Red Army Morale

Franklin Times, Volume XXVIII, Issue 31, 20 March 1939, Page 6

Red Army Morale

HOW IT HAS SLIPPED THE POLITICAL COMMISSARS The efficiency and morale of the Red Army, which is considered questionable by military attaches stationed in Moscow, has been further handicapped by the Political Bureau, the highest governing body in Russia, writes Donald Day from Riga to the “Chicago Tribune.” . The political bureau issued a decree which places the politi< al commissars again on equal footing with military commanders and provides that both classes of officers must share responsibility for the military preparedness of the troops.

The chief difference In the make-up of the Red Army from the fighting forces of other countries is the fact that the Communist Party attempts to convert all its recruits to Communism and make them willing fighters for the ideals of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and

Stalin, the four great prophets of Bolshevism. The propoganda work is conducted by the political commissars. The special branch of military service was developed during the civil war period in Russia. Communist officers were attached to every company. They left military commands and operations to regular officers, many

thousands of whom served the Red regime as loyalty as they had served the Tsar.

The duty of the political commissars was to convert civil war into class war.' They compiled lists of persons who were executed when Red forces succeeded in winning territory. They preached class hatred and the necessity of Red terror to the soldiers in the Red forces. They selected what prisoners should be shot and those who were pardoned for opposing Communism. They even had authority to arrest and execute officers of the Retl Army who failed to heed their commands.

Compared to Chaplains

Political commisars have been compared to chaplains who are attached to armies in other countries. While they deliver sermons about Communism and maintain close contact with the rank and file of the Red Army they also possess unlimited authority which is supported by the GPU (secret police). The corps of political commissars has almost as many ranks as the mili-

tary commanders. The lowest rank

are those attached to each company. The chief of the political department of the Red Army, Deputy Commissar Mechlis, former editor of the Moscow “Pravda.” ranks next to Commissar of War Voroshilov in both military and parly councils. Naturally a conflict developed between the regular officer staff and the political commissars. Officers demanded discipline and obedience among the ranks. Over a period of years the officer class succeeded in strengthening its position. Insignias of rank were restored. Officers slowly began to

gain privileges. Foreign military observers always commented upon the fact that the officers refused to associate with the political commissars. At receptions in restaurants and cafes, in gatherings during manoeuvres, these two officers corps remained in separate groups. The military specialists openly boycotted the political specialists. The result was the greatest purge in the history of Russia. Marshal Tukhachevsky and nine leading commanders of the Red Army were shot as alleged traitors. During tlie last eighteen months it is conservatively estimated that between 30 and 40 per cent of all the military commanders of the Red armed forces, including Army, Air Force, and Navy have been purged. The political commissars had won.

Victory Confirmed The victory has been confirmed by the “Krasnaija Svesda,” the official Red Army newspaper, which declares:

“The political commissar is the chief power in the Red Army. He is the man who teaches the Army why it. must he always prepared to fight i'cr the Communist Fatherland, which is also the Fatherland of all the oppressed workers in the world. , “The military commander tells the soldier where to point his bayonet, hut the political commander develops the force behind the stab. Both groups of officers are equally responsible for the state of military preparedness of the Red Army. The military commanders represent the General Staff. The political commander represents the Communist Party.

“The latter should not try to undermine the authority of his fellowofficers, -the military specialist. He should co-operate and help him without being officious. He also should participate in everything pertaining to the life of his command, should miss nothing, and also seek to learn something about military tactics so he could replace his officer in case of need. “There have been many instances of political commissars attempting to hold themselves aloof from military affairs and from the training and military instruction of the troops. They should even attend marksmanship practice, for one of their most serious responsibilities is to keep track of all ammunition served out to the troops.” The “Krasnaija Svesda” admits there si ill is much disorder in the Army, especially among the forces in the Far East, but says that Russia’s unique system of dual command will be continued.

This system, say foreign officers who have watched Soviet manoeuvres, has had exactly the opposite effect from that desired by the Communist Party. Political commissars still are considered a class apart by the officers. There is no fraternisation between the two groups. The rank and file know of the existing hostility. Here that peculiar Slav characteristic. the love of snitching, plays a great role in destroying morale. Both the officer and the political commissar always are on the watch to obtain some information incriminating each oilier and, as petty intrigue is second nature to the Russian, the ‘mora 1 chaos” condemned by the Krasnaija Svesda flourishes. The decision of the Political Bureau to support the authority of the political commissar against the authority won over a period of years by the military commanders is considered one of the most important internal developments in Russia this year.