The Grey River Argus TUESDAY, April 6, 1943. MACARTHUR’S SUCCESSFUL ATTRITION.

Grey River Argus, 6 April 1943, Page 4

The Grey River Argus TUESDAY, April 6, 1943. MACARTHUR’S SUCCESSFUL ATTRITION.

His comparative ami admittedly continuing limitations in aircraft, to mention no other offensive weapons, have not prevented Genera] MacArthur from keeping up offensive action. Whether Ins 'Own countrymen reckon he must play second or third fiddle to commanders in other sectors, outsiders must recognise that his operations are achieving results second to none upon other fronts. Following up the Bismarck Sea victory, his bombers have just put a dozen more units of Japanese Avar shipping out of action, and perhaps half of this number, including three or more warships, have been sent to the bottom of the sea. Using fewer than two bombers to each enemy vessel, he has not lost a single plane during a three-day action in which a whole enemy concentration on the north of the island of New Ireland has been entirely dissipated. On top of this, Mr. Nash, upon his returii yesterday to the Dominion, says that there are in store for the Japanese still greater surprises of an unpleasant character, but it appears meantime as if, in the words of American observers, the worst with which the enemy as yet has to reckon is what MacArthur 'nay do to him. Mr. Nash denies the truth of the earlier Allied thesis that until Hitler is linked the Japanese can only be held. Naturally he is not going to say how the holding strategy is being turned into an offensive, but one inference should be justified by his statement. It is that New Zealand’s risks have steadily been reduced, and especially by the blows inflicted on the Japanese to the north of Australia. No doubt, the recent intimal ions from other. New Zealand .Ministers that the Dominion has real and even growing obligations in the Pacific point to the development of the offensive strategy indicated by Mr. Nash.- It is only reasonable that New Zealand should signify her sense 'of greater security by taking a bigger hand in the operations which are calculated to overcome the Japanese menace. That menace, is steadily being liquidated in New Guinea by the land operations of the Australian 1 and American forces, but the outstanding fact of the situation is that with comparatively a, small numerical air force the South Western Pacific Command has taken of the Japanese a far heavier toll than has been taken of them by any other Command. The argument of General MacArthur and the Australians has thus been vindicated, and the utility of a substantial future increase in the aircraft at the disposal of General MacArthur has been aptly demon-

st rated'. The reason, apart from enemy losses, for holding this view »is that, in spite of past losses, the Japanese have been continuing to strengthen their air forces north of Australia. Any number of enemy bases from half a dozen to a whole dozen figure regularly in the South Western. Pacific Command communiques as the targets of successful ’attacks. It is probable that the idea of a holding campaign meantime in the Pacific has arisen from the very effective use made by MacArthur’s command of such aircraft as it has been allowed, which now include Spitfires whose crews meantime are in Australia binder training to fit them for fighting the Japanese airmen. It is now quite a long time since the enemy has figured in any but a losing role in the South Western Pacific. Though he keeps coming again, it is significant that it is always in the same direction. There has been apparently no attempt at a diversion in our direction, and presumably one reason is that New Zealand has already taken effective steps to counter any such diversion. We nevertheless may count upon being expected to do more than merely to remain entirely on the defensive. Mr. Nash’s forecast will have a meaning for Americans and Australians, but likewise a meaning for New Zealanders as well. If the Japanese are going to be hammered harder in the Pacific. New Zealand will be accorded its due part in the process, and must, be ready to play that part right out to a successful end. Nor is it to be assumed that the enemy has shot his bolt or done his worst. Air. Nash doubtless has in mind a campaign of the type known as an offensive-defensive during the critical stages of an absolute Allied offensive on the | European Continent. It is far i preferable that the Japanese .should be deprived of the initiative to the greatest possible extent than that they should bo left in undisturbed possession of all the area they have overrun so as to consolidate their hold. Operations against them now must render their eventual expulsion quicker and less difficult than would a mere holding policy. The Kavieng victory points that way. It has carried the war further into enemy territory.