SOVIET AND PERSIA

Grey River Argus, 1 February 1946, Page 9

SOVIET AND PERSIA

ASKED TO NEGOTIATE For a Settlement U.N.O. SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXPEDIENT. I LONDON, Jan. 30. The U.N.O. Security Council for nearly four and a half hours debated the Persian application for the council to apply the U.N.O. Charter to settle the dispute between Persia and Russia. PERSIAN ACCOUNT. The Persian delegate, M. Taquizadeh said: “The dispute cannot and must not be dismissed. Under no circumstances must it go out ot Lie hands of the council. It must be pursued. We will not refuse to go on with direct negotiations if the council recommends this way to e tried.” Negotiations should be carried on under the aegis of the council, to which progress should be reported, and the result brought back in reasonable time. Recounting the history of the notes exchanged between Persia and, the Soviet Union, M. Taquizadeh recalled tne Persian Government’s sending. Oan expeditionary force to Azerbaijan after the outbreak of rebellion and its sending a note to the Soviet Government listing interferences in the internal affairs of Persia, and asking for freedom of movement of the force, which was nevertheless halted by Soviet military forces 80 miles from Teheran. The . Persian Government on November 22 and 23 sent two notes asking for the cessation of Russian intervention. The Soviet Government replied on November 26 denying interferences, and said similar interferences would not be made. M. Taquizadeh referred to the suggestion that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Persia should go to Moscow, but all this did not avail and was ignored. In the end no direct, negotiations for settlement of the dispute occurred at all. He argued that the note from Persia requesting that the forces might proceed and the notes from the Soviet Union rejecting this issue could not be called direct negotiations. SOVIET VERSION.

The Russian delegate, M. Vyshinsky, replying, said he was unable to follow M. Taquizadeh. Persia admitted that negotiations had taken place, but said they were not direct negotiations. M. Vyshinsky denied this and contended that indirect negotiations meant the presence of an intermediary, but there was no intermediary in the Russo-Persian negotiations. The second point was whether negotiations brought any result. He said: ‘We denied charges made against us. Whereafter the Persian Government denied our denial and refused to accept it. Persia expressed the intention not to ask for further investigation and said she would not again refer to the matter. This enabled the Soviet Government to consider Persia satisfied with the results of the November negotiations.”

M. Vyshinsky, referring to Russia’s objection to the Persian desire io reinforce the Persian troops in northern Persia, said he believed there were sufficient Persian regular police there to restore order in any situation arising from the native population’s wish to obtain some sort of national autonomy within the Persian framework, which might have occurred in any democratic country. The presence of additional forces might have led to complications and Russia, under the Teheran agreement, was obliged to prevent any bloodshed in this territory on absolutely insufficient grounds. The Foreign Ministers’ conference _in Moscow did not discuss the Persian question, as a result of a decision taken on the eve of ‘’■ - conference, and for this reason it was of course unnecessary to send for the Persian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, who only wanted to put their case before the three Foreign Ministers.

“The Persian delegation’s declaration that it will not object to further direct negotiations fully meets our views, but the Persian delegation wishes the Securh” Council should somehow control the negotiations. I say that if the Soviet is to remain under the control of the Security Council I emphatically deny such responsibility. Russia is willing to enter bi-lateral negotiations, but to place the Russian Government under the control of the Council is not in conformity with the dignity of the Russian Government, the dignity of member nations, or even the council itself.” BRITISH ATTITUDE Mr Bevin said that the treaty under which the Allies were empowered to maintain forces in Persia undertook to leave the sovereignty, administration and the movement of security forces and police to the sole judgment of the Persian Government. “I was a little perturbed to hear M. Vyshinsky say that the Soviet decided that the number of police in Azerbaijan was sufficient to keep order, because this was the responsibility of the Persian Government and of no one else.” Britain felt a great sense of gratitude that at the very dire moment when the war was at its worst Persia • placed its territory, citizens and communications at the Allies’ disposal. Britain, therefore, felt a very strong obligation to hand back the territory intact, and withdraw the Allied forces without interference with Persian sovereignty. There was a conflict of opinion whether Persian sovereignty had been infringed. Mr Bevin said: M. Vyshinsky has admitted that, the F'ersians were prevented from taking the steps they deemed necessary to protect their nation. Well what was there to negotiate about? If they were stopped the treaty was infringed. I do not think there is any answer to that because the treaty is perfectly clear. Persia’s case was that the tripartite treaty should be strictly preserved and Persian officials and security forces allowed to do their duty. I would like to ask the Soviet Government in the friendliest fashion: Is that denied to the Persian Government? Mr Bevin said that if Britain had been charged with breaches of a treaty he would not have regarded it as a question of dignity if the Security Council inquired into it. Russia had referred to dangers to the Baku oilfields but he could not imagine the Persian Army attacking the Russian Army for the Baku oilfields. “This thing” looked to Britain very much

like the beginnings of aggression. “I am quite certain that if this is eliminated it will benefit the peace o: lhe world. I am quite willing tor negotiations to take place, but as a party to the treaty I would ask Persia to agree to leave it on the agenda as a subject for public discussion.” Mr Bevin expressed an opinion (hat powerful countries like Britain. America and Russia should welcome assistance from the council in disputes with small Powers. “We must feel a sense of gratitude to Persia —yet she has to negotiate, with an army of how many thousands of men on her territory I cannot tell. It is not for the Great Powers to sit in judgment on the smaller Powers and conduct their internal affairs. Therefore the task should proceed with the dispute remaining 'on the agenda.” AMERICAN VIEWPOINT

Mr Stettinius said he did not believe in keeping the matter on the agenda while negotiations were proceeding (which would not be compatible with the Charter or the dignity of council members). -But the council could not divest itselt of responsibility and should ask the parties to negotiate until a mutually satisfactory conclusion, in accordance with justice, was reported to the council. M. 'Bidault (France) said he faw cured dealing with the problem by direct negotiation with the council’s approval and support. Dr Van Kieffens (Holland) moved that the council express its confidence that Russia and Persia would reach a just solution w’W : ~ n reasonable time; that they should be requested to inform the council when agreement was reached, and that the negotiations should be undertaken without prejudice to the council’s right to assume consideration of the matter before it was informed of the result of the negotiations. Dr Van Kieffens pointed out the motion did not prejudice the council’s right to resume consideration, if desirable or necessary.

Mr Bevin then moved: “Having heard the statements by the representatives of Russia and Persia, and taking cognisance of the documents presented by the Russian and Persian delegations and those referred to in the course of the debate, and considering both parties affirmed a readiness to seek a solution of the matter at issue by negotiation, and that such negotiations should be resumed in the near future, the council requests the parties to inform the council of any results achieved by such negotiations. The council, meanwhile, retains the right to request at any time information on the progress of negotiations.” Mr Stettinius supported this. Dr Van Kieffens indicated a readiness to withdraw his resolution. RUSSIAN REPLY M. Modelewski (Poland) submitted a new resolution providing merely for a report to the council on the result of the negotiations. M. Vyshinsky said that if the council adopted Mr Bevin’s proposal, A would mean under the Charter’s article 37. the council could keep the dispute on the agenda, only if there was danger to peace and security. There was no such dispute. The Rus-sian-Persian declaration left no legal ground on which the council could implement article 37. They should content themselves with bilateral gotiations, and information to the council about them. The council should only deal with it if there were no results. “We do not want war with Persia; Persia does not want war with us,” said M. Vyshinsky. “Therefore Mr Bevin’s proposition does not correspond with the case. It is only a manifestation of distrust, that same distrust which always in the past prevented true cordial cooperation between the United Nations. To eliminate that distrust is the first duty of this organisation. I absolutely object to the retention of the proposal that this dispute should continue on the agenda. If there are no results from negotiations—though I am convinced that there will be results—the matter might be reported to the Security Council, who are then entitled to ask how the parties to the dispute discharged the responsibilities they had undertaken. “Mr Bevin said that it was not a question of trying to keep U.N.O.’s charter. It seemed that the council, by referring the dispute for bilateral negotiations, did not discharge a duty, but merely adopted a procedure, and juntil the results achieved had been reported to the council, the dispute under the Charter, remained with the council. “I do not know what answer the world would give if, after settling the procedure, we washed our .hands of it, except for getting periodic reports. We, under article 36, are duty bound to see it through.” Mr Bevin said that he understood M. Vyshinsky to say he accepted the resolution except for the clause that 'the dispute should remain on the agenda. If M. Vyshins l ---- looked at it reasonably and without suspicion, ’■ would see that the council was merely carying out its legal duties, and if they were discharged the matter went off the agenda. The resolution was not put forward out of any distrust of either Government, but because the council was trying to carry out its obligations to both of them. Mr Bevin’s resolution was finally adopted unanimously, with the deletion of the final phrase “in the meantime the matter to remain on the agenda.” The council thus approved of negotiations between Russia and Persia to settle the dispute, requiring the results to be reported to the council with the council retaining the right to request information at any time during the progress of negotiations.