The Grey River Argus FRIDAY, May 13, 1938. GERMANY’S AIMS.

Grey River Argus, 13 May 1938, Page 6

The Grey River Argus FRIDAY, May 13, 1938. GERMANY’S AIMS.

Germans are reported as commencing to train colonists. Where > do they intend to place them? It is a question of more interest to the British than probably any other people. The official publicity does not, however, inform the ' people, unless it can be said that I the advertising of British haste in i rearmament, and even of comI plaints that it is not hasty enough, form a warning. It is, however, obvious that those who' guide British policy are no longer under any delusion as to the importance of this question of projected German colonisation. The treaty just concluded with Italy is a proof that they are now fully alive to the risk previously run in forcing that country to make common cause ’on the Con-' tinent with Germany. What has opened their eyes, of course, has been the annexation of Austria, a thing which, though Mussolini failed to oppose it, he undoubtedly does not relish in the slightest degree. Hitler’s latest visit to Rome signifies neither any stronger “axis,” nor any weaker AngloItalian understanding. So much may be inferred from the manoeuvres in Geneva over the conquest of Abyssinia, which Britain is obviously going formally to recognise in due course and to 'obtain for it the League’s acquiescence. It was- quite evident Italy’s advantage had been to see Austria to remain independent, and also the States to the east of Austria, including Czechoslovakia. For years Italy had used her strength to keep Central Europe from falling wholly under the domination of Berlin or the Prussianised Germans. Relying too long, however, upon this being the Italian determination, British foreign policy had been so directed as further to antagonise Italy, with the result that, almost as soon as Mr. Eden took his exit from the Foreign Office, Hitler struck at Von Schuschnigg, proclaimed himself a sort of agent of Providence in grabbing the country, which, indeed, had had any chance of organised resistance knocked out of it when no outside support remained. It was never felt in London, how-; ever, that Italy would acquiesce, and the revelation to the contrary was soon followed by the Anglo-Italian agreement. That' agreement Hitler cannot ignore If he has designs on Czechoslovakia, and expects to obtain leadership through Central and Eastern Europe, it is quite within the bounds of possibility that he is due for opposition quite beyond that which he encountered from Austria. Germany indeed, has now gained access to the Mediterranean, and she may anticipate that the Tyrolese, now under Italian rule, will by “blood and race” move soon to join the Third Reich. Germany is creating a united military power, is a growing naval power, and already is rated a preponderating aerial power. That is an explanation of the precautions in London against air raids. It can be preIsumed that at the back of the mind of the Nazi regime there is a policy of making successive encroachments. So soon as they saw one inroad made in the Far East upon a great source of British tribute in banking, administration, foreign loans, and

industrial exploitation, the Germans would certainly design their increasing power to get a share in the spoils of foreign economic sources. The policy would be naturally implemented both by supporting rivals to those in possession, such as Britain, and by making demands such as the Germans contemplate and prepare for. Abyssinia, by all accounts, is not going to be much good to Italy, and so Germany must cast an eye elsewhere to engage in colonisation. The Brenner Pass, according to Hitler, is going to remain inviolate, but according to history it has been for Italy a point ’O-f anxiety such as it may again become soon enough. Ihe annexation of,Austria had been allowed to pass without an admission in the official press that its consequences would be at least as important elsewhere as they were there. Now it is said there is grave anxiety in Czecho-Slo-vakia, though Anglo French representations have been made to that country as well as to Germany in favour of compromise. Thus, should there be a compromise, however temporary, it will indicate that the AngloItalian understanding has a wider scope than the margin of the Mediterranean. If there is, on the other hand, no compromise, then the indications are that the Anglo-Italian understanding will . have to be given a wider scope than the margins of the Mediterranean.