborough knew and Wellington knew to their cost. And in a democracy a certain amount ot interlorei.i e is ir.ai it,ll.i .. Pott in the second ball of tic* (Heat AYar il na.s-ed all reasona!;! e bounds. Lord FYem-h ami Sir DnuglaHaig bad nothing to ’complain about in their treatiueui. by Mr Asquith. but when Air Lloyd George became Brime Minister, a very dill'ereut tegiim; prevailed. The fil'd intimalion ol tJt new order of things was given ill coni i ion with NB- lie’s cdl’ensiv • early in Pair. Most British ami many Frame!, soldiers (including Beam) thornitgfilv disaji* roved of Nivelle’s plan. Bul All r.lovd George was “livpiunised" by Ni Voile’s glowing piomises. and as a ra.,i!i t!i<* British Gommandar in-t hint

was subordinal ad to the F'reiieh general. Xe, objection can b" latum to the arrangement it- •-■If — :i similar :ne wot. welcomed in 1018. But 11 1 • meilmd was grossly object io'iaUe. Ihe arraugeiiK’iit was made hel e l Hm t*a ■!■- of llaig and polm-lsma ; whom _il iame a- a e'ne.plete surpre . At Hi last minute they were c m il* inform' d o’ the War ( abini't' - di : Kem. wld.-b mii'i have ion\eyed to the Flintli GovernaH'mt and higli eommaiid the snggestiim that ill" British (.me ruanml had m, emilidemc in the Brite-h (Vmmaud •r-in-Chief. As evoiym •• knows. .Nivelle’s plan proved a gha-tlv failure. F'ltmch moral was impaired that jin tin* ,-est of the year the 'French would hard I v go out ot their tr. aches. Ihe one i, right soot in the offensive _was tin* capture by the Canadians ol \ ima Ridge, which was an extremely important gain. Yet this operation wall;, jo’s Idea. Xivelle was utterly opposed to it. and only gave way leciiuse Haig literally insisted on it. And vet siibsaqu n: !* in ihe House of (.ominous. Ali l.loytj George had the nitd.tcjlv to cite thi-' oiieraiion a-' an example of the magnificent results to be obtained i rout unity of command. p.ut if the politicians meddled with tie* soldier's with unfortunate cotisoqu: lie" - in lill 7. what shall lie said of tlieir int'erforem e in PMS) I he iiiiteor.s make a mimhar of categorical marges aga ilist Mr l.loyd George and hi- die vanillienl. some of v.'iiiah we quoteWhv was the War Cabinet deal to llni-i's urgent requests lor more in ops amfwliv were his referemss to Hie shortage ol men excised from bis despatches. veu when the war was over; simply u> shield the v ahiiiet from criticism a Why curly in L , 'B did Mr I,l***.il Georgia dm hir** (>" 1 '1 1 ■'I - 1 1,;,; ue had ah', ay been P"' >'l ~,|" mi llie We-Lern Ironi. win nin lack of drafts llaig was actually compelled to reduce Hie battalion.' by HI to bring tlu* re't up to strength: British (t.ll.tr. in Frame predicted with absolute accuracy where and v. hcnjhr G o' man ofi’eti.sive ol March would jail. Win was iu warning ignored f Is it not a fact that alter the defeat at ( lumiin des Dane s in .May. the ”ar Cabinet lost faith in F'oeh. and that just before bis i oirnier-attaek in July it sent General Smuts to exhort llaig In refuse F’oi li's J-,HI:: I for eight Br itish divisions i V. lutl posse-seil UnWar C'ahimt on the eve o! r.aig;s Lr iiiin i>l lit ii t a-'-ault on llie 1 1 iudonbiirg line to trau-mil to him “a warning and discouraging telegram in eil'le r.' It will he interesting to see wliat answer. if any. i< supplied to these questions.

At one time the impression that the unilu iition of commund under F'oeh iu 1918 was unpalatable to Haig bail some currency. Since tin u ii has been established beyond all «i 1 -•)*nt-* Unit Haig welcomed it. This book goes even further. and shows Hint it was llaig who made the first overtures and took the first practical steps towards its eunsiiniiiialitvu. Late in Alan h, when tin* Hit ■•-

man thrust towards Amiens mus I.*eoming menacing, f’etain informed Haig tliat it the enemy continued to advance in tliat direction (as litev were almost certain to do) I- would have lo withdraw tlu* French troops which wore to support the British right, and move them son ill-west to cover Baris. Haig was cunvimtd that the separation ol Hie F’reneh and British would lie iatal to the -Allies. Potain's intention "involved the decision net of one ha tip only, but of tlie war." He straightaway recommended that F'oeh should he appointed generalissimo. Being sure that F'oeh Mould arrive at a letter appreciation of the needs of the situation —as F'oeh promptly- did.

Iu fact. Haig and the British command "merge Iron) this survey with infinite credit. Tlieir loyalty to Mien F Vouch colleagues was unwavering. They did not blow their own trumpet. They had to shoulder the respoi-.-i----bility of the mistakes of the politicians. and were prevented by the traditions of the service from justifying themselves. As a result, the worth of their work, in tlie popular appraisement. may have been insufficiently t - cognised. As Air Dewar sa.vs: —“The (utiipaigu in tlie mam -eat of Mar. the skill and sound slrategv of its dirtctinn there bv llaig and his coil agues at G.FI.G. and his army i ommanders. have not been understood as they should Ik* by a great many peoplt: otherwise, dwelling far more on ilicir grand work and the wonderful triumph and blessing 01 British arms, we should largely have escaped the blighting pessimism and other ills which soon followed victory." Again, in reference ta the famous haiHe ol Amiens on August Bth—Germany’s “Black Day”—he says —“This is tiie first of the great and deei'ive series of British operations, all of which Mere luneeivrd and worked ( ill by British leader-hip. i iiis truth Las ! cen slurred over or suppressed by those m!io. combining folly and falsehu id cho'e to represent that until the Rrilsih ( ommauder-in-Chief and his colleague' were taken over and inspired hv French genius they were strategically impt.” In fine, the aim of the j-.ook has I cen. without in any May detracting from the laurels of the French to explode the myth that "thanks to unity of command. French g.iuus. living tit length given it- chante. waved its wand and forthwith made up for years of indilleieiit British generalship, and a. s.-n-ele-s policy of attrition. "