HOLIDAY PAY

Grey River Argus, 27 November 1943, Page 4

HOLIDAY PAY

VEXED HARBOUR ISSUE Rights of Courts ARBITRATION JUDGE AND CHIEF JUSTICE. P.A. WELLINGTON, Nov. 26. A dispute as to whether shift workers, according to Clause 5 of the New Zealand Harbour Board Employees’ Award, 1941, were entitled to receive double time for work done on Sundays and holidays again came before the Court of Arbitration today in the form of appeals against ■the decisions of Magistrates in cases at Napier, Wellington, and Lyttelton. The Court comprised Mr Justice Tyndall, Mr W. Cecil Prime (employers’ representative) and Mr A L. Monteith (workers’ representative). Mr J. F. B. Stevenson appeared for the New Zealand Harbour Boards’ Industrial Union of Employers; Mr M. J. Gresson (Christchurch) for the Inspector of Awards, at Christchurch; and Mr G. F. Grieve, of the legal branch of the Labour Department, for the Inspectors of Awards at Napier and Wellington. Opening the case for the employers, Mr Stevenson suggested that the Court under Section 105 of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1935, should state a case for the Court of Appeal to decide the vexed question. The Chief Justice had stated that, though the award was valid, the Harbour Boards had a sense of grievance. His Honour: It would appear that all the facts were not placed before the Chief Justice. Mr Stevenson said that the Chief Justice had stated that the Court of Arbitration had power to state a case where an award did not appear to be just. His Honour: It would appear that there was some taint about the award. Does the Chief J'ustice insinuate that I have a number of shares in the Wellington Harbour Board? This Court is at an utter loss to understand why it should be insinuated that it would be guilty of anything that would not be just. This Court knows ‘more about its own intention that anybody else. In the new award, the Court maintained the status quo with the express intention of creating no grievance to either side. There was no argument in the opinions expressed by the Chief Justice. Mr Stevenson said that the stating of a case for the Court of Appeal w’ould be in the interests of justice. His Honour: Did you impugn the conduct of this Court in the Supreme Court? Mr Stevenson; I only stated the full facts of this case. His Honour 1 : Someone impugned: the conduct of this Court, and the Count is entitled to know what conduct w.as impugned. Mr Stevenson: I am not here to be cross-eexamined as to what I may have said in another Court. I simply put on affidavits facts, and you can read the affidavits as well as I can. There is nothing In the Chief Justice’s judgment which is not supported by uncontradicted affidavits. His Honour: It appears as if all the important facts nave not been placed before the Chief Justice. Mr Gresson said that the law gave no right to the Supreme Court to instruct the Court of Arbitration to state a case for the Court of Appeal. The Judge of the Court of Arbitration was the only person who could state a ease for that Court. The Court of Arbitration could ignore a direction from the Supreme Court on the ground that that Court had no jurisdiction. Though the Court of Arbitration should give great weight to the Chief Justice’s opinion, the Court of Arbitration was the sole tribunal to decide the case. After having given his judgment on the sole question of issue the Chief Justice had gone on for four or five pages, to give advice to the Court of Arbitration, which was not in his jurisdiction. The Chief Justice had suggested that the Harbour Boards had been unfairly treated by the Court of Arbitration re-inserting Clause 5 in the 1941 award. The fact that the parties had agreed w.as vital, and it was part of the Court’s -duty to carry the agreement out. Yet the Chief Justice (had Stated that this was immaterial. The Chief Justice had said that the conduct of the Court of Arbitration had been impugned, but counsel could say definitely that he had at no time impugned the conduct of that Court. The Chief Justice had said that the Court of Arbitration could either have drafted a new clause or adjourned the matter. If the full facts of the dispute had been placed before the Chief J'ustice, he' would never have made the comments he had done. The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over the Court of Arbitration, unless that Court exceeded its jurisdiction. In some cases, the Court of Arbitration had greater jurisdiction than the Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice had no cause to lecture or attempt to advise the Court of Arbitration. r Mr Grieve had just opened his case for the Inspectors of Awards when further hearing was adjourned till Tuesday morning.