BACK TO GOLD

Greymouth Evening Star, 28 December 1934, Page 12

BACK TO GOLD

PREDICTION BY SNOWDEN. A world-wide return to a better gold standard is predicted’ by Viscount Snowden in the second volume of his autobiography, published here, says the “New York Times.” “Personally, I have not yet seen any practical plan to supersede the gold standard,” Lord Snowden writes, “and when international confidence is restored and international trade recovers I believe the countries will return to an improved gold standard.” As the Chancellor of the Exchequer who took Great Britain off gold in September, 1931, Lord Snowden reveals much unwritten history of the great crisis of that year and of the frantic budget-balancing efforts which led to the break-up of the Labour Government. Lord Snowden warmly defends the attitude of the international bankers of Paris and New York in August, 1931, wlien the Bank of England was 'appealing desperately for credits to avert a collapse. In particular he testifies to the fairness of Mr George L. Harrison, governor of the Federal Reserve Banks of New York, and denies the Labour Party’s charge that a “bankers’ ramp” forced the Labour Government to resign.

“So much has been said about the dictatorship of the bankers that it is only fair to state clearly what their attitu.de was,” Lord Snowden writes. “The financial position was daily geti ting worse. A collapse of credit was imminent and this would have a disastrous effect. In order to fight the financial crisis the Bank of England was endeavouring to raise a credit fund of £80,000,000, half of which would be raised in New York and the other half in Paris. “The Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Central Bank in Paris had throughout shown a sympathetic attitude to the financial difficulties in which Great Britain was placed. They had already granted credits for £ 50,000,000, and these credits were exhausted. Both New York and Paris were quite ready to grant a further credit of £80,000,000 provided satisfactory assurances for the security of their advances could be given. In fact, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Central Bank of France had issued on their own initiative a reassuring statement as to the British Government’s intentions to stabilise the national fmaneal position.

WILLING TO HELP. “Contrary to reports which were circulated that" the crisis was due to a conspiracy on the part of the bankers, the fact was that throughout the banks had shown great willingness to render financial assistance to the Government. All that the foreign banks had insisted upon was that they should be reasonably sure of the security for the advances they were ready to make.” The Labour Cabinet had already

agreed to economies of £56,400,000, Lord Snowden recalls; but the Bank of England insisted on £20.000.000 more to restore foreign confidence. Mr Harrison agreed by telephone that if this further reduction could be made New York’s half of the £80,000,000 credit would be forthcoming. It was on this additional £20,000,000 ot economies that the Labour Cabinet split and a national Government was formed. Even a Coalition Government could not stop the rout, and a month later the Franco-American credits were again exhausted. “By the middle of September the situation had become so serious that there was no other course open but to suspend the gold standard, ’ Lord Snowden says. “The amount of] foreign assets held in London largely exceeded the amount of the bankers gold.” ' n . , Although Lord Snowden judges many of his contemporaries acidly and even harshly in his book, he becomes positively mellow in paying his tribute to Mr Montagu Norman, governor of the Bank, of England. At their first meeting in 1924, Lord Snowden confesses, he expected to find a “hard-faced, close-fisted, highnosed individual,” like the caricatures in Socialist newspapers.

THE REAL MAN. “There came into the room a man 1 so different!” he writes. “He might have stepped out of the frame of a ■ I portrait of a handsome courtier of the I Middle Ages. It took but a short aci quaintance with Mr Norman to know ; that his external appearance was the i bodily expression of one of the kindI liest natures and most sympathetic I hearts it has been my privilege to , know. “To him, more than to any states- | man of Europe, is the credit due for the partial restoration of the econ- | omic condition of Europe from the utter collapse in the years following the war. Whether Mr Norman’s policy and actions have been right or wrong, whether he has made mistakes or not, one thing is indisputable—no man with great responsibilities ever tried more faithfully to discharge them with the single aim of promoting national and international wellbeing. “I know nothing at. all about his politics. I do not know if he has any. Aman’s real politics arise from his temperament and feeling, and the governor’s nature is essentially democratic. I should say that he hates snobbery and class distinction. Aftei' four years of intimate and almost daily associatjon with him, I am sure his work as governor of the Bank of England, especially in developing the principles of central banking and international financial co-operation, deserve the recognition which posterity will accord him.” .

All through a dinner three of the guests, bridge demons, were worried about finding a fourth. They knew that most of the others present didn’t play, and immediately after coffee it became apparent that their only hope rested in a woman unknown to the three of them. On being approached, she said she had played, although not for quite a while, and was available if they realty wanted her. They really did, and a table was set up. The unknown won the deal. She picked up the pack, hesitated, looked uncertainly at the other three, and then asked quietly: “Now, do I deal all the cards?” “By the way, did that new chauffeur of yours turn out all right?” “No, that’s why he’s in the hospital.”