WAR HISTORY IN MAKING—TRUE PICTURE

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 22818, 13 December 1948, Page 4

WAR HISTORY IN MAKING—TRUE PICTURE

A-JOR-GENEKAL Sir Howard Kippenberger’s advice that it is unwise to accept too freely opinions on certain critical phases of the Second World War is sound if the historical recording of facts and conclusions are to stand the test of time. Contemporary histories frequently lack this virtue; in fact, past experience has shown more often than not that a completely accurate presentation is not possible until the reluctance to criticise living personalities — political and.military—has expired with their death. Apart from unwillingness to offend, frank criticism of contemporaries has as its deterrent endless argument and perhaps the threat of litigation. In any reasonable attempt to give a true presentation of the past there are two main processes—the investigation and discovery of the truth, which is a branch of science controlled by the rules of evidence, and the literary recording of the result, which is a branch of art. From the beginning the writing of history has combined in various proportions both procedures. The historian should be essentially a narrator wholly detached or impartial, tracing causes and results but avoiding as much as possible moral judgments from his own standpoint, and eschewing alike the emotional, rhetorical method of treatment. At the same time it must be interesting. A military history must also be deductive, and from the past present lessons for the future

For instance, in the event of another war should victors insist upon unconditional surrender? Major-General Ivippenberger questions Hie wisdom of that decision in the ease of Germany in the last war, and states that it prolonged the enemy’s resistance. But with evidence in 1944 of the Nazi Party going underground, was not the continuance of the war and the complete disgrace and extermination of its leaders desirable? Was the discussion of terms with a fanatic like Hitler and his removal from office likely to have been fruitful ? Was it likely that he would have resigned; he could not. have been allowed to remain in office.

Major-General Ivippenbcrger suggests that strategic bombing was not a sound policy. Tic gives figures up to the middle of 1942, but. no statistics of results later when airborne radar had been considerably improved. Allied intelligence, photographic and ground, showed heavy destruction and production delays. Has this since been proved false? The psychological effect was great. MajorGeneral Kippenbcrjrer.admits the effectiveness of strategic attacks on oil and transport targets.

Much that has been published so far on the Second World War has been by interested parties—political, Navy, Army, Air Force — in justification or in criticism of decisions taken. Has the historian yet had time to make his judgment? For the final word, for the completely impartial, objective account, it is suggested, we may have to wait some years.