UKRAINE THREAT

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20634, 14 August 1941, Page 5

UKRAINE THREAT

GRAVE POSITION STUBBORN RESISTANCE SURPRISE TO GERMANS (Elec. Tel. Copyright—United Press Assn.) (British Official Wireless.) Reed. noon. RUGBY, Aug. 13. An officer from the War Office, reviewing the situation on the eastern front, stresses the gravity of the position of the Ukraine, which certainly deteriorated last week. This south-easterly drive is very dangerous, he states. If successful, and the Dnieper is crossed east of Odessa, the position of the Russian forces in this area would be precarious, although there is a possibility of a seaborne evacuation in view of the fact that the Russian fleet dominates the Black Sea and there is little chance of a Nazi attack by sea from Constanza. At the same time the Russian force likely to be affected is not thought to be large, as there already has been the possibility of this threat to cut them off. Dealing generally with the position, the officer said that all reports of the fighting, except those in communiques, must be treated with suspicion, and there is no knowledge of the sources from which Helsinki, Stockholm and Ankara obtain some of the most sensational reports. No doubt the Germans had a large measure of success territorially, having occupied a stretch of country equal to the size of the old Germany, but no doubt also the German High Command expected more and was greatly surprised by the stubborn Russian resistance. Effect of Slow Withdrawal If the Red Army succeeded in extricating themselves from all the pincer movements and made a slow, methodical withdrawal the Germans would gain very little, even if they occupied Leningrad and Moscow, but the speed of modern mechanised units and methods of the present day warfare makes a slow withdrawal impossible. Great battles have taken place in scattered areas. The losses have been prodigious on both sides, but it is probable that neither side knows what is happening everywhere on the long battlefield in depth without a clearly marked front line. Thus the map of the front line, issued by the German High Command for German consumption, means little, for if it were possible for an accurate map to be issued it would not be strategically wise for the High Command to do so at this stage of the fighting. Two factors will decide the issue: Firstly the German ability to maintain the pressure, and secondly, the power of the Soviet High Command to replace losses of men and material.