THE FORTS OF LIEGE.

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume IV, Issue 204, 13 August 1914, Page 3

THE FORTS OF LIEGE.

PIVOT OF FRANCO-GERMAN SIRUGGIE PROPHETIC ARTICLE BY HILAIRE BELLOC. A TVZD YEAR OLD FORECAST OF THE WAR TRAGtDY.

r HILAIRE BELLOC.)

(By

[lt is over two years ago— 27 months ago to be exact —that a. remarkable sind truly prophetic article by Mr. Hilaire Belloc was published in the ‘‘London Magazine.” It was inspired |»y the Agadir incident, and we now Know that it was not on account of the German preparations not being sufficiently advanced that the great war which is at present proceeding was not enacted at that time. Possibly it would have been to the advantage of Germany had she then assailed France for she would probably have not had Russia to contend with in the north. But what we wish to emphasise in this introductory note is the great knowledge, of what Germany’s line of action would be when attacking France, displayed by Mr. Belloc- as disclosed by the war news recorded in these columns during the last few days. It is right and proper that every one should be afforded an opportunity of taking an intelligent interest in the stirring tragedy now being staged on Belgium soil* and within a few miles of the heart of the British Empire, and Mr. Helaire Belloc 1 , in writing the following clever and interesting forecast has macle it possible for all his readers to do this.—Ed.]

In the course of last summer, and particularly in the first days of September, there was grave danger of war between France and Germany. Had war broken out, Great Britain would have dispatched an army amounting, it is believed, to 150,000 men, and in any case well over 100,000, to act in alliance with France and operate against?- the German forces. All was ready for conveying this great force across the Channel. 'Well, where would this army have been engaged? And what are the conditions necessarv to its being used at all?

It is to try and answer these questions that I am writing these lines, and I propose to show that that army would have come into action in the neighbourhood of the town of Liege, in Belgium. Why do I say that the shock between a British Army, acting in alliance with the French, and a German Army opposing that alliance, would have taken place in the neighbourhood of Liege? In order to understand that one must briefly recapitulate the main elements of the Franco-German Frontier and show the nature of the line which the German Army would have to negotiate if it .hoped for success. There is no necessity for studying the other side of the problem, or for describing the line

■which the French would have to force before they could hope for success; and the reason why there is no such necessity is very simple. The line does not exist. The Germans have deliberately staked their policy upon the chance or expectation of very early and immediate success after the outbreak of war. _lf they fail in that they have no defensive line upon which to fall back, and the failure to achieve immediate success under such a policy is equivalent to defeat. What, then, is the nature of that defensive line which lies between the German Army and a successful campaign against the French? After the great German victories in the war of 1870-71 a peace was imposed upon the French called “The Treaty of Frankfort,” and this Treaty (among other provisions) defined a new Frontier between France and Germany. The old Frontier had run from the Swiss mountains along the Rhine, for about 120 miles (as the crow flies), and then turned a sharp corner westward away from the Rhine to the Frontier of the little independent country called the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. The Frontier between this little independent country and France continued the line to the neighbourhood of a town called Longwy, where the Franco-Belgian Frontier began. The new Frontier imposed upon the French by the Treaty of Frankfort ran from this town of Longwy to the foothills of the Vosges Mountains, and then ran down the crest of the Vosges Mountains to the great French town and fortress of Belfort, which was not annexed by the Treaty, but left in French possession. Just beyond Belfort the new Frontier struck the Swiss Mountains, but at some distance from the Rhine. All the world knows that the territory thus annexed by the new German Umpire is generally called Alsace-Lor-raine.

The only consequence of that annexation which concerns us here is the military nature of the new Frontier. All nations with a sound military tradition fortify. Not to fortify, not to expect or provide for acting on the defensive, to take victory for granted and to consider the offensive only, is the full mark of an unmilitary spirit. The French, who have always believed wi fortification, set out after their great defeat to fortify in the amplest manner the new Frontier which had been imposed upon them. The reader must- plearly understand what fortification is, and why it is undertaken. You do not fortify a frontier as a man builds a fence —in order to keep people out. You fortify with the object of checking the enemy’s offensive and making time fighting upon your side. No fortification was ever made with the object of keeping a weaker party permanently safe from the attack of a stronger party. No fortification is intended to prevent permanently the advance of an assailant. What fortification does is to hold that assailant while you, in turn, attack him ; to cheek him while you bring tip further resources against him ; to employ three of his men as a sacrifice of but one of your own. When, therefore, people say that the French proceeded to make their new Frontier “impregnable,” we must not take that word literally. What it means is that the French proceeded to place obstacles upon that Frontier such than no army could pass without prolonged fighting ,heavy losses, and possible defeat, and that with a comparatively small expense of numbers on the French side, leaving the mass of the French forces free to take the counteroffensive. . The obstacles thus designed by the French consisted in the great ringfortress of Belfort at the southern end ; then, next in order, tne A osges Mountains (which are such difficult country that they need little artificial strengthening), then the great ring-fortress of Epinal: next the great ring-fortress of Toul r and, finally, at the northern end of system, tho great ring-foi tress of . , Ndw, this series of obstacles makes it absolutely certain that the Germans, instead of trying to get through the line of them, would try to get round that line. “Absolutely certain” is a strong phase, and 1 do not mean that O C’ , .’ ,O V is unanimous upon tho matter, nhat I mean is that co far as the lessons ol the war. in Manchuria and the siege of Port Arthur, a knowledge of what a modern great ring-fortress is, and a p moral acquaintance with the history of war can bring one to a conclusion on this matter, that conclusion is as clear as can be that f he most elementary principles of warfare would incline the German staff to attempt to get round the hue instead through it..

; . The next thing to appreciate is that I if you get round a line of any kind in j warfare, whether it is a strategic line of | fortification or a line of men in battle, i you have won just as surely as though i you had broken that line. Only, of • course, you must get round quickly so as ; to be able to take it in reverse, or roll j it up from the encl before the men who constitute it (in the case of a lino of I battle) or who are behind the fortifieaI tions (in the ease of a line of these) can I face about in your direction.

1 Lot us take it for granted, then, that in case of war the Germans, while atI tempting to “hold” the French on this 'great fortified' line of theirs (which, j from the; Swiss Mountains to Verdun, measures 150 miles), would direct their I principal effort to trying to “turn” it to the north or to the south. To “hold” in this sense means to occupy the attention, of the defenders, and to prevent their being employed elsewhere ■ to pin them clown to the works they garrisoij. They could not hope to turn thb • French line on the south, so the Germans must necessarily try to turn it on the north.

Now, when you turn to the problem of turning the French fortresses by the north a very curious position is apparent. It is thus: The natural defensive line which continues the French line of Frontier Fortresses is the Meuse River, whose crossings must he and, as we shall sec, are fortified against aggression where they are not protected automatically by “difficult country.” But the Meuse River is no longer under French control in this northern section. It is under Belgian control. In other Words, the French strategic Frontier does not correspond to their political Frontier on tile north. This would not matter if treaties were hold sacred by the Government of Berlin. In that case l the line would end at Verdun ; and if Verdun was too strong, so much the worse for Prussia. She would suffer defeat as the price of neglecting to fortify and to prepare for all eventualities. The French Frontier to the north of Verdun and its forts does not run between France and Germany at all. It runs between France and Belgium. Once you are north of Verdun and past the end of the line of obstacles which the French'have constructed, the little independent country of Luxembourg and the larger independent country- of Belgium lie between the French and the Germans. That it would be an abominably wrong and treasonable act to attack the Belgians, with whom they had no quarrel, and to violate their neutrality, need not concern us here, where we are only concerned with the military side of the problem, though it is worth reminding those people who were so shocked at the idea of fighting at all last year that Great Britain is solemnly pledged to defend Belgium from treacherv of this kind.

Anyway, it is rightly taken for granted that in case of war Germany would disregard her Treaties and her pledged word, and invade Belgium in order to get round the French line, of obstacles. I have already, said that an immediate success at the outset of the war is necessary to her whole political plan, and that a check at the outset would be fatal.

Now, so thoroughly has European opinion taken for granted the certainty' that Germany would invade Belgium in ease of war that the part of Belgium through which German armies would have to come has for many years been fortified in nrecisely the same way as the French Frontier has been. And it is just here that the tole of Liege conies in, and that we can see how a British contingent landed to help the French would be bound to act in the neighbourhood of that town.

The German attack would have to be made along the line of the Lower Meuse River . You cannot get into Belgium without crossing that river. Now. on the Lower Meuse River there stand two first-class fortresses, which, so far as guns and works go, are as strong as anything in Eurone. These two fortresses are Namur and Liege. ’I lie Germans cannot cross the Meuse lower down than Lieg' l and march through Belgium, neglecting that fortress, because if they did so their line of communications —that is, the food of the armv and its ammunition. and evervthing by which it exists as a fighting force, ami an interruption in the supnlv of which would mean defeat—would then run between two great fortified garrisons. Liege and Antwerp, with a third a little further on that line of advance, at Namur. It is tru<« that Antwerp and Liege lie far anart, but the former is indefinitely suppliable by sea, and, so long as Germany does not control the sea .can be made the secure base of an ever-increas-ing force to act against the German communications. They cannot cross the Meuse between Namur and Liege, as for instance at b'iiy. because the gap is too short for safetv, since their line of communications would lie between two unconquered garrisons which would put the very life of the army into constant peril. They cannot attack Namur before Liege,' or Namur instead of Liege, because the French would he in Namur before them. It is Liege that stands near the German frontier, and Liege that blocks the way.

It is certain that ujaon that line, and the German success' or failure there, Germany’s success or failure in turning the French frontier by Belgium and the north would depend. Let us take it as our starting point, then, that the Germans would and must try and get across the Meuse at Liege, and therefore must take that town in some way, by occupation or by force, so as to render its fortification inoffensive to themselves. How do we know that a British contingent would operate in that field ? We know it because it would be impossible to keep the British line of communication separate and intact, and impossible for a British force to act in conjunction with the French, save by its presence upon the extreme north of the French line.

The real strategical Frontier of France is, as I have said, the Meuse River. 'J he forts of Namur and Liege are as much part of the French scheme of fortification as those of Epinal, Toul or Verdun. Yet, though Germany makes no concealment of her intention to attack a neutral country, and to attempt to cross the Mensa where it runs through Belgium, France cannot in time of peace defend that river! Well, then, Liege and Namur would bo garrisoned by Belgian troops, at any rate at the beginning of the struggle. Now, it would bo the function of any forces coming into Belgoum from the west, whether those forces were English or French, to march up in aid of the Belgian garrison of Liege, which, immediately after the outbreak of war, would certainly be “contained." Jt cannot be doubted that within the first few hour' after hostilities had begun the German troops crossing the Frontier m the neighbourhood of Aix-la-Chapelle would have come under fire of the easternmost forts of the great twenty-mile ring of forts which surround fjieo-c ; and 1 would add that it cannot be reasonably doubted either that, with tho utmo. t ramditv the German fr.rco-; .+ la”. k

great ring, and attempt to bring about would form a circuit all about that They would do that long before any French or British troops could be got upon the scene; and we may take it that a siege of Liege would be the first imperative necessity imposed upon the Germans at the outset of the campaign. It would be a woeful miscalculation to imagine that such works as those which protect Liege could be forced simply because the Belgian army is smaller and less instructed than the army of one of the Great Powers. It is amply sufficient for such a task as maintaining the ring round Liege intact; at any rate, for a space of time long enough to permit the arrival upon the scene of relieving armies from the west. Since the lesson of Port Arthur no one should consider the capture and occupation of one of the great modern ring-fortresses as the matter of a few hours, or even of a few days. Let the reader glance at the sketchmap. It will be worth his while, for, though the point is a commonplace with military critics, it has not caught hold of general public opinion that Liege is the pivot of a Franco-German struggle. The works round Liege consist of twelve isolated forts, forming the most perfect and the most formidable ring of defences in Europe or in the world. The ideal ring-fortress would be a town capable of ample provisioning, and lying within an exact circle of heights at an average of some 8000 yards distance, each height some 4000 wards from the next, each crowned with a selfcontained closed work, and each such work within support of at least two others.

such absolutely exact conditions exist, of course, in reality, but skill and the relief of the soil combined have endowed Liege with a ring of forts very nearly combining these conditions. The circle, though not exact, is more nearly exact than in the case of any other ring-fortress; its largest diameter is not 20 per cent, in excess of its shortest. The greatest distance between any two works is but 7000 yards, the average less than 4000. Each work is easily supported by two others, and often by three, and in one case by four. In a word, Liege with any adequate provision of gunners and supply, would stand a siege more thorough and prolonged than any of the other great ringfortresses of Europe; and calculations based upon “rushing” its defences are calculations of defeat.

Liege, then, could be neither neglected nor carried. It would have to be reduced ; and, as I have said, to prevent that reduction would be the whole business of Anglo-French forces advancing across the flat country from the sea towards the lower line of the Meuse. No army can fight upon two fronts — at least, not for long. To compel an army to fight upon two fronts is pretty much the same thing as cmpelliug it to be defeated.

Therefore, before any great siege is undertaken, the besieging forces must be secure from attack from outside its circle. If there are other armies in the field beside the army shut up in the fortress the besieging force makes itself secure by the use of what is called a “covering army,’ ’or “army of observation,” and it is the business of this last to defeat and beat off any outside force coming up to what is called the “relief” of the fortress.

The larger the forces which may come up in relief of the fortress, the larger the covering army has to be—quite apart from the numbers which may be necessary for conducting the siege. The mere knowledge that the enemy will soon have in the field, in the neighbourhood of a besieged fortress, a force of such and such a size compels one, before undertaking the seige at all, to provide for a covering army of equal strength. Tn practice, therefore, the knowledge that large forces would be available within a few days of the opening of hostilities, in the Belgian plans behind Liege makes it certain that the siege of Liege could not be undertaken without much larger forces for both the reduction of the fortress and the covering of the operations. It was precisely here that the advantage of a British contingent was evident to the French. That contingent in itself, even if we suppose that it would really have reached the number of 150,000 men, mighty not have been sufficient to prevent the immediate containing of Liege by the Germans upon the outbreak of war, the passage of the Meuse below that town, and the formation of a large covering army to the west of it upon the left bank of the river.

But the fact that a large arpiy was preparing to gather in the flat country to the vest of the town would inevitably compel the German plan to develop upon the Lower Meuse. It would fix the seat of war, and it would fix it in a field eminently calculated to administer that first cheek to the German offensive, which, seeing that the whole German plan depends upon a very rapid and immediately successful offensive, would be the best possible opening- of the combat for the allies. It has been said that the threat of combined French and English action in Belgium would he sufficient to prevent a siege of Liege at all. I confess I do not see bow this contention can he maintained. The offensive must betaken somewhere by either party. The French can take it where they like, because their opponents have drawn up no defensive line. The Germans musr, in the face of the very thorough defensive line drawn up by the French, attack immediately upon some one of two or three restricted areas. I have said why 1 do not believe there would be an attempt to turn the French line by the south and the Swiss mountains, and why I do not credit the more plausible but, I am convinced, erroneous theory that a German advance could take place through the Ardennes. To sum- up, it seems inevitable that in case of hostilities Liege and the Lower Meuse would be the. point of attack; that the old German conception of “rushing” a ring-fortress, even with no stronger resources behind it than the Belgian, must be abandoned ; that a regular siege of Liege would have to be undertaken before a general German advance into Belgium was sate; that the forces required to conduct such an operation would have to 1“' larger in proportion to opposing forces that might soon be gathered in the Belgian plan ; that Britain was peculiarly suited to afford aid at this point, and that the expeditionary force which was prepared to leave lor the Continent last September would have landed upon the stretch of coast between anti including Boulogne and Ostend, and would have been asked to operate in the fiat country, whose limits upon the east run somewhat bevond the Hue of Namur and Louvain.

| NOTE. —The maps which should have appeared with this article have been delayed in transit. They will be published to-morrow. ]