FROM WEEK TO WEEK

Grey River Argus, 7 April 1943, Page 3

FROM WEEK TO WEEK

(By

H. Winston Rhodes)

SUPPLIES: If the problem of the supply of war materials to the various fronts from the Soviet Union to North Africa, from the Middle East to Burma, from China to the South Seas were merely a problem of industrial technique and transport, it could be safely left to experts. The story of the Eighth Army is a sufficient guarantee that such experts are available. But unfortunately the problem of supply in this war is also a problem of political strategy, it is more than that. It is a problem which is closely interwoven with the political and economic organisation of the countries concerned. The volume of war materials depends to a large extent not only on the energy and enthusiasm of the workers in the war factories, in mines and on the land, but also on. the coordination of monopolistic concerns and private enterprises, the owners of which are necessarily interested in profits and in post-war developments. The transport of war materials to the different fronts depends not only on available shipping and on numbers of factors connected with the claims of the different commands, but also on the political strategy of war administrations which depend for support partly on pressure groups with vast economic interests and definite political, policies. In the unavoidable absence of precise information upon the supply problem it is not possible for a commentator to do more than suggest, to point to inconsistencies, to note contradictions and to refer to specific instances of the failures affecting production because of antiquated methods, lack of co-ordination and hampering restrictions inevitable in a society which allows the claims of private enterprise to struggle against the claims of the whole people. The problem 'of production is the problem of social and economic organisation, and by now it should be clear’ that all governments have been forced to abandon at least in part the time-honoured but inefficient and wasteful methods of private competition. All governments have ' been forced to plan, but their plans have succeeded only to the extent that they have been able to control and to co-ordinate. It is a sufficient commentary upon the ways of capitalism that a crisis forthwith demands new and more efficient methods. Fascism as Hitler has demonstrated can produce the efficiency of fear and the efficiency of total war, but socialism, as the Soviet Union has shown, can produce the efficiency of total defence and the efficiency of a free people fighting for their way of life. It may be true that it would be difficult to carry through a major revolution in social organisation dur- ■ ing war. It is equally true that unless this is done not only will the length of the war be’extended and the cost in human life be excessive, but also that the enthusiasm of the people will be reduced. One of the most important aspects of' the war effort is to ensure that on the industrial front men and women will work with the confidence that their energies are not being dissipated by the activities of those who are interested in maintaining the present social order both during the war and after its conclusion. TRANSPORT: in the unavoidable absence of information on shipping, it is impossible to discuss problems of transport With any confidence. Nevertheless it is possible to point to inconsistencies, to contradictions and' to the presence of political bias which may have a' considerable bearing upon the direction in which supplies are sent. No one can fail to observe that the Chinese are worried about the difficulty of obtaining satisfaction with regard both to their military and their economic needs. Maisky’s recent statement shows that the Russians are growing more and more concerned over the absence of a second front. Dr. Evatt’s remarks can only be interpreted as an expression of dissatisfaction with the supply problem as it affects Australia, and the delayed offensive in Tunisia shows that the amount of war material in Africa is not yet sufficient for the large-scale offensive which the situation in Europe demands. Moreover since the re-occupation of the Burma Road would solve one of the main problems of strategy in the Pacific area, it is clear that the absence of a powerful offensive there must be due once again to the difficulties of supply. But the direction in which war materials are sent depends not only on military requirements but also on political strategy. Recent statements have shown that in spite of agreement which it is said has been, reached between Britain and America, (here is still very little co-ordination in war and supply strategy between the United Nations. A very little thought will convince most people that the distances to be covered at the present time in order to send supplies in considerable quantities either to the Soviet Union or to China must prevent any real relief to the peoples of those countries. ‘Nevertheless comments are frequently made that too much has already been sent to the Soviet Union or that China has not been forgotten. The Chinese ask only for a few hundred aeroplanes in order to open- an offensive which would 8 have a telling effect upon Japanese morale. The Russians have said time and again that they would, prefer a second front to the war material that is being sent, if it is impossible to have both.

The immense productive capacity of Britain and America is well known to our Russian and Chinese allies. It will be difficult for them not to come to certain political conclusions if we fail to overcome all obstacles in the way of complete unity. Such conclusions would be disastrous not only for the prosecution of the war, but also for plans for the post-war world.