SINGAPORE BASE.

Grey River Argus, 21 July 1923, Page 5

SINGAPORE BASE.

Underhand Tactics. ■BRITISH M.P.’S CRITICISM. (Aus. and NZ. Cable Assn.) (By Electric Telegraph—Copyright.) LONDON. .Inly 19. In the House of Commons in Committee of Supply on the Naval Estimates, Mr Lambert moved to reduce the naval vote as a protest against the proposal for the construction of the Singapore naval base, lie complained that this proposal did not mention the Washington naval limitation confer once. He said the very basis of such a treaty :.s that of Washington must be confidence and good-will. Conceal ment in these matters was inconsistent with the best traditions of British statesmanship. If, he said, we proceeded with this base, we should be leading in a new arma neats race. The base at Singapore w; s only necessary in contemplation of a war with Japan. If this war was contemplated, why did we sign the Washington Treaty? It was inconceival le that the British Grand Fleet could be sent thousands of miles to Singapore, to destroy the Japanese fleet. The whole thing, he declared, was a piece of “woolly thinking. ” The motion was rejected. INTERESTING DEBATE. IS JAPAN THE OBJECTIVE? (Received July 20 at 10.30 p.m.) LONDON, July 20. Tn the House of Commons naval debate. Commander Burney said the Singapore Naval Base would not be a violation of the spirit or the letter of the Treaty. ITe believed that a combination of the airship and the aeroplane would eventually eliminate the floating battleship. However, Singapore was vital to the defence of Australia. and of Britain’s •eastern trade. The Oppositionists were gambling with the fate of the Empire. Major Hay said it would require two thousand artillerymen and two thousand infantry to protect Singapore on the land side. Colonel Brabazon declared that the Singapore scheme concerned Empire more than it did England. He suggested that they should not commit the country before the question was considered. If there was danger of a war with Japan a generation hence, then Singapore would be the most important strategical point in the world, but the proposed policy would lead to an expenditure of 50 millions. Was the country prepared to face that? Sir F. Banbury said |hat so long as human nature was as it was, there would be wars and Turnouts of wars. The only security was preparedness. Admiral Gaunt, in a breezy, sailorlike way, swept aside all objections, saying:—“You must keep in touch with the extremities of your Empire, and for goodness sake be prepared for war, if you want to run an Empire. You must have a base somewhere, and there is no place better than Singapore.” .Viscount Curzon rejected the suggestion that the Singapore plan was a threat to Japan, which was six and a half days’ steam away. Distances in the Pacific were terrific.. Both in Australia and in New Zealand, he said, the Singapore base was ardently desired. He continued: —“Surely this country, when Australia appeals for help, will ■not say to her: “Wo are very sorry. You are in danger, we know, but wo cannot come to your assistance.” Mr C. W. Darbishire (a former resident of Singapore) objected to the policy of the base, because it was an aggressive one., and would make a war inevitable in the future. Mr Shirley Benn said the Japanese had far more sense than to think this naval base 3000 miles from their shores ■was part of a preparation to attack fibem. Commander Carlyon Bellairs said that successive Committees of Imperial Defence had been convinced that Singapore was a vital necessity. Without it they might have to abandon the whole Empire, and also their interests in the Ear East. Lady Astor said she hoped that, even now, the Admiralty could agree to postpone a final Singapore decision, until the Imperial Conference. If the Conference agreed, there could not be a voice raised against the proposal. Captain Wedgwood Benn said Britain was the most heavily taxed of all the signatories of the Washington Treaty, and she was the first to embark on an expenditure which was an infringement of the spirit of that treaty. WHO IS BASE AIMED AT? (Received July 26 at 9.5 p.m.) LONDON, July 19. Tn the naval debate, Colonel Amery, replying f° r the Government, repudiated the charge that the Singapore base would be a violation of the Washington Treaty. Britain, be said, led the world in the fulfilment of that Treaty. Lt was perfectly clear that the Singapore base was outside the zone of non-ae-tion. The Japanese, before and since the Conference, had been engaged on a policy of dockyard and naval base extension, on which they were spending large sums. They said nothing about if at the Conference. Japan, in the ■present year, was spending- two millions on her naval bases. America, on ,\)ie East side, was strengthening her fortifications. These operations had no off ensive object. As a matter of fact, it was their object to establish^zones of neutrality in the Pacific, and to sep-

arate the nations by such distances that the nations could not act offensively against each other. The only reason why the British Government considered this base was because the capital ship to-day was very different from that of pre-war days. It was difficult to protect such craft from attacks of submarines. Therefor* it was necessary to have a graving dock big enough io hold those ships in Pacific waters. He said: “If we had any aggressive designs against the Japanese, we should never have proposed a scheme under which we would bo deprived of the use of Hongkong, where we already had a base. The distance from Yokohama to Singapore is the same as from Gibraltar to New York. If we were to put an additional dock at Gibraltar, could it be said that we had menacing designs on America? We cannot expect the Dominions to help to defend the Empire unless we are able to help them. There is no reason why the estimated total cost of tern millions and a half should be exceeded.” The closure was then carried by 214 votes to 133.