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WAR IN SPAIN

POWER OF DEFENCE. Major-General A. C. Teniperley, “Daily Telegraph and Morning Post” Military Correspondent, writes: — It is not an easy matter to be certain what lessons, if any—either technical or tactical —have been learnt from the Spanish war. Firstly, the information has been somewhat scanty on the technical side. It is no doubt true that the foreign Powers who, despite the Non-Inter-vention agreement, supplied one side or the other with material, have probably learned a good deal from this valuable trial run. Yet. they have been careful to keep the lessons to themselves. (Secondly, a civil war, in which the army, on one side at least, was originally extremely amateurish, is not a very favourable arena for tactical deductions. Latterly, however, the new army on the Government side has approximated more nearly to a competently trained force; their weapons are properly handled and the tactics have improved.

The first and most unmistakable lesson has been the ever-increasing power of the defence. The multiplication of machine-guns and the lack of adequate artillery support for the attack —as well as inferior training and staff work —have swung the balance in Spain still further in favour of the. defence. The attacking tanks, few in number and badly handled, have frequently collapsed before the anti-tank gun. This is a new phenomenon in war, and the temporary superiority that I the attack and gained by the intro- ! duction of the tank has now been considerably diminished. There seems to be no doubt that the anti-tank guns on both sides have been very effective. The German guns of 22mm., 37mm. and 47mm. have I all done good service, but they have been opposed by better tanks than General Franco possesses. The 20mm. “Oerlikon” anti-tank gun on hte Government side can penetrate armour of a thickness of 16mm. at a range of 1,000 yards. It can therefore destroy the light tanks supplied by the Germans apd Italians. ; It is now realised that these havei been a failure owing to the thinness of their armour. They were, in fact,] little more than reconnaissance' cars, t and some types of the Italian Fiatj Ansaldo could only shoot straight ahead. On the Geinnan side the T 26, of! Spanish make, and the medium T 2S ' Russian on a Vickers model. have! been definitely superior. j It would be premature to discredit i the tank on the imperfect information.! we possess, but it may, I think, be concluded that thicker armour is required —which will reduce speed—and that frontal attacks, unless in darkness or I as a surprise, can hardly hope to sue- : ceed. But the struggle between guns and armour will continued. '

ANTI-AIRCRAFT SUPERIORITY. In the air General Franco has been served by the Caproni and Savoia bombers and by the Fiat Meinkel 51. Junker 52, and Messerschmitt as fighters. The last-named has a speed of 255 miles an hour, and the others about 220 miles an hour. On the Government side are the Russian Katiouska bomber, with a speed of 198 miles per hour, and the J. 15 and 16, also Russian. ’Plane for ’plane the Russians are probably the better. General Franco’s superiority in the air is due to his very formidable antiaircraft guns of German make. The 88 m.m., with a ceiling of 36,000 feet, and the 37 m.m. and 20 m.m. for low flying aeroplanes are all very efficient. The Government weapons are poor and scarce. The Nationalists scored the whole of their successes against the Basques by theii’ German aircraft. Given —as in this case —the absence of antiaircraft gunnery with the latest in-

strnments is incomparably more, efficient than it has eyer been.

At the same time aircraft are faster and can fly higher. More experience is required between more evenly matched opponents before we can be sure that the gun ,can give efficient protection against air attack on, a large scale. Finally, there is the age-old lesson that militia armies can fight bravely in defensive positions, but offensive operations on a large scale require trained regimental officers and an efficient staff.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/GEST19380419.2.85

Bibliographic details

Greymouth Evening Star, 19 April 1938, Page 12

Word Count
681

WAR IN SPAIN Greymouth Evening Star, 19 April 1938, Page 12

WAR IN SPAIN Greymouth Evening Star, 19 April 1938, Page 12