MONEY CONTROL

Grey River Argus, 4 July 1944, Page 5

MONEY CONTROL

AFTER THE WAR

Anglo-American Divergencies

[Aus. & N.Z- Press Assn.l (Rec. 8.15) NEW YORK, July 2. “The majority of the American bankers would oppose the plan tor an international fund, said the United States spokesman, Mr. Harry White, at the Bretton Woods conference, according to the “New York Times.” Criticism was also voicea by various delegations among the forty-four participating countries. Mr. White said: “Discussions on the question of a monetary fund have priority over discussions on the question of an international bank, because the fund is of more immediate .importance. Mr White pointed out that the press was enjoying full access to this conference, in sharp contrast to the secrecy prevailing at the U.N.R.R.A. last year. He explained that arrangements made were because of the complicated nature oi 1 the discussions and of a desire to keep the public fully informed Senator Hull (Secretary of State) sent a message to the chairman Oi the conference;. Mr. Morgenthau (U.S.A. Treasurer) describing the conference as one of the most important and historic international meetings and one having a far-reach-ing effect on the reconstruction of the world. , T j The “New York Timess” London correspondent reports: “The British representatives at the conference will not make any commitments interfering with Britain’s internal price level, or with the maintenance of England’s position within the sterling bloc.” He added that British reservations were three fold: (1). The fear of the repercussions of a possible post-war American boom, and slump of the British economy.(2) The desire for full freedom to the British Government to regulate employment. (3) The fear that here creditors will attempt, after the war to transfer too rapidly the sum of three thousand million pounds sterling in balances to dollars. The British attitude on economic questions widely diverges from the American attitude, adds the correspondent, because the British feel that the conference ought not to consider the technicalities of an international monetary settlement so much as fresh practical policies in terms of gold, services, and needs for world reconstruction.