NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Franklin Times, Volume XXIX, Issue 43, 19 April 1940, Page 8 (Supplement)

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

BRITISH WAR STRATEGY LANDING IN NORWAY i A TRADITIONAL METHOD Once again Britain has landed an expeditionary force to meet a threat to Europe, to. help a nation menaced by a man who would dominate the continent and to threaten an aggressor on the flank. I The effect of the Nazi invasion of Norway, though it may not he realised at first, is to throw Britain hack upon her traditional way of fighting a war. Use of Sea Power. This traditional method is to make use of the mobility afforded by the possession of sea power to choose tlie field in which to strike the enemy. The World War campaign in France and Flanders was a notable departure from this principle. It was made because a previous Chief of Military Operations had prepared the British mobilisation plan on the basis of the British fighting on the French northern flank, and because when it was discovered that this had been done the British Cabinet was unwilling to depart from the scheme because of the political results of such action. Nevertheless, even in the World War Britain threw an expeditionary force ashore at a vital point behind the enemy main lines. The adoption of this course was the result of the initiative of Mr Winston Churchill. ' who was then as now First Lord of the Admiralty, arid who appreciated the significance of the threat which a British force could make to the extended and wheeling German line. When he heard that the Belgians were planning to abandon the fortress of Antwerp he urged that reinforcements should be sent there, and on October 3 a brigade of 2000 men of the Royal Naval Division landed at Antwerp. Cavalry Divisions Land. The British plan at this stage was to push on to Ghent, and the British 3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions landed at Ostend and Zeebrugge and the Naval Brigade was brought up to a strength of about 10,000 men by the dispatch of other units of the Royal Naval Division. The Germans succeeded in breaking past the barrier presented by the Belgians because of the fatigue of the defenders (they had-been fighting for two months) and the superiority of their artillery, and the Royal Naval Division had to be withdrawn because the British Government. did not wish to leave it to be surrounded.

But even this episode had its effect on the course of the war, and was one of the reasons for the failure of the first great German offensive against Paris. In the Low Countries.

In the course of history Britain has repeatedly landed troops to fight in the Low Countries, she sent two expeditions to Spain against Napoleon and bled France white in that fatal peninsula, and in the course ot that long struggle with the Corsican Emperor she even launched an expedition against the Dutch East Indies. Sea power was the basis of all these plans, and sea power was used in 19 lo to launch an attack on the Dardanelles in the effort to win the war by means of the back door, and to bring aid to a poorly-equipped Russia which desired that aid so little that she would r.ot consent to the Greeks making a land attack on Turkey. The story of the Dardanelles is known to every New Zealander because it was there that the name of Anzac became famous as a description of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. Similarities seen. There are similarities between the Dardanelles campaign and that in Norway—first preparatory fleet action.

second tlie rushing of an expeditionary force from a base many miles away, thirdly tiie constitution of the force: British, French, and Dominion troops. There is another similarity in the fact that the landing has been made at a number of points, and the Germans must guess where, the main blow will fall .(the Turks were unable to. do so in 191.7 and the attack produced consternation). Again, “new Armies” have been used both at the Dardanelles (Suvla Bay) and in Norway.

But in other ways the intervention is nearer the action in Belgium in 191 i. and in some ways it is unique. There is no example in modern times o“ Britain landing a force in Europe against organised opposition by enemy units -(which may have been done at Narvik), or of having to send a force to fight its way ashore. Results of Success.

Strategic factors which make themselves apparent also give the same importance to the present campaign as was possessed by that at Gallipoli. In 191-7 a success by the invading force would have resulted in the opening up of the Black Sea, the provision of materials for Russia, and the threat of an attack from a new quarter on Germany. In 19-40 the successful defence of Norway will mean that the war has been carried much nearer German soil, and may force her to fight in Sweden in the effort to escape a threat on her northern front. The mere fact that the Nazis would never respect Swedish neutrality (if they were in the position of the successful Allies) may convince them that Britain and France will not do so. On Friendly Soil.

In general, however, the situation is much closer to that of Spain under Napoleon or Belgium attacked by Germany. There is a small local army resisting a larger and better-equipped invader, one with a long military tradition and one who has ruthlessly set out to win his way by force and terrorism. There is a British Army on the soil of a friendly nation, supported by a Navy which has command of the sea to strike at the enemy’s economic front as well as at his geographical weak spots. There are imponderable things—prestige, the morale of the home front—at stake for the invader as well as material advantages. And there is a fleet which has narrowly escaped a Trafalgar in its adventures before the campaign was even well under way.