PICTON MURDER APPEAL

Hawera Star, Volume LII, 1 February 1933, Page 9

PICTON MURDER APPEAL

DEATH SENTENCE DISPUTED PLEA MADE.’ BY TARRANT CONDUCT OF CASE QUERIED EXPLANATION ADVOCATED (By Telegraph—Press Association.) WELLINGTON, Feb. 1. The appeal of Edward Tarrant of Picton from his conviction for the murder of James Flood at Picton on or about November 3, 1931, and the subsequent sentence of death passed upon him at Blenheim by Mr. Justice Blair on November 29 last, commenced before the Court of Appeal this morning-. The court consists of the Chief 'Justice Sir Michael Myers, Mr. Justice MacGregor and Mr. Justice Ostler. Mr. J. Evan Parry (Wellington) and Sir. Scantlebury (Blenheim) are appearing for the prisoner and Mr. Fair, K.C., and Mr. MacAssey for the Crown. The matter came before the Appellate Court in the form of an application for a neiv trial based on the ground that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of evidence coupled to which is the case stated for the opinion of the court by the trial judge under the provisions of Section 442 of the Crimes Act, 1908. The case stated asks the following questions : ‘ (1) Whether the jury was entitled in law to find the accused, guilty. (2) Whether the trial judge misdirected the jury (a) as to the time when it could be inferred the murder was committed; (b) in making use of a simile comparing to the strands of a ' cord or to sticks in a faggot the various facts constituting the Crown’s case; (c) as to the effect of the evidence relating to the question whether bank notes changed by the accused had belonged to the deceased Flood. (3) If any of the foregoing questions should be answered in favour of the accused, what course should be followed ? Opening the case for the prisoner, Mr Parry contended there had been no evidence ,at all adduced by the Crown on which the jury was entitled to find the accused guilty. Mr Parry made the following submissions: (I> Wfth regard to the number of facts relied on ,by the Crown as part of its case tlie Crown had failed to prove__ the facts on which the jury was asked! to rely; (2) in cases where the Crown had proved the particular facts on which it relied those facts were remote from tlie real matter in the issue and were capable of explanation upon the hyjpothesis of innocence; (3) in many instances the best evidence that circumstance permitted was not produced by the Crown; (4) the accumulative effect of the facts proved and alleged to constitute the case against the accused was consistent with and explainable upon a reasonable hypothesis of innoCeilCG. Mr. Parry added it was conceded there were certain discrepancies between the statements made by Tarrant and the.' evidence given by certain, witnesses. He submitted, however, that the discrepancies were slight and unimportant. “We submit,” said Mr Parry, “that the witnesses differ amongst themselves as much as they differ from Tarrant’s statements. W« submit that the differences may be accounted for by lionest- mistake on t : ba part- of Tarrant and oil the part cf the witnesses. We submit in effect, that the Grown, was- not entitled to ask the jury to infer Tarrant was lying when the difference's were capable of an innocent explanation because to do so would be ta proceed on the assumption of guilt.” The Chief Justice : Your case, in a nutshell, is this, that the case- is one of suspicion and that it should not. have been allowed to' go to the- jury? Mr. Parry: That i® so. Tlie njan has been condemned to death on cumulative suspicion. To a remark from Mi: Justice Ostler, Mr Parry said: “My argument is tjus. Each circumstance relied on by the Crown was not more than suspicion. This man has been condemned to- death •on tbs cumulative suspicion of niiie points, one af which has been proved.” (Proceeding).