R.A.F. WEAKNESSES IN MALAYA

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 22572, 27 February 1948, Page 5

R.A.F. WEAKNESSES IN MALAYA

CHIEF’S ANALYSIS

ATTACKSJDELAYED POLITICAL FACTORS (10.0) LONDON, Feb. 2G. To avoid offending American susceptibilities, General Headquarters ordered that tho Japanese seaborne force must not. be attacked until there was absolute certainty it was goin" to invade Malaya, says Air Vice-Marshal Sir Paul Maltby, assistant R.A.F. commander in Malaya during the invasion, in a dispatch dealing with the Malayan campaign. Enemy Established Ashore “The political circumstances which made it imperative for us to avoid any action that might precipitate war or that might make us appear the aggressors were partly, but only partly responsible for preventing the small air striking force that was available being used in the role for which it was primarily trained—to hit enemy convoys at sea as far away and as often as possible,” he says. ‘ The consequence was that the enemy was able to establish himself firmly ashore in neutral country before aeticri could be taken against his convoys. “The political factor was also partly responsible for preventing the initiation of the planned British advance into Siam (Operation Matador). “The consequences were far-reaching. Those affecting the air force were immediate. The enemy vas able to establish squadrons in strength in Siam within easy striking distance of our virtually defenceless aerodromes in North Malaya.” Enemy’s Power Under-estimated Air Vice-Marshall Maltby adds: “Put bluntly, the enemy's true value was much under-estimated. They on the other hand, were not deluded about our true value." The qualities of the Japanese airforce came as a complete surprise. The British aircraft were obsolescent or obsolete squadrons had not been modernised. Their signals and; navigational aids were primitive, their armament In some rospectß was poor and the radar warning was limited to Singapore’s immediate vicinity. There was particularly weakness in the trained fighter squadrons and reserves of aitcrews were inadequate.

Air Vice-Marshal Maltby refers to the weakness in the other services, “not in a carping spirit but only to counterbalance the imoression that the air was nrimarjlv responsible for Malaya’s: downfall. Neither Ihe Army nor the Air Force was strong enough to supnort the other or to fulfil its commitment'. Both suffered severely in attempting to do so,” he says Weakness of Other Services Air Vice-Marshal Maltby said although the talk about poor relations between the army and the R.A.F. had been r>y iterated, there was l'-ihco truth in it before the arrival of General Percival and Air Marshal Pulford, A.0.C., who died on a small island after the ship in which he left Singapore Was sunk. “Unfortunately, honestly-held differences of opinion about defence matters between their predecessors led to weaknesses which had not been fully rectified by the time the Japanese invaded,” ho said. In a naval dispatch covering the Malayan campaign, the narrative of the sinking of the battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse, drawn up Under the direction of ViceAdmiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, Com-mander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern Fleet is omitted. Only the reports of the Repulse’s cantain, Commander W. G. Tennant, and the Prince of Wales’ senior surviving officer, Lieutenant-Commander A. G. Skipworth, are published These give no facts not previously published, “Indomitable Spirit of the Navy”

The most interesting feature of the brief Admiralty document is an appendix containing the report of the first R.A.F. pilot to reach the scene of the sinkings. He flew for an hour low over the ships’ crews strugglnig in the water. He says: “I witnessed a show of that indomitable spirit for which the Royal Navy is so famous. I was over Dunkirk, in the Battle of Britain and in London night raids, but never before have I seen anything comparable with what I saw. It was obvious that ihe three rescuing destroyers were going to take hours to pick up hundreds of men clinging to bits of wreckage, swimming around in filthy, oily water. “The threat of another bombing and machine-gun attack was imminent. Yet as I flew around every man waved and put his thumb up as I (lew over him, I saw men in dire danger, waving, cheering and joking as if they were holidaymakers at Brighton. Here was something above human nature. In them I saw the spirit which wins wars.”