DOBSON DISASTER

Greymouth Evening Star, 13 June 1927, Page 2

DOBSON DISASTER

COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY THE TREND OF EVIDENCE Completing its second day’s sitting on Saturday, the Commission appointed to enquire into the disaster at the Dobson Mine on December 3 last, has already heard voluminous evidence, but the hearing is likely to continue for two or three days longer. The majority of the witnesses examined so far have been practical miners, called by the Grey Valley Miners’ Union. The views expressed are somewhat contradictory, so far as concerns the actual explosion, but the concensus of opinion appears to agree on the following points: That the Dobson Mine is gaseous; that coal dust was plentiful prior to the explosion, and that the precautions taken to deal with it were ndt adequate; that the deputies were overworked; that some miners were in the habit of preparing in an improper manner the holes for shot-firing; that no proper check was kept on the issue and return of oil safety lamps, which were sometimes left in the mine; that the ventilation was not always satisfactory, but it improved considerably, as well as the general condition of the mine, during the few months preceding the disaster. It is alleged that flames were seen issuing from the electric motor driving the fan on one occasion, but this is only hearsay evidence, as the men who are said to have seen the flames were victims of the disaster. The chief recommendation made by the witnesses is that more precautions should be adopted to keep down the coal dust in the mine. So far, definite theories as to the . cause of the explosion, and the section of the mine in which it originated, have been lacking.

The Commission comprises Messrs E. Page (Chairman), J. Watson, and W. Balderstone. The following representatives were also present: Messrs A. H. Kimbell (Under-Secre-tary of the Mines Department), J. A. C. Bayne (Chief Inspector of Mines), O. J. Davis (District Inspector of Mines), C. J. Strongman (ex-District Inspector), J. Hughes (Manager Dobson Mine), W. Leitch (ex-manager Dobson Mine), Q. Hunter (ex-Man-ager, Dobson Mine), J. A. James (General Manager, State Mines), J. W. Hannan (Grey Valley Colliery Co.), W. J. Joyce (West Coast Deputies’ and Underviewers’ Union), R. J. Wearne (West Coast Miners’ Council), J. Smeaton (Grey Valley Miners’ Union), and A. Smith (Chairman of Directors, Grey Valley Collieries, Ltd). When the “Star” went to press on Saturday, the witness under examination was Thomas Reid, the miner who reported gas in his working place on the night prior to the disaster. Continuing his replies to questions put by Mr Leitch, Reid stated that the oil safety lamps might have been checked, but he had never seen it done. They were simply dumped on the floor of the lamp cabin when returned by the men. To Mr Watson: The lamps were examined by a deputy before they ■were taken into the mine.

To Mr Strongman: It was not the duty of witness to test his place for gas, but the duty of the deputy. Edward Keating, who was employed as a shot-firer on December 2, said that it was reported to him by Black (deceased), that the fan motor had sparked. Witness told the deputy (Little), about it, and the latter went for the engineer (Payne), leaving witness in charge of the fan, which had stopped. The engineer came down, and Noakes (deceased), showed him where the flames had been seen. The engineer said he did not think it was possible for the motor to flame, but witness believed what Black had said. He personally, after firing a shot, had seen smoke coming from a hole in one place, and blocked the hole up. He considered the shot-firing regulations were complied with. His opinion was that the explosion originated in Black’s place, judging by its shattered condition. Personally, he was too wide awake to .fire shots in gas. (Laughter). He did not think that some of the places had been worked practically. To Mr Wearne: The flames came from the part of the motor where the cable went in, but he did not see it himself. He did not consider the mine was dangerously dusty. To Mr Leitch: The majority of the electric lamps when returned were properly checked and booked up by witness. The oil lamps were not checked so far as numbers were concerned, and there was nothing to show that they were all returned. He had on many occasions refused to fire shots because they were not properly prepared, and had reported the fact once to Mr Leitch, who confirmed his action. All the officials were instructed not to fire any shots that were not properly prepared. If the hole was not deep enough, he refused to fire the shot. The miners sometimes “kicked up a fuss,” but he did not fire shots just to please them. Mr Hunter, when manager had also been strict. When Black reported the trouble at the motor he said that the fan had gone “bung.” Witness did not try to start the fan. He had only the dead men’s word about the flames coming from the motoor.

To Mr Joyce: It occurred on ; the back shift, when the electrical engineer was at home, and witness remained in charge until he arrived. To Mr Kimbell: The safety provisions had been enforced by the Mining Inspector, so far as he knew. To Mr Smeaton: He could not say whether tight shots had been fired by other shot-firers, but the fact that tight holes were prepared looked suspicious. The fan motor was working without any attention, and an oil safety lamp was hanging near it. Mr Balderstone: For whom did you refuse to fire shots? The Chairman said that as the men were not present, he did not think their names should be mentioned. Mr Balderstone said that the Commission wanted the truth, and any statements made should be proved. Witness said that one man (Heineger) was now working at the State mine, another was Brammer (deceased), and a third was an Italian “Big Gus.” “The big man who carried a knife,

interjected Mr Smeaton, amidst laughter. “I cannot pronounce his name!” To the Chairman: Witness had never known miners to fire their own shots. The deputy did the firing on the night shift. He had had over 20 years’ mining experience, and considered Dobson was safe and sufficiently ventilated. He went down with the second rescue party. The trucks in the rise workings were not so badly knocked about as those in the dips. FLAMES FROM MOTOR. Robert Marshall, trucker, son of the late Mr Marshall, said that his father told him that the fan motor had sparked two weeks before the disaster, and that he had seen flames three or four feet Jong coming from it. James Ford who worked in No 2 dip with his father on the night of December 2, said that the place was always good, but had tightened up that night, although free from gas. On one occasion, witness had seen a well-cut shot hole smoke. He had never seen men working in gas, he considered that the shot-firers were satisfactory, and he did not suspect anyone of smoking. He could not suggest anything to make the mine safer, except the proper treatment of coal dust. The No 2 dip was characterised by lino dust, and the roof was quite dry. To the Chairman: He did not. think any men fired their own shots. He had no idea, where the explosion originated. •The luncheon adjournment was then taken.

The first witness called by Mr Smeaton , after lunch was Carl Roberts, secretary of the Grey Valley Miners’ Union, who was also a mate of Noakes. Roberts said he was on the day shift during the week ol the explosion, as there were not sufficient trucks on the night shift. Noakes place was in good order when witness left it at 3 p.m. on. December 2. He was positive there was no gas present, and there was no coal dust. It was not the custom to' employ “grunching” to prepare holes in that place. He considered that Noakes was a careful, capable man, who would not be likely to fire a shot himself. The place was very clear after shots were fired. Noakes told witness that he had seen .flames coming from underneath the cover of the motor, about a week before the explosion. Black. Marshall, Lindsay and Noakes were all there at the time. Witness had never noticed large accumulations of fine dust in the mine, but No. 2 dip was fairly dusty. He had seen a little dust in the main heading, but did not consider it dangerous. The level known as Brammer’s was damp underfoot. He could not suggest any cause for the disaster, and heard no complaints from the men regarding danger in the mine. He did not think that smoking was carried on in the mine, and did not think men took in matches or cigarettes. He remembered the men being frequently warned by Air Smeaton against carelessness. To Air Wearne : He was quite positive Noakes said that the flame came from the motor. The mine was not dangerously dusty, but was • very gassy. The dust was fine and could easily be disturbed. To Air Joyce: He reported to a trucker about the fan being out of action, and the trucker went for the deputy (Litle). To Mr Kimbell : He could not suggest any amendments to the law. He had five years’ mining experience, and was satisfied that the Department’s inspection staff had done their best to enforce the, regulations. He had never complained about the dust. To Mr Balderstone : There was no set method of working Noakes’ place; it depended on the state of the coal. To the Chairman : He did not wait there until the engineer attended to the motor. When the lid was lifted off, witness saw soot-covered parts and something like molten lead. The engineer did not say what had happened. Noakes had been on the night shift only for one week before the disaster. He was building a house, and wanted to be off during the day. So far as witness knew, Noakes did not do any “grunching.” He bad not seen Noakes’ place since the disaster. When he' went down with the second rescue party, he did not see any sign as to where the explosion originated. Noakes showed the engineer where the flame was seen to come from the motor.

DEPUTY’S EVIDENCE. George Little, who was the deputy

in charge of the afternoon shift on December 2, said that he made a complete inspection of the mine after crib time, but did not see anything out of order. There was no trace of gas in any working place. Heid had said that he had not inspected all the working place, including iSie “goaf” area, but witness contradicted that. He was certain he made a complete inspection after 9 p.m. a W^ iei i Reid reported the gas witness said he did not think there was any . gas present. He admitted that gas could accumulate rapidly if the ventilation was interfered with, but said there was no gas when he inspected the place. If there was a movement in the “Dobson fault” near Reid’s place, it might produce gas. In Iris opinion, the No. 2 dp was pretty dusty in parts. Had gas ignited in Black and Marshall s place, the dust might have propagated an explosion of considerable violence. lie inspected the place at -the face of. No. 1 dip. below Noakes’place, but it was quite free from gas. He never heard of sparks coming from the small motor operating the pump in that dip. He had examined the sump several times, but there was not always water in it. If it was full, he would use a safety lamp as far as he could reach. He did not -consider the rise workings dusty or dangerous, and no place was as bad as No. 2 dip. From his experience in other mines, he considered that the ventilation at Dobson was very good, and the air was kept well up to the face. In August, he was present when Mr Strongman found gas in all places except two, but not in sufficient quantity to have the men ordered out. The gas was then attributed to the fact that the ventilation pipes or brattice was not close enough to the face. When he worked at the State Mine, brattice work was used, and witness never heard of ventilation troubles, [n his opinion, brattice was the handier method. He had never had occasion to refuse shots at Dobson. He fired one which a shot-firer refused, but it had been improved and was quite safe when witness fired it. He had never seen men smoking in the mine, and could offer no theory as to the cause of the disaster. The deputies at Dobson had too much work to do; all they'should be required to do was carry out inspections.

To Air Wearne : Reid’s part of the .nine would require watching, as gas .night accumulate. He did not think the’ Dobson mine was dangerously lusty, but precautions in the way of lusting were necessary. He did not think the clay used was effective. The coal dust would probably cause the explosion to spread. The leading miner in each working place should be compelled to qualify for gas testing, and the Act should be amended to make him responsible. To Air Joyce: He had been a deputy for about seven months before the" disaster, and was previously a miner for six or seven months. On the night of December 2 he pulled a bit of bad stone down from the roof of Heid’s place, about 9 o’clock. The ■entilation was good while he was here, and if it remained the same there would be no chance of the place filling up with gas. If Reid had no safety lamp, it would be his own ;ault. Reid did not complain to witness when the latter visited the working place, but did so later at the bottom of the main dip. He outlined the deputies’ duties at Dobson, which included a lot of manual labour. The shot-firer used to knock off about 0.20 p.m., book up all the shots ■red, and then go to the cabin to receive the men’s lamps. He thought .liree shots were fired in Brammer’s ;) |ace during the shift on December 2, ' ne at the right-hand side at the bot;iin and the other two at the top, on the’ left-hand side. He had never een any “grunching” done. Brammer’s place was used as a drive to cut through to the rope road, and was being driven quickly. Purdy and Hogarth were working there when witness inspected the place. Witness mid no time to revisit Reids place il'ter the latter reported gas, but he •eported it to Richards, the night de ■ utv, who said be would go and see khat was to be done. Witness had every confidence in Richards. On previous occasions, witness had found oil lamps hanging on trucks at the bottom of the dip? They left them for someone else to bring up. The oil lamps did not give a good light, and were used to give warning of gas. He had seen one or two oil lamps left burning at the bottom of the dip. The fan, or “booster,” situated near Noakes’ place, stopped on one occasion, and witness rang up for the engineer, leaving Keating in charge meanwhile. The engineer was promptly on the job. Witness heard nothing about sparks or flames from the motor. Carl Foberts sent a message to witness that the fan had stopped, but neither Lindsay, Black nor Alar shall, who were present, said anything about it to witness. He reported (lie incident in his book, the date being November 17. He did not hear any more about the fan before the explosion. It was not part of his duty to stone-dust the mine. Ihe shiftmen would do that under the manager’s supervision. During the lime he was deputy he carried out all his duties, and had no complaints from the men. The mine seemed (piite safe when he left on the night before the disaster. There was sufficient air going through to ventilate Ihe mine.

To Air Leitch : He reported several (fines to the underviewers that the men were leaving the oil lamps in the mine, but the lamps were not numbered, and the men who left them could not be found. ~ * To Air. Smeaton: He did not remember Keating reporting to him that the motor was sparking. The other men did not say anything eithed He did not think it was right to take out the pillars in a new mine like Dobson, because such a policy would cause falls, and might drive gas out to where it would come in contact with flame. It seemed a reasonable method to complete the driving of the headings first, and then work backwards. To Air. Bayne: Witness reached the fan about 45 minutes after it had stopped. He did not notice any smell of burning.

To Mr. Kimbell: He had seen one or two oil lamps left alight at the bottom of the main stone drive. They were extinguished, and sent out on a truck. There were no numbers on the lamps, such as there was at the State mine. No records were kept of the oil lamps at Dobson. The deputies had too much to do, and could not attend to all the safety provisions of the Act. He had 13 pair of hewers in his charge on the back shift. Only on one occasion, on the night before the explosion, he was visited by the manager in the mine, but he conferred

with the manager every day before going into the mine at 3 p.m. To Mr. Balderstone: The shot-firer was in Reid’s place after witness, and the shot-firer did not make any statements about gas, therefore he thought that the report was a ruse by the men to enable them to knock off early. To the Chairman: His report about the fan stoppage was in the report book.

The Chairman examind the book, but found no reference to the matter on November 17. It was mentioned, however, in the report on November is. Witness said it was not a practice of the men to allege that gas was present in order to get away early. Reid’s mate (Blanche) had reported gas on several occasions previously, and an immediate inspection by witness had proved the report to be correct. He did not investigate the report on the night of December 2, because it was so near knock-off time. Some of the safety oil lamps were left at the bottom of the main drive by the men, and others were left on the trucks on the west level. He had on one occasion found a lamp hanging in a working place. The miner told witness that he had left it there, and asked him to go and get it. The lamp was still burning when witness reached it. The majority of the men left their oil lamps at the bottom of the main drive,- instead of carrying them up. Lots of Dobson miners used oil lamps to see whether gas was present. The fan breakdown was reported to witness by a trucker, but none of the men near the fan said anything particular about it. He had no recollection of any reference being made to flames or sparks. To Mr. Strongman: He did not apprehend any danger from the use of the oil lamps, unless they were left hanging at the face. To the Chairman: He did not know whether any lamps were missing after the explosion. “HOTEL REPORTS.” Horace Griffiths said that on the day shift on December 2 he was actingdeputy at Dobson; prior to that he was a, shot-firer almost from the inception of the mining operations. He was satisfied everything was safe on December 2. He did not think there was enough dust to cause a disaster in No. 2 dip. As a shot-firer, he did not see any “grunching.” He had declined to fire, perhaps, a dozen shots during his time in the mine. They were all fired later by someone, but he did not know whether they were first improved. Another shot-firer followed witness around the mine. He had seen Brammer’s place since the explosion, but he could not say whether “grunching” had been done. The shot fired in the roof at Noakes’ place he considered highly dangerous in the Dobson mine. He had never found men working in gas. Some men might not be competent to test for gas, and just guessed about it. He examined the whole mine on December 2, including the sump. The custom was to move the small motor and the pump as the working face advanced, but he did not think it had been closer than half a chain. He did not suspect any men of smoking in the mine, or carrying matches. He had heard what might be called “hotel reports” about flames from the motor, but did not place any reliance on them. Neither Black nor Marshall told him about it. He could not suggest any improvement in the working of the mine. To Mr. Wearne: He never apprehended danger from coal dust at Dobson, and did not think that the mine was any more gaseous than others in the district. It would be all the better if extra, precautions were taken with regard to coal dust. To Mr. Smeaton: He could not give any reason why an explosion in the St. Kilda section of the Brunner mine did not spread-. He could not answer such questions. “You are further up the tree than I am!” commented Mr. Smeaton, but the witness was not to be drawn. To Mr. Watson: One hole in Brammer’s place looked as if it was a “grunched” shot.

DUST OVER BOOT TOPS

Thomas Nimmo, who was shiftman at Dobson on the night of the disaster, said that the level leading to Brammer’s place was fairly wet, but there was a little dust up the jig. No complaints were made to him. The men were in the habit of having crib in the level below their place, about half a chain away. Witness considered the ventilation was good prior to the disaster. In his opinion, No. 1 dip was not dusty, but No. 2 was, the coal dust being over his boot-tops in parts. He did not hear any complaints regarding gas in the mine. It was hard to account for the cause of the explosion. About three or four shots would be fired in Brammer’s place per shift. He did not know whether the men were making good money, or whether they were on thef “make-up,” or minimum wage. He had no reason to believe that any smoking ■was done in the mine on the night of the disaster. Deputy Richards (deceased) said nothing of anything being wrong.

To Mr. Leitch: He was sure that the doors in the dip were closed when he left. To the Chairman: He was having crib at the surface when the explosion occurred. The noise was very much like a big gun going off, but lasted longer than a gun. There was a sort of hissing sound afterwards for a few seconds. It all happened so suddenly that his recollections were not clear. On entering the mine, he noticed that the trucks had been thrown from the west level towards the east, at the foot of the stone drive. There used to be a lot of oil lamps hung on trucks at the bottom of the dip. On the night of the explosion, he saw an oil lamp hanging up in Brammer and Pardington’s place, while they were working there. It was the so far as he knew, for the lamps to be left at the bottom of the drive, and taken up on trucks. WORKING IN GAS. William Chetwynd, miner at Dobson, who had also worked in other West Coast and English mines, said that on the night of December 2 none of the deceased complained about anything being wrong. No. 2 dip was dangerously dusty—“too right it was!” No. 1 was not so bad as No. 2. The fan motor was in the return air way. He considered that ' Brammer’s level was wet, but he had never been right up to that working face. The only sign of danger witness knew of was the repch-t made by Reid concerning gas. There was coal dust galore in the bores from No. 1,2, and 3 west headings. On one occasion, when act-

ing as workmen’s inspector, about 12 months ago, he found some men working in gas, and a hole was being drilled there, but he could not say whether any shots were fired. The place was in the east level, and he told Clark, one of the men, to “get to hell out of it!” „ . Mr. Smeaton: Did he do so. No, he didn’t' (Laughter.) On that inspection, he also found gas in a place where Italians were working, but that was due to a brattice that needed attention. The ventilation was sufficient, but the pipes weer not put together properly. The only thing he could suggest for the safer working of the mine was greater attention to coal dust. He, would not like to fire “grunching” shots there. Witness picked up a small piece of candle near Brammer’s place since the disaster, but did not associate it with the . explosion. It was only a small piece, with no wick. He did not think anyone had been smoking. The only way he could account for the explosion was that a fall of stone in the rise workings had ignited gas and coal dust. As workmen’s inspector, he did not receive any complaints about the mine. The only thing he saw wrong was the coal dust. To Mr. Hunter: He did not consider that it was a check inspector’s duty to test for gas; it was the duty of the deputy. To Mr. Joyce: He saw the deputy (Richards) at the bottom of the dip about 2 o’clock on the morning; of the disaster. He heard Dando, the shotfirer, tell Richards about the gas in Reid’s place, just when they were going on shift at .11 p.m. Richards was a capable, reliable man, and witness was sure that he would have made an inspection.

To Mr. Davis: The manager should see that the men joined up the ventilation pipes properly. To Mr. Bayne: Gas was found in many working places on July 23, and so far as he knew, all the men had oil safety lamps.

To Mr. Strongman: Electric lamps were not in use at that time.

To Mr. Balderstone: He verbally reported the dust, but did not make a written report. There was very little work being done in the mine at that time, and he did not consider a report was necessary then.

To the Chairman: The miners would at that time have to carry the oil lamps out to show them the way. Since the electric lamps had been installed, however, he had seen oil lamps left at the bottom of the drive for someone else to take up. He had never seen an oil lamp left alight at the face after the men had gone. Edward Hallinan, workmen’s inspector, who had worked as a miner since the inception of the Dobson mine, said he had been employed in every section except the No. 1 dip. He did not consider the mine very dusty, and it was like the other mines on the Brunner field so far as gas was concerned. He did not think any smoking went on, and was satisfied that the men were not careless. Wherever a hole was put in the mine roof, gas accumulated. Hunter gave orders for the erection of a brattice at such a place in the east level, and this removed the gas. He could give no theory as to the cause of the disaster, and no suggestions for improving the mine. The chief accumulation of dust he saw was at Carter’s level. He did not consider Dobson was any more gaseous than Paparoa. He had also seen large quantities of gas in the St. Kilda section of the Brunner mine. He had seen Noakes’ place since the explosion, and considered that the shot fired there should not have been fired in the Dobson mine, as it would be dangerous. Witness picked up two lengths of shot-firing cable in the main dip, one piece about a chain below Noakes’ place, and another about two chains away, but he could not account for their presence there. “Was any battery found?” asked the Chairman.

Mr. Smeaton said that the dip had not yet been thoroughly cleaned up, and twenty batteries might be found there.

Witness said he had no theory as to how the explosion originated. To Mr. Bayne: One piece of the cable he found was rolled up. It was not the same as the cable used at Dobson before the disaster. The other piece was unrolled. To Mr. Smeaton: A shot could be fired by that type of cable. To the Chairman: The majority of the men used to carry up their oil lamps after their shift, but others did not. The oil lamp was not a nuisance when the electric lamp was used also. Had the cable been used to fire a shot, it could not have been rolled up again in the manner in which witness found it. The unrolled piece was shorter.

The Chairman expressed the wish that Blanche (Reid’s workmate) should be called to give evidence regarding the report of gas in their working place. Mr. Smeaton said he had not called Blanche because he wished to avoid repetition and save time as much as possible; but he would call Blanche on. Monday. The hearing was adjourned at 5.10 p.m. TO-DAY’S PROCEEDINGS. DIPS VERY DUSTY. The first witness called this morning by Mr Smeaton was John Bullock, a miner employed on the day shift in No. 2 dip on December 2 last, and for two months prior to that. During the week before the explosion, the place was very dusty, and he reported it to Griffiths, who was then acting as shotfirer. The dust, was so thick that witness could hardly see his mates. The air coming through the pipes was not sufficient, to remove the dust from the working place. He made a practice of testing his place three or four times a day with an oil safety lamp, but found no trace of gas. After he complained about the dust, clay was put down. Before coming to New Zealand, witness worked in English, Canadian, and American mines, and thought the New Zealand laws were all right if they were carried out properly. He preferred brattice to ventilation pipes. Dobson was not as gaseous as some of the mines he had worked in. He did not. believe in taking out pillars in a new mine, and did not believe in the use of electricity. When working in No. 2 dip he used to have crib near the cut-through. He had never seen the fan motor sparking, but had been told by Cornish that Black had complained about it. Both Deputy Richards and Griffiths had refused to fire shots which witness thought were all right. There had been some grunching carried on in the Dobson mine, but he regarded holing as being much safer, and always adopted the latter method himself. He believed that the ail- intake to working places at Dob-

son was not wide enough; it was nar-1 rower than the return air course. To Mr Wearne: No. 1 and 2 dips were both dusty.. The latter was particularly dusty during the week before the disaster. To Mr Leitch: He had never seen pillars taken out in a gaseous mine before coming to Dobson. He did not believe in places being sealed up in a gaseous mine; they should be left open for inspection. Air could be taken for any distance by means of brattice. Two months before the explosion, the No. 2 dip was dusty, but no so bad as it was before the explosion. He then complained that there was no ventilation pipe, and said he would not work there unless one was put in. He was “like a nigger” owing to the thick dust. Leitch never complained to witness about hanging his oil lamp on a jig post. If he “got ten years for it,” he would still say no. Leitch might have warned his mate about the lamp. He had found that air travelling at a low velocity would clear gas better than high velocity. The latter might cause an explosion, and it was risky. To the Chairman: Dobson was the first mine where he had seen air pipes used in preference to brattice. To Mr Leitch: He preferred the holing method, of working the face, and favoured that being made the law of the country. He believed Griffiths refused to fire shots for witness because he thought witness was making too much money. Griffiths said that the shot was not properly holed, but it was approved by the manager. (Hughes.) To Mr Hunter: The dust in No. 2 dip was thick, but he could not say definitely how deep it was on the floor. It might be about half an inch deep. The dust was probably distributed all the way along the dip, but he could not say definitely. To Mr Joyce: He had also complained about the air pipes being inadequate. He had not gone into any other men’s working place but heard it said that grunching was carried out. It would not be dangerous, if a place was well ventilated. He did not consider that the officials carried’ out their duties properly in regard to treating the coal dust. He had noticed gas in the mine, but had left the places as soon as he noticed it. As soon as he could smell gas, and feel the temperature going up, he used his lamp to test and make sure that gas was there. He had heard gas hissing at Dobson. The shot-firer Griffiths had a grudge against witness, and made excuses for not firing his shots, in order to stop witness making as much money as he otherwise would have done. To Mr Kimbell: The Inspector of Mines was in witness’s working place two days before the explosion, and he ' did not give Mr Davis the impression that the mine was dangerously dusty, but he did not consider it was safe. Clay was put down before Mr Davis arrived. i To Mr Smeaton: There was some i water in No. 2 dip, which the men • used to bale out. If a mine was work- ; ed on the “panel” system, the worked- • out places would be safe if properly i stopped off with brick or concrete. , Deputy Richards had refused to fire two shots for witness, until he improv- ; ed the holes. He did not suggest that , Mr Richards had a grudge against him.

■To Mr Balderstone: He had seen coal dust in Noakes’ place. To the Chairman: He had been working at Dobson for about 18 months, but he did not see any steps taken to deal with the dust until the week before the disaster, when clay was put down. The clay stopped the dust on the floor from spreading, but nothing was done to the roof or sides. He had sometimes thrown water over his place to make it more comfortable lo work in. The ventilation at the mine would be improved by the use of brattice instead of pipes. He complained to Griffiths about the coal dust in the working places during the week before the explosion, and the clay was then used, but it was used in the dip, and did not improve the dust in the working place. The only effective way to do that was by putting in more air. He regarded the dust at Dobson as dangerous. To Mr Smeaton: It was not the practice of miners to complain to Mining inspectors; the latter were supposed to see things for themselves. He also told the secretary of the Union (Roberts) about the dust. To Air Strongman: He could not say whether samples were frequently taken by the Inspector at Dobson; he had never seen it done, but it might have been. James Blanche, who was Reid’s workmate in the rise section on December 2, said that gas was not noticed before 9 p.m. A safety lamp was forgotten that night because they had tools to carry into the mine, but he had not made a practice of going without the lamp. While they were putting up a prop, Reid said that the place was full of gas. They borrowed a lamp from the Italians, proved the presence of gas, and left the place. They reported to the deputy (Little), but the latter accused witness of wanting to get away early. Witness offered to go back with Little to test, the gas, but Little said he was too busy. There were no ventilation pipes in the rise. Little had visited the place three times that night, but did not make a proper inspection, not going beyond the working place. The •gas might have been making in the “goaf” area for some time. He did not leave the place because he wanted to get home early. He was making £2 1/- per day, and was not likely to leave that without a good reason. To Mr Hannan: The last inspection was made by Little three-quarters of an hour before the gas was noticed. Dando, the shot-firer, visited them shortly after Little, but did not inspect the place. Witness left the place at 9.45 p.m. If Little said it was 10.25 p.m., when witness reported to him, Little’s watch must be sadly wrong. He had never had any trouble with the officials at Dobson, and denied that Keating had found him knocking a safety lamp against a rail He told Keating that the lamp was out, and would not burn. Keatingsaid he would report witness, but did not order him out of the place. The lamp was subsequently examined by the officials, but no marks were found on it. . ~ To Mr Leitch: The gas was in the goaf section, but the actual working face was clear. There was no brattice at the place, and nothing to stop the gas accumulating. There were no pipes into the place; they never went past the level, and he would contradict Mr Leitch if he said they did , Mr Smeaton objected to Mr Leitch s questions, on the ground that Mr Leitch had not been regularly in the To Mr Joyce; Witness said the pipe never went within a chain of the end of the fault line, or coal seam. The place should have been ventilated that night, and should have been thorough-, ly examined. Little said he would not'

go back with witness. Reid- did not refuse to go back; he said nothing. It was not the duty of colliers to go back to a place and ventilate it. It was not correct that they did not meet Little until 10.25 p.m. They met him at the bottom of the drive, helping the trucker, before 10 p.m. Dando did not come near the working face, and did not test for gas. Little took some stone from the roof before crib time, but did not inspect the roof later. Reid found gas five or six feet above the floor; the roof was 14 feet 6 inches above the floor. Mr Hughes kept “nagging” at them all the time to keep the place well timbered and the roof up. Numerous props were put in, and the Act always complied with as regards timbering. To Mr Balderstone: The only reason given by the deputy for refusing to visit the place was that he was too busy. He seemed to have an idea that they wanted to get away home early, but witness defied any man to say that he had ever reported gas merely in order to get home early. To the Chairman: When Reid tested for gas, the flame of the lamp went blue, and they then left the place, in accordance with the manager’s standing orders. When witness got outside, he told Dando to tell Richards to be careful if he went into their place that night. He considered that Dobson was a very gassy mine, but he had not been troubled much by dust in the rise workings. In his opinion, the deputies at Dobson were overworked.

At this stage, witness explained the rise workings to the Commissioners, with the aid of a plan.

In reply to the Chairman, he said he was sure that Reid took the safety lamp out of the mine after using it.

Mr Smeaton said he did not suspect electricity of causing the disaster, but statements alleging danger had been made, and he would like some evidence called regarding the fan motor. The Chairman said this could be done.

DEPUTY RECALLED. Recalled by Mr Joyce, Deputy Little declared that he examined the “goaf” side in the rise workings .at 9.5 p,m. The ventilation pipes ran right .to the fault line, and had never been taken out since the section was first worked. He explained his statement by reference to the plan. The ventilation went right through the "goaf” area, and had a considerable amount of gas accumulated it would have worked its way out. It would be impossible for it to reach the dip section of the mine. Witness thoroughly examined Reid’s place, but found no gas. Reid and his mate came to the bottom of the dip at 10.25 p.m. Witness arrived there at 10.20 p.m., a fey minutes before they arrived. He said he did not think there was gas in their place. Blanche then said .they were going home, but witness refused to let them go. He was quite satisfied that everything was safe. He reported the complaint to Richards, the incoming deputy, who said he knew all about it. Neither Reid nor Blanche asked witness to go back to the working place with them. It was nearly knock-off time, and he had to see that all the men were out of the mine. To Mr Wearne: The “goaf” area was 35 feet or 40 feet wide, and he considered the ventilation was sufficient. To Mr Balderstone: He considered Reid and- Blanche competent to test foi’ gas. As it was nearly knock-off time when he received the complaint, and as the shot-firer had said nothing about the gas, witness left the matter to the incoming deputy. Reid’s place was not to be worked that night, in any case. To the Chairman: Blanche’s statement, that he offered to go back with witness, was incorrect, so far as witness remembered.

SHOT-FIRER’S EAHDENCE. Mr Hannan called Walter Dando, deputy, who acted as shot-firer on December 2. He said that he visited Reid’s place about a few minutes .to 10 p.m. He stayed ,there for a while, as a truck had been derailed. Blanche started to argue the point about payment for trucking, but Reid told him to get .on with the trucks, as they had two more props to put in that night. Reid said there were no shots to fire. Witness was absolutely certain it was 10.5 p.m. when he left the place. Blanche’s statement, that witness did not examine the place was not correct. He found no sign of gas, although he put his lamp to the roof in order to look at the “fault.” To Air Smeaton: He had only one section of the mine to attend to, as shot-firer, and did not consider he had too many men to attend to. He examined a -place after he fired a shot, to make sure it was safe, and told the men to make it safe if necessary, although he had no time to wait until thev carried out the instructions. It might take them up to two hours sometimes to put a .place in order. Witness usually fired about 28 shots pei shift; .the average number of shots fired in the whole mine would be pn that basis. He had seven pair of men to attend to; five shots was the greatest number he .had ever fired per shift for one pair of men. His section included part of both the rise and dip workings. He was quite satisfied that the mine was understaffed, and deputies should not have to fire shots. To Mr Wearne: He considered the “goaf” area was sufficiently ventilated when he saw it. Gas could accumulate in such an area if anything went wrong with the ventilation. Atmospheric pressure changes would also bring out the gas from the “goaf, if gas was present there. In his opinion, the mine was rather damp, and not very dusty, compared with other mines he had worked in. He did not think a handful of dust could be found in No. 1 dip. He put the clay down in No. 2 dip before the disaster, but for a chain and a half at the top of the dip it was not required. The clay was taken out of the trucks with a shovel, and then spread out. He thought it would be quite effective, and would not rise with the coal dust. Other methods would be required to deal with the dust on the roof and sides. To Mr Leitch: He had never found gas in Blanche’s place. He put his lamp up to a height of nine or ten feet. Had such a quantity of gas been there, as alleged, his lamp would have gone out. He assisted to drive the No. 1 dip, but never saw any dust in it. The sides were wet, the dust being turned into mud. In No. 2 dip there would be two or three inches of rough coal dust, on which the clay was spread. The dip was wet from the top to the second cut-through, and Hughes agreed with him that clay was not" necessary on that portion. He did not. know whether the sides of No. 2 dip were wet. He was not bustled to attend to all the men, but had to

keep going as shot-firer. He could show a hole already bored in the mine in the first place oh the left-hand dip going down that he refused to fire on the night before the explosion. He had du another occasion refused to fire shots for Groom and Hasson, as he did not consider they were properly prepared. To Mr Hunter: He could not give any i'dea as to the quantity of dust lying in No. 2 dip. The dust was mixed with other debris on the floor of the dip. To Mr Joyce: He left the mine about 10.20 p.m. on December 2. Reid and Blanche had not reached the bottom of the dip when he left. Little was at the bottom of the main dip. He was only in the “goaf” for a few minutes, not long enough to say definitely whether the air was adequate. He was quite satisfied there was no gas there at 10.5 p.m.

To Mr Smeaton: A proper examination could not be made unless the -lamp were put close to the roof. There might have been gas near the roof. So long as the regulations were observed, he thought the mine could be quite safe. The New Zealand Act was, in his opinion, quite up-to-date. He considered Monobel a very safe explosive. It was used in the State Mine when he worked there. He \yould not dispute the Mining Inspectors’ opinion that No. 2 dip required stone-dusting. To Mr Bayne: Noakes’ place was damp, but ho did not know whether any “wet-time” had been paid there. “SAFEST MINE IN N.Z.” To Mr Balderstone: The dampness oozed from the coal. He could not form any theory to account for the explosion. He had looked on Dpbson as the safest mine in New Zealand. To the Chairman: The hole he refused to fire on the night before' the explosion was prepared by Dick Hall, and it could still be seen. To Mr Balderstone: He was particular with regard to the firing of shots because he carried out the regulations. The safety of the mine depended upon the carrying out of the regulations. An explosion could occur in a “safe” mine.

To the Chairman: Witness was in the lamp cabin when Reid told him about the gas. He was not present when the complaint was made to Little. Recalled by Mr Kimbell, I. A. James repeated his opinion that the Dobson explosion occurred in the rise workings. On 27/10/26 a little stone-dust-ing was done in the Liverpool mine in the form of a lime wash, but it was used more to illuminate the sides than to deal with coal dust. On December 10, 1926, the second requisition for stone dust was given to the storekeeper, and the mine had since been treated with it. Up to the time Mr Davis ceased to be manager of the Liverpool mine, safety lamps were sometimes issued at the discretion of the manager, but it was not a regular practice. To Mr Leitch: He was not in favour of issuing an electric lamp to each miner and an oil lamp per pair of miners. One or the other type of lamp should be issued, in order to guard against the miners forgetting the oil lamps and leaving them behind. To Mr Smeaton: In a gaseous mine,

ha favoured the man in charge of each working face being able to test for gas. If that man was not given a safety lamp, the tests could be made by the various officials on their frequent visits. He would not allow men to work in 2 per cent of gas, although the law stipulated that 2% per cent, of gas must be present before men were ordered out. If men were prevented working in places where there was even the slightest trace of gas, there would not be much work done. There would be danger if the gas were allowed to accumulate. To Mr Wearne: Two per cent, of gas would be dangerous for shot-firing in a place which was dusty. To Mr Strongman: Oil lamps were generally hung up on pj’ops, and therefore became dangerous when neglected. A practical man could detect gas without making a test by a lamp. If it was known that there was 22,000 cubic feet of gas in a certain place, lhat information would be valuable with reference to the safety of the mine. Such information could not be obtained without using an oil safety lamp. To Mr Joyce: He did not think it was necessary that a shot-firer should hold a deputy’s certificate. A shotfirer must have three years’ experience at the coal face. He did not think it was necessary to change the present system. To Mr Hannan; It depended on the conditions in a particular mine as to whether the duties of a deputy should be confined to inspections. The deputies at the State mine also did shot-firing. To Mr Watson: He would issue electric safety lamps to the miners at Dobson. y , To the Chairman: He was satisfied that coal dust must have played the main part in extending the explosion. In his opinion, gas would start the explosion, and coal dust would carry

it on. If the explosion had originated in the dip section, it would have been possible for it to* cause the damage done in the rise workings. There was no electrical plant underground at the State mines. If the electrical plant were erected in accordance with the regulations, it should be quite safe. The luncheon adjournment was then taken. (Proceeding.)