The Grey River Argus TUESDAY, February 11th., 1941 MR CHURCHILL’S ESTIMATE

Grey River Argus, 11 February 1941, Page 4

The Grey River Argus TUESDAY, February 11th., 1941 MR CHURCHILL’S ESTIMATE

His office may ensure for Britain’s Prime Minister the ear of the world for whatever he has to say of the war, but of this circumstance he has a personal ability to take advantage in so exceptional a degree as to exert moral influence. Experience of war and politics and other interests have peculiarly adapted him to be at this critical time the mouthpiece of his countrymen, his latest review of the situation denoting a rare aptitude to display it in exactly the light in which they see it. Due emphasis is laid upon the factor of optimism, and its fruit in the favourable changes of fortune since last midsummer brought dark days, especially the changes whereby British arms already have placed one enemy in a grave quandary, and British courage has inspired the incalculable advantages derivable from United States support. The map of the war, as the ordinary person is familiar with it, is set out. by Mr Churchill, and his statements in each regard are as definite as in the' circumstances they are reassuring. There is the promise that Britain can maintain her Mediterranean ascendancy, even should the central sector call for stern action in the future, no less than in the past. The German blockade is not acknowledged to be the menace which the enemy pretends, and the sinews of war are declared to be in process of becoming fully adequate for ultimate success. Mr Churchill takes occasion again to remark that he disdains to ignore the more sinister features of the outlook, and even assumes, in advance, a German offensive in the Balkans to which to-day nobody could perhaps set bounds with any degree of certainty. It is doubtless the science of military strategy which underlies the Prime Minister’s final analysis of the position. The great and outstanding issue he declares not to be anything which the enemy might do in Europe, Asia, or anywhere distant from the main front, but he makes a statement on this occasion which seems to mark an advance in Confidence as compared with previous pronouncements made bv him. Formerly he declared that even should the enen\y set foot in Britain he would be fought trom beyond the Atlantic. On Sunday he said Germany cannot win unless she destroys Britain by way or a successful invasion. That is the evident core of the matter. It is also a challenge which he may expect the enemy to dodge. The Chief of the General (Staff is the authority quoted for the assumption that invasion would now be dictated less by confidence on the enemy’s part than by a loss of confidence of the enemy’s part. The reason for expecting invasion to be attempted is, first, the probability that troubles on the Continent, especially due to the British blockade, will dictate the choice of an attempt at invasion as the lesser of two evils. It should not indeed require repetition of this point as to the depend-

cnee of the ultimate issue upon the ability of Britain to carry on in order to convince the Germans that it is the most vital point of all. Britain has already demonstrated that unless she is overcome the war must gain momentum on her side. If the enemy falters in his original acknowledgement that Britain is the real adversary, he will be unable to conceal from the world the fact that he does funk the supreme issue. The speech, therefore, while it |n <iy give reason for satisfaction, is more important as being one ol instruction. Everybody is able to judge the war by reference to the single fact of Britain’s perseveiance.