The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, Sept, 23, 1943. MACARTHUR’S POSITION.

Grey River Argus, 23 September 1943, Page 4

The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, Sept, 23, 1943. MACARTHUR’S POSITION.

It is hinted President Roosevelt’s military protege, General Marshall, said to be now designated as Allied Generalissimo, to direct in particular attacks against Germany across the Channel via France and the Low Countries, has at all Anglo-American war 'councils had the fattest finger in the strategical pie. That would go to explain why the Pacific war has remained so much a “side show,” letting alone allegations that Presidential political rivalry may have kept General MacArthur both short supplied and in the strategical background. He alone of all the main Allied Commanders has at anyrate. been left to his own devices, and left outside (all of the conferences ' in North America when high strategy has been decided. This implies that his capacity for repulsing the Japanese was realised, and also suggests that no more than defence lias so far boon the Allied strategy in the Pacific. General Marshall now talks of the pouring into the Pacific of vast forces quick!v to defeat Japan, but says there 'is a difficulty in finding enough bases from which to operate those forces against Japan. The question is whether he remains an adherent of the islandhopping tactics, on which MacArthur has been able manifestly to improve, as illustrated by the way the Japanese have been hunt, ed at comparatively little cost in men, both in New Guinea and the Solomons. . For his admittedly too limited supply of forces and munitions MacArthur has done wonders. Pie has made incomparably the best job of licking the .Japs. No doubt General Marshall is behind the plan for Lord .Mountbatten to control operations projected against the Japanese on the Asiatic mainland, but it cannot be claimed that, those operations have prospects better or as good as those directed by General MacArthur. Mountbatten is an ‘‘amphibious” operational expert, and as such the operations he personally directs, when they do start will be similar to those of MacArthur, but less diversified. The idea is coastal attacks, because he is not going himself to direct a land offensive, since one has in Burma been proved already impracticable, owing to the Japanese forces being screened from aircraft by dense jungle and forest. If therefore seaborne, the projected offensive with Ceylon for a base may have a far inferior base to that' of MacArthur in Australia. MacArthur, who is said to be doubtful of the new departure, not only on the score that Australia is the best base — and Japan’s enormous losses point that way—but because he sees in the route, so rapidly overrun by the Japanese from the Philippines to New Guinea the best route to roll up the enemy, now that ho cannot stand the racket by air and by sea, but has to continue back moving in the South 'Western Pacific. Marshall apparently reckons isolated island bases far flung in the Pacific can function as effective attack bases, coupled with whatever plan there may be regarding Burma. To got to China Allied forces must go by a new road not yet completed, and oven, then it would be a case of island-hopping to Japan. At anyrate MacArthur appears justified in reckoning Australia a preferable base to the American mainland or India for a major offensive, He is using air and sea craft in complete co-ordin-ation with land forces for his advance in the South West Pacific, and the. Japanese cannot take it there. He does not want to use mon storming island after island and beach after beach. He is America’s senior strategist, and his idea is massive strokes against the main Japanese strategic strongholds, such as those at Guadalcanal 1 , New Georgia, Salamaua. and Lae (which have been taken); Rabaul, Wewak, Madang, (which may be taken soon) and Truk, as well as East Indies positions, leading to Singapore, and the Philippines. He says with the elements of surprise, air and ground striking power, and the navy, this is better than any hopping, which is slow and .costly. As the most experienced and successful Allied Commander in warfare with the Japanese. MncArthur’s 'observations on strategy devised by men at a distance are important. The Japanese say they are prepared to sacrifice ten million men. They have now been for yeahs hardening their inner core of fighting power; stepping up rapidly their aircraft production ; using the labour of vast numbers of subject peoples in preparations; and may even now be a tougher proposition than the Germans to overcome. MacArthur’s strategy kept Australia and this country safe. They undoubtedly are safe. He is therefore the last man that strategists or politicians at a distance should attempt to sidetrack. Moreover, it is the actual fighting men, Alexander and Montgomery, who are doing the job in Italy.