BRITISH NAVY READY

Greymouth Evening Star, 7 September 1939, Page 13

BRITISH NAVY READY

GUARDING OF TRADE ROUTES What aie probably the most elaborate plans ever prepared by the Navy to meet an emergency have now, I understand been .completeci writes Mr. Hector C. Bywater, naval correspondent of the London “Daily Telegraph,” under date July 8. They refer to the protection of the imports of food and other commodities, on the maintenance of which our chances of victory in a major war would depend. It has taken three years to work out these plans, which are not" the work of naval officers alone. Experts in economics and other sciences have been called in to help, and the Air Ministry has been consulted throughout.

The following outline, while in no sense official, may be accepted as authoritative.

Should an emergency occur it would find at least 1,600 British merchant ships at sea, scattered over the globe, the majority being cargo vessels, in addition to over 200 large coastal vessels. Very soon this number would be substantially increased by putting into commission older vessels now laid up—though here there might be delay caused by lack of personnel—and possibly by neutrals under Government charter.

The main routes for food and raw materials, including oil, traverse the North and South Atlantic. If the Mediterranean were closed to merchant shipping the already large volume of traffic proceeding northwards from the Cape to Britain would be greatly increased.

Whether convoy would at once be put into force on one or all of these routes would depend on circumstances such as the Admiralty’s knowledge of enemy warship movements. The probability is, however, that convoy would be established in certain waters very soon after the emergency arose, and all arrangements to this end have been made.

Of equal, perhaps of greater importance, is the effective patrol of the more distant areas of the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans where, in the last war, enemy raiders caused considerable damage. In those days patrolling cruisers were hampered by their limited range of vision, dictated by weather conditions and the eyes of the masthead lookout. Sometimes an enemy was missed by only a few miles owing to low visibility. Those conditions have been radically altered by the air arm. Even in certain Naval circles there has been sharp criticism of the Admiralty for its action in building a fleet of large and costly aircraft carriers, of which six are now under construction and seven others are already available. It has been widely assumed that these ships, were intended to act with the battle fleet, and that owing to their vulnerability they would fall an easy prey to, enemy attack.

PLANES FOR PATROL This, I understand, is a complete misconception. What is much more probable is that most of these ships will be detailed to patrol the ocean trade routes, where, in normal weather conditions their ’planes— tOi which they each carry at least 60 —-should be able' to locate enemy raider's and attack them.

It is also not unlikely that each carrier would work in conjunction with one or more cruisers, which would instantly be informed of the position aod movements of suspicious vessels. This scheme applies only to the more distant ocean routes. In the narrower seas friendly shipping would be protected by light vessels —small cruisers escort vessels, motor torpedo-boats — and shore-based aircraft. The Admiralty’s attitude appears to be one of quiet confidence in the Navy’s ability to perform its vital task. But over-confidence would be dangerous. Points that suggest critism are: The lack of Sin-guns cruisers as modern and as heavily armoured as those building in Germany.

The as yet. unproved efficiency of measures taken to safeguard merchantmen discharging in port or entering or leaving. On most days of the year about 300 British vessels alone are lying in United Kingdom.ports. The notorious inadequacy of port and docking accommodation on the West Coast of Britain, whither a very large volume of traffic normally using East Coast ports -would be diverted. On this point nothing whatever seems to have been done. . Finally, it should be borne in minci that in time of war the demand foi all commodities would greatly increase, thus entailing the use of moie shipping and throwing a still heaviei burden on the defending forces. It cannot be said, therefore, that the outlook can as yet be viewed with complete equanimity.