EURMA-CHINA FRONT
Coming as it does from headquarters of the South-east. Asia Command, the attention drawn to indications that the Japanese in northern Burma have decided to stage a slow withdrawal is significant. Most people have learned not to regard as infallible all the speculation in which various agency correspondents are prone to indulge. Even the “well-informed circles” have been known to err. But a military command is almost notorious for its conservative estimates and its canny approach to prophetic utterance. If it is true that the Japanese are contemplating withdrawal from northern Burma, leaving suicide parties at selected points to hamper the oncoming Allies as much as possible, it Is likely that an attempt is being made to consolidate the positions in China proper, Yunnan, and Indo-China.
To knock China out of the war is undoubtedly a primary objective of Tokio’s strategy. This is necessary not only for the defence of the Japanese mainland but also for the maintenance of a strong communications link with Malaya and the Netherlands Indies, both prizes which the enemy must hold as a source of vital supplies. Perhaps the Nipponese war lords have good reason to suspect that the naval and air arms of the Southeast Command are not exactly slumbering in peaceful bases and that at any time the units under Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten may strike between ’ Moulmein and the Kra Isthmus with a view to cutting the enemy’s land communications with Burma. Nothing, would be so conducive to a general retirement in northern Burma than the imperative demands of defence in this area and the maintenance of -strong- communication lines thereto. While fresh hope for China itself lies in a political reshufille which holds out promise of a much-needed contribution. to unity, the military j position is still not reassuring. The possibility of a strong Japanese thrust towards Yunnan from Indo-China is regarded as an- ever-present threat. There is also the prospect of blows at Kunming and 'Chungking and of an attempt to defeat the. purpose of the opening of the Ledo road. The further the enemy falls back in northern Burma, however, the greater the chances there Will be of extending this road into a new sphere of usefulness. From Myitkyina it could take either of two routes to China. It could cut eastward to Yunnan province through the jagged mountains that rise above the Salween River or it could be driven south through the valleys to Bhamo and from there join the old Burma road. In light of this latter alternative, the stiff fighting for Bhamo is given added point.
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Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXI, Issue 21581, 7 December 1944, Page 4
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432EURMA-CHINA FRONT Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXI, Issue 21581, 7 December 1944, Page 4
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