PLEDGES TO CZECHS

Greymouth Evening Star, 26 April 1938, Page 4

PLEDGES TO CZECHS

RUSSIAN INTENTIONS The Soviet Union will fulfil all her pledges to Czechoslovakia, on condition that France does the same. This statement was made to-day by a high official here in a deliberately casual and informal way. but it can be accepted as an expression of a decision finally and irrevocably reached, wrote the Moscow correspondent of the “Daily Telegraph and Morning Post” on March 17. I am not allowed to divulge the name of the man who made it —the Soviet is very secretive in these things. It suffices to say that no one could speak with greater authority. The statement was carefully timed to follow M. Blum’s more formal assurance to the same effect given to the Czech Minister in Paris, and may be regarded as equally conclusive. It also follows the French communique declaring that the Supreme Council of National Defence in Paris is already working out, in co-operation with the Czechoslovakia General Staff, the best and swiftest way for France to help Czechoslovakia. For that reason the remark of the high Soviet official, when reminded that Russia had no common frontier with Czechoslovakia, is highly significant. He declared: “A corridor must be created.” Such a statement could only have been made after precise plans, both .jol.’**'-al .1 be”" '’nwn up between Moscow and Prague as to the best way of supplementing Russia’s plans to help the Czechs if the latter should become the victim of an unprovoked aggression. It is no secret that during past years and months prolonged and frequent conversations, have taken place between the staffs of the Czech and Russian armies.

No General Staff can judge its plans of campaign in advance, and Russia is the most secret country in the world. The only information communicated by the Soviet authorities is a denial that there has been any movement of troops.

But Marshal Voroshiloff has repeatedly declared that the great garrisons of Western Russia are kept in a state of preparedness, both in training and munitions. Admittedly the absence of all common frontiers is the most awkward problem, political or military, confronting the experts of the two Governments. This problem, however, existed already at the time the Pact of Mutual Assistance was signed, and it would be a mistake to think they were now taken by surprise. . It is impossible to read Herr Hitler’s mind. Moscow, like Paris and Prague, is convinced of the necessity I of making quite clear to him that she j is prepared and ready to fulfil her treaty obligations. THE AIR ROUTE The air problem is fairly obvious and comparatively easy. If Czechoslovakia were invaded by an aggressor the Red Air Force, whose numerical strength is no secret, could send large numbers of planes to help the Czechs, flying them at a great height over, for instance, the corner of Rumania, along the route followed by the MoscowPrague air line. The Germans and Italians have successfully used this means of getting their planes to Spain. * The problem of troops is a much

graver one. But this, in its first stage at least, a political problem has certainly been thought out. After all, the League Covenant is still in force. If Czechoslovakia became the victim of an aggression she would immediately invoke Arfticle 16, under which Poland and Rumania are, like everybody else, pledged to allow the passage of troops across their territories when the aggression has been proved. . The Rumanian route from Russia to Czechoslovakia forms a poor and primitive line of communication. The centre of the whole problem is Poland, whose ideas on the passage of Red troops through her territory are well known. 1 can only repeat that—in view of the nature of the problems, both poli-' ‘ tical and military, involved—the “high Soviet official” declares that ' “a cor-

ridor must be created.” Or, if Polland to-day no longer likes the word “corridor,” then let us say a “way” must be found.