FINLAND’S COLLAPSE

Grey River Argus, 21 March 1940, Page 4

FINLAND’S COLLAPSE

LACK OF SUPPORT Mr Chamberlain Explains WHY IT DID NOT ARRIVE. [British Official Wireless.] RUGBY, March 19. Rt. Hon. N. Chamberlain, Prime Minister, in his speech reviewing the progress of the war to the Commons, dealt first with the “great tragedy’’ of Finland, the collapse of whose resistance, he said, gave a profound shock throughout the world. The peace terms were such as could only have been accepted by a proud people like the Finns under dire compulsion, for they greatly compromised their independence *md integrity. Their heroic stand was not in vain, for they won the respect of the whole world. The Government which fought the war still held office, the army was intact, the spirit of the people was unbroken, and added Mr Chamberlain, amid cheers though Britain had been unable to save Finland, perhaps her power to help her was not yet at an end. Britain would take her share with others, in the regenation of Finland.

After speaking of Germany’s inescapable responsibility, since the Soviet invasion of Finland was a result of the Moscow Pact, and it was German threats which “terrified the Scandinavian countries into withholding help which might perhaps have saved her,” Mr Chamberlain declared that the suggestion that the Allies had failed to do their utmost to help could not for one moment be maintained.

Before listing the material assistance sent by Britain, Mr Chamberlain reminded the House that the Allies were facing an unscrupulous and very powerful foe, whose forces for many weeks had been marshalled, ready for an attack which could be delivered in a few hours, sb that all requests from friendly neutrals must continually be weighed in the balance against their own needs. There were also difficulties of communication. Nevertheless, no appeal by the Finnish Government had remained unanswered. The Finnish requests had naturally varied. In the early stages, they were chiefly for fighters, later for bombers and considerable quantities of small arms and ammunition, and later still the chief emphasis was laid on guns. Every request was promptly and fully considered, and was met as far as possible.

British aid detailed. The Prime Minister read the following list: —Aeroplanes promised 152, actually sent 101; guns of all kinds promised 223,- sent 114; shells promised 297,200, sent 185,000; Vickers guns promised 100, all sent; marine mines promised 500, sent 400; hand grenades promised 50,000 all sent; aircraft bombs promised 20,700, sent 15,700; signal equipment promised 1300 sets, sent 800; anti-tank rifles promised 200, all sent; respirators promised 60,000 all sent; great-coats promised 100,000 all sent; battledress promised 100,000, all sent; antitank mines promised 20,000 sent 10,000; ambulances promised 48, all sent. The list also included manyother items, such as medical stores, tents and equipment sandbags, steel

helmets, and large quantities of small arms ammunition.

EXPEDITION PREPARED.

He then proceeded to deal with the more-important question of men. In the middle of January, Field-Marshal Mannerheim had informed the British representative that he did not then squire men, but would be very glad to have some 30,000 in May. He stipulated that they should be trained soldiers. At the same time, the Government was given to understand that both Finland and Sweden were nervous about the reactions of Germany, and both therefore hoped that forces would not be sent officially. On examining the question at once, the British Cabinet felt satisfied that an effective force for aiding Finland I was not possible on a voluntary basis, and that the reinforcements required for May would only be available if they were raised .on an official basis, as a properly-organised expedition. Plans were prepared, and approved by the Supreme War Council on February 5. At the beginning of March, the expedition was ready to leave — two months before Field-FJirshal Mannerheim had asked for it to arrive. In. planning the expedition, there were two over-riding factors to be borne in mind. The first was that no expedition could arrive in Finland except by passing through Norway and Sweden; therefore, before such an expedition could be despatched, it was necessary to obtain the consent of these Governments. It did not take much imagination to conceive what would be the attitude of Germany, if such assent were given. “We were conscious that those two countries would have to brave the wrath of Germany, and, as a matter of fact, we know now that Germany, as soon as she heard the rumour of such a force passing through to the assistance of Finland did threaten Norway an'd Sweden with her intervention, if they gave their assent. Therefore, we felt that we must be ready also , to provide a force to come to the assistance of Sweden in defending herself, if she should be attacked by Germany.” (Cheers). The second factor was that the transport facilities between Norway and Sweden placed a definite limit upon the size of the force which could be transported in any given period. “What did we do in those circumstances? We decided to provide the largest force* which would be permitted by the physical conditions we had to eiacounte-r. Part of that force would be required for assistance to Sweden, if she were attacked by Germany, and part of it would be an expedition to help Finland.

In addition to that, certain troops would be required to guard the long lines of communication. The size of the force arrived at, on that basis was about 100,000 men which was to be heavily armed and equipped, and plans were made for it to be taken through Scandinavia in March, and the whole of it was to arrive before the end of April. Members would realise that this was not necessarily the last force that would be sent. It was the largest force that could be sent at one time.

The Finns were informed in the second half of February, but, bearing in mind the very difficult position of Not way and Sweden, it was suggested to the Finns that they should make a public appeal for assistance not later than March 5, and, after that, the Allies proposed themselves to make an appeal to the Governments of Norway and Sweden, to allow the passage of the expedition. It was hoped, in the' face of a public

appeal from Finland, that they would feel they could not stand in the way of what might be the salvation of their neighbour and friend. They did so and the Swedish Government replied tha tthey would continue to permit facilities for the passage of munitions and volunteers in small groups, but they

could not grant a passage

to regular armed forces. Despite this discouraging news, the preparation of the expedition continued, and the Allies awaited the Finnish appeal, hoping that, at the last moment, Norway and Sweden would relent. There was one further inquiry from Finland—asking for an increase in the numbers of the original force to reach Finland to 50,000, a. greater number than the Allies believed it was physically possible to transport —before the Finnish Government decided to accept the peace terms. At the end of a long recital of facts, which was followed with intense interest by the Commons. Mr Chamberlain drew cheers with the words, “People that have put up such a fight as the Finns must be immune from all criticism.” GERMANY’S ATTITUDE. The part played by Germany next claimed the Prime Minister’s attention. He recalled the boasts of Hitler and other Nazi leaders, over the share the German army took in the liberation of Finland, and her salvation from the “Red menace,” and their assurances that Germany would never fail Finland, sipce they regarded her as the bulwark of European civilisation against Communism.

When Finland was once more threatened, when once more she had to put her tiny forces into the field to resist the huge hordes that came against her, Germany publicly professed her neutrality, but behind the scenes made every effort to prevent others from saving Finland.’, and from performing the task which she had always declared should be her own. Lastly, before leaving the Finnish question Mr Chamberlain examined the effect of what had h/ppened, on the security of Scandinavia, and spoke of the significance of these events in relation with the status of neutrality in the great struggle, such as that in which the Allies were hfiw engaged, and on fhe outcome of which so much of the values and meaning of civilisation was at stake. Danger had come closer to Sweden and Norway.

APPEAL TO SCANDINAVIA? Disclaiming lack of understanding or sympathy for the Governments of those countries, in their dangerous difficulty and predicament, Mr Chamberlain said: But I am bound to point out that this doctrine of neutrality, which paralysed the action of Norway and Sweden, was based on the assumption that aiything was better than to be involved in the war between Germany and the Allies. That, in turn, was based on another assumption—the assumption that it was a matter of indifference to small neutral States whether the war ended in a victory for Germany or a victory for the Allies. But until those assumptions are abandoned, and the necessary deductions are drawn from their abandonment, fhe policy of those small neutral States will neither correspond to realities, nor wlil it be adequate to safeguard their own in-

terests. Nothing will or can save them but their determination to defend themselves, and to join with others who are ready to aid them in their defence.