The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES" GISBORNE, WEDNESDAY, AUG. 12, 1942. THE RUSSIAN ENIGMA

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20860, 12 August 1942, Page 2

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES" GISBORNE, WEDNESDAY, AUG. 12, 1942. THE RUSSIAN ENIGMA

Not for the first time iu recent years Russia presents a problem to those who have attempted to follow developments there. To-day. the puzzle is primarily, if not essentially, a military one. Compared with last year, when the German invasion was launched, with little warning and on a vast scale, Russia should be incomparably stronger. She has had time to marshal her own resources, to bring up reserves, and to dispose the stream of supplies which has been pouring, in from Britain and the United States. Notwithstanding these things, the Germans seem to be pushing relentlessly forward and, more surprising still, there is an apparent lack of Russian opposition. To many people this situation is disquieting and discouraging, more particularly since the Russian initiative during the winter had created hopes of better things with the coming of the summer. It is not unnatural, in these circumstances, that questions should be asked hs to what has happened to the vast Soviet armies and that doubts should begin to arise as to whether it will be possible to check the German onslaught. It would be foolish to attempt to minimise the gravity of the situation —the Russians themselves emphasise its seriousness—but it is -.uggested that the immediate picture may be a misleading one. In the first place the commentator is handicapped by the absence of authentic information. The Russians, as in the last war, persist in refusing to allow Allied observers at the front and this means that reports are confined to the terse official communiques issued by either side—Russian admissions generally following a few days after the German claims—and these, naturally, are not particularly communicative or reliable. The only picture that is officially presented, there r fore, is one that is delineated by various place names which serve to indicate, almost exclusively at the present time, the speed and extent of the German advance. This picture, if not actually misleading, is .apt to give a wrong impression and an incorrect perspective, for it focuses attention only on one sector of the vast eastern front. The fact is that the Germans iave advanced into the Caucasus and hey have advanced with remarkable rapidity. But the Caucasus is not Russia; it is only a very small and, 'part from its oilfields, not very important part of it. Nor has this advance constituted, so far as can be

judged, any ■great, military victory, because it has not been seriously resisted. What lias really happened, then, is that the Germans have pushed forward an arm, or a head, into a narrow neck of Soviet territory and left the Russian armies intact in their rear or on their flank.

It has already been said that it is incredible that the Russians, theoretically much better situated than they were last year, could not hold the enemy. The fact that is apt to be overlooked is that they are holding the enemy everywhere on the vast front except in the extreme south. That is the point which should he underlined, for it is evidence of two things—firstly, that the Germans are unable to maintain an offensive along the whole front, as they did last year, and, secondly, that the Russians can hold the. enemy if they choose to make the necessary disposition of forces. The latter point is borne out by the success that has been achieved at Voronej. When ihe present offensive was..: first launched it. was suggested a close watch should be kept on developments in this sector, since it might prove to be the key to the whole campaign. If that view is correct, then the Russians still possess the key because the Germans have been unable to take Voronej—and it is certain that they would have taken it had it been within their ppwer to do so. South of Voronej, in the Don bend, a great battle is raging for Stalingrad, which is no less vital to either side. It is now suggested that the best guide to future prospects is Stalingrad and that eyes should be focussed there rather than on the Caucasus. Where does this reasoning lead to? The inference is that what has occurred in Russia during the summer campaign has been much more in accordance with the plans of the Russians than those of the Germans. It may be dangerous reasoning, it ii is unduly optimistic, but the only alternative conclusion is that the Russians are quite incapable of stemming the tide of the German advance—and there is no justification for arriving at that conclusion yet. From Leningrad in the north to Voronej and Stalingrad in the south the Russians have shown that they can hold the enemy. Further south still there is no evidence that they 'have offered any serious resistance. The inference is that the Germans have advanced only where they have been allowed to advance—and if they have advanced in accordance with Russian plans, then it bodes ill for the Germans. And if this' is not the Russian plan, how else can the ease of the advance and the withholding of the main Russian armies be explained? Superimposed over the whole picture of the present campaign in. Russia is one large question mark. The answer to it must await the event, but until such tune as the answer is provided it would be premature to assume that a German advance in one sector means a Russian defeat or that a Russian defeat at. one point presages the defeat of .Russia as ft.