JAPAN HARD PRESSED

Greymouth Evening Star, 9 December 1939, Page 4

JAPAN HARD PRESSED

NEED FOR NEW POLICY. It would be difficult to find a more revealing example of the peculiar war-time mentality of the Japanese than the attitude adopted in official, and unofficial circles towards the problem of American-Japanese relations. The fundamental basis of American policy (wrote Mr H. C. W. Woodhead, C.8.E., Shanghai correspondent of the “Sydney Morning Herald,” on November 4), has long been known to Tokio, and the American Notes of October and December last made it plain that the American Government will neither recognise nor condone the proposed "New Order in the Far East.” No secret is made of the apprehension of Japanese politicians over the present state of American-Japanese relations,' and the consequences of further exacerbating American feeling. Yet even in directions which would not affect the fundamentals of the "New Order in East Asia” policy no serious effort has been made to conciliate American interests. There has got to be a fundamental change in Japan’s policy towards America, and other third Powers,, if there is to be any reasonable hope of improved relations. Mr Siuna, who is about to become Foreign Office Spokesman, can hardly, after his recent. tour of duty in Washington, be under any illusions as to this. Confidence in Japan’ bona Udes can ever be re-established while the “New Order in East Asia” policy is adhered io. The “China Incident," as the present Sino-Japanese hostilities are still referred to in Japan, is now well into its third year, and it cannot truthfully be said that there is any indication of an early and satisfactory termination. Speeches anti interviews by leaders of the Chungking Government continue to reveal the persistence of the will to resist, and the long heralded establishment of a new Central Government under the leadership of Wang Chingwei has failed to materialise. • The appointment of General Toshizo Nishio as commander-in-chief of all the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China and the pronouncements of the new Japanese Premier

and his Ministers suggest that an intensification of efforts to reach a military decision is about to be made. But the difficulties of further extensive ‘ advances into Chinese National territory. while so much in the way of pacification of the occupied areas remains to bo undertaken, cannot be under-estimated. There are. moreover, signs of increasing disconteir in Japan both in regard to the Government's foreign policy and the indecisive character of recent, military j operations in China. What, it has already cost .Japan to carry on hostilities in China since July, 1937, can only be guessed. Slate expenditure has been quadrupled during the past two years. The National Debt has been more thon doubled. ' Apart from indirect and trade losses, 1 lit would appear that the “China In- 1 I cident” has already cost the Japanese! Empire a sum little less than 30,000,-p | COO.OOO yen—l2 times, as much as the < total State expenditure in 1.03(1, and!' | over iso limes as much as the total ' value of Japan's exports to China in J 1 Hie last normal year. ' The. Kcnovc. Hiranunia and Abe 1 Cal inets al! cnnimi’ted tbems'Jvc: to ’■ what has been described as Japan's - , “immutable" policy. There can, however, be no greater mistake than to £

regard any policy formulated in conditions of uncertainty and change as “immutable.” The policy to which Japan now professes to adhere was not the policy announced at. the outset of ’ Sino-Japanese hostilities. The Anti-Comintern Pact until a few weeks ago formed one of the corner-stones of Japan’s “immutable” policy. It went into the waste-paper basket after Herr Hitler’s defection, and is now but an unpleasant memory. To the great democracies it is becoming increasingly puzzling how Japan can still adhere to her “New Order in East Asia” policy when it conflicts so seriously with her repeated assurances to third Power Governments, and appears to make any hope of peace with any self-respecting Chinese regime hopeless.

Most of aims in China which can be regarded as legitimate and consistent with the maintenance of China’s sovereignty and independence could have been realised without recourse to large-scale hostilities, though it would, it is true, have been necessary to beget confidence in Japan’s bona tides by proofs of goodwill and the renunciation of military

aggression. ; NEUTRAL TRADE STRANGLED. Wherever the Japanese Army or , Navy has penetrated, there third . Power trade ha sheen carried' on in . reduced' volume —if it has not been , completely extinguished—against such . obstruction, restrictions and flagrant ■ discrimination as to make it doubtful whether it is worth while. In Tientsin and other parts of North China neutral trade has been practically strangled by currency and export re- . strictions. In Tsingtao these obstacles have been aggravated by refusal, now extending over many weeks, to allow neutral shipping the use of the wharves, to which Japanese 1 vessels are given free access. Neutral trade and shipping communications with Hankow and other Lower Yangtse ports have not been permitted since the capture of the Wu-llan cities. Railways, linanced with funds invested by foreign bondholders, whose properties and revenues have been pledged as security, are being operated, wherever they come under Japanese control, .in complete disregard of the interests of the bondholders. The time has come when the only means of convincing these Powers that any credence is to be attached to Tokio’s pledges is to implement, them. There is no other means by which the ill-will and suspicion created by Japan’s ■odious during the past two years can be overcome and confidence in her intentions restored. ! It. is easier for Japan to-day than it. has been at ahv time since the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities to

readjust her "immutable” policies so is to implement her pledges to third Powers and to place greater emphasis ipon what may be regarded as their ■ununciatory features. There can no onger be any pretence that any bond )f friendship or of confidence exists jetween Tokio and Berlin. Herr Hiter has demonstrated just as em.'hatically to Japan as ho has tc irance and Britain that his pledges< ire valueless. The Japanese ought iy this time to realise that they have icon victims of Nazi double-dealing' hroiigbout the duration of the "China 1 neident." Wha,fever immutability hero may have been about the AutiTminretn Pact has been destroyed h{Tier’s perfidy. The Berlin-Moscow Pact has reuited in the complete isolation of

1 Japan, and in aggravating the danger, i of a Soviet-Japanese conflict. On this! ground alone a. reconsideration of' Japanese policy especially those feaof it that have bad so deploran effect upon her relations wit!] the democracies, seems imperative. Ono cannot base an immutable policy .

I upon immutables that no longer exist. ' And' (hough Japan not unrcasonablj 'complains of Germany's perfidy in the matter of treaty violation, it ought not to be forgotten that most of the grievances ci third Powers are based upon similar charges levelled against, liersel i.