The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, June 4, 1942. DEFENCE OF NEW ZEALAND.

Grey River Argus, 4 June 1942, Page 4

The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, June 4, 1942. DEFENCE OF NEW ZEALAND.

Siuce the Japanese are extending their operations southwards, New Zealanders are naturally interested in this country’s preparations to repel an attempt at invasion. In acknowledging that people are apt to be kept , in almost complete ignorance by the natural tendency of the authorities to observe secrecy, the Commander of tire NtfZ. Army, Major-Gen-eral Puttick, is now issuing information on the subject. Our isolation he points out in a review of the situation, would entail a long sea voyage for an invading. force, and a very large naval escort, while the expedition would be open to naval attack, as the American Fleet is in our vicinity. The Japanese would, however, lack shore-bas-ed aircraft, having only smaller ones off carriers, whilst it would be necessary to make for waters here that are sheltered, since there must at first be a place to refuel; where fuel, heavy stores, guns, vehicles, and heavy aircraft would be landed without much molestation. Hence such waters (around our coasts must in most cases be suspected as possible points of attack. The. weather here is so variable, says General Puttick that the enemy would be handicapped by lack of reliable meteorological information, whilst even when landed, 'Japanese forces would tend to be | isolated, until more supply ships and escorts could regularly arrive. The enemy would seek a harbour easily to be . defended with limited forces, whilst landing ,and having reasonable reading on which to advance, but not over country that easily could be defended against the invader, or that would lessen the efficiency of such arms as those in which he expected to have superiority. A single road over mountainous country, which could be blocked, or . defended, would cause delay such as to enable greater resistance • to be summoned. Nearness to an aerodrome or landing ground would affect the enemy’s choice of a landing point, so that large aircraft from carriers could be landed and be available as soon as possible. Aircraft carrying parachutists could not operate from a carrier, but smaller, planes could bomb and land on an aerodrome. They would, however, lack both fuel and repair facilities. To secure the latter sheltered waters would be requisite. ’While it is most difficult to foresee the sdale of an enemy attack, even though distance would be calculated to limit it, New Zealand neverthe-

less must, in making its estimate, to adopt for it the very highest scale of attack that it would be possible for an enemy to make Under the conditions most fav-ourable-for invasion. The naval forces ,within even a thousand miles of the Dominion would leave a deterrent effect on the Japanese, although the use of the Allied warships is not under local control. The New Zealand Army’s plans are considerably .'affected by the ability of our Air Force to attack an enemy convoy, while there are arrangements for detecting an enemy approach which are a military sedret. General Puttick says sea command is essential; for an enemy to attack us in force, although, given that, there is a wide selection of places to attack. Our small population and long coastline prevent defence in force of all possible points of /attack, and it is thus necessary 1o anticipate the enemy's object in any attack in force, and to select the landing points which he probably would choose. Those are the points to be defended, and in various areas strong fore es are placed so as rapidly to be able to reach actual points of attack. The distances, General Puttick adds, make it impossible for one force situated centrally in each island to reach all of the probable points of attack quickly enough. Several centrally situated forces of suitable size and composition have, therefore, to be provided, and measures taken so that they can mutually support ehch other. Finally, time is calculated to be of the greatest advantage for the Dominion’s defenders, and early warning of enemy approach and points of attack are of first importance, together with delaying actions of all kinds and any measures that will speed the movement of our striking forces.