BRITAIN'S FOOD SHIPS

Evening Star, Issue 22573, 15 February 1937, Page 2

BRITAIN'S FOOD SHIPS

METHODS OF PROTECTION Hector C. Bywater, * Daily Telegraph ’ naval correspondent, writes : I understand that one of the chief problems now engaging the attention of the Committee of Imperial Defence concerns the protection of ships laden with foodstuffs raw materials, and oil fuel when entering or leaving coastal waters and while dying in port. The Navy is confident_ that, given the necessary resources, _ it can not only safeguard these ships from surface and submarine raiders while they .are on the high seas, but give them adequate protection from overhead attack when they come_ within range of hostile shore-based aircraft. It is emphasised, however, in naval circles, that the Navy is not responsible for the defence of merchant snips when they are discharging or loading cargo in port. That is the joint affair of the Air Force and the Army. - As regards the overhead- risk to snipping while in coastal waters, I aril informed on good authority that i considerable measure of protection can be afforded by putting ships into convoy and providing escorts with strong anti-aircraft armaments. This will at least prevent low-flying attack. High bombing _ can be indulged in on only a proportion of days in the year. Even then- it is not likely to bo_ effective unless a large number ef aircraft are employed. AIRCRAFT MENACE For technical reasons the aircraft menace to merchant _ ships at sea is not regarded as serious. It might become so in areas such as the approach to the Thames, but even there it could be largly parried by so controlling the movements of traffic, that most of the ships would enter or leave in hours of darkness. On the other hand, the importance of making our harbours safe against air attack is fully recognised in com;petent quarters However adequate and efficient the Admiralty’s. plans for safeguarding seaborne trade might prove to be, their effect would be largely nullified were merchant ships to suffer heavy casualties from air bombardment while in port. Even in normal times over 1,000,000 tons of foodstuffs and raw materials arrive every week in United Kingdom ports, a large proportion of these supplies—roughly one-third—being discharged in the London docks. Thus the rendering of London and other major ports reasonably safe from mass attack by aircraft -- is an essential corollary to the protection of shipping on the high seas. Aberdeen, our northernmost port, is 420 miles from the Continent. Newcastle is less than 370 miles, and Hull 330 miles distant, while in the case of other East Coast ports the distances from the Continent vary from 200 to 20 miles. WITHIN STRIKING RANGE London itself is less than 100 miles from the Continent, Plymouth is 90, and Southampton only 80 miles away. Even the Western ports-—Glasgow, Liverpool, Bristol and Cardiff—-though less accessible are all within striking range of modern large bombers operating from Continental bases. Shipping in the southern area of the North Sea, the Straits of Dover, the English Channel, and possibly in, the Bristol Channel as well, would be exposed in daylight to attack from the air. Our naval authorities, .however, do not believe - that this form of. attack would be practised by an enemy save in the last resort. It would, they point out, constitute a gross violation of international law and. the humanitarian code, which stipulate that a merchantman must be stopped, searched, and her crew and passengers placed in safety _ before she is sunk, even if that drastic action is justified by the circumstances. Aircraft cannot possibly observe such rules, and their use as commerce raiders would therefore be grossly illegal. In view of Germany’s experience in the last war ; it is felt that a belligerent would think twice and thrice before adopting a practice which must infallibly range world opinion against him, and probably bring neutrals into the war. COASTAL AIRCRAFT , I understand that the proposal to protect merchant ships entering and leaving port by maintaining aircraft Eatrols at sea in nodal and focal Areas, as been definitely turned down as impractiblc. Thus there is no question of the Royal Air Force taking over the defence of shipping until the ships are actually in harbour. . ■ What does remain to be determined, is the operational control and training in peace, of the coastal reconnaissance aircraft needed to. co-operate with naval units in the narrow seas. The prompt solution of • that problem is regarded as being of vital importance. For this reason _it is highly desirable that the question of the Meet Air Am should be finally settled between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry. A matter which apparently has not yet received due attention, despite, its manifest importance, is the provision of arcraft for convoy duty. Experience in the last war leaves no doubt as to the value of air escort as a protection against submarines. In the later stages of the war ,it was provided by small airships ( Blimps ) and flying boats. So far as is known no airships are available to-day, and our shortage of service flying boats is notorious. The whole problem of “food defence,” a phrase which covers all imported supplies, including oil, is so complicated that it is hopeless to expect a solution unless all three fighting services—for the Army’s ground anti-aircraft defences must play their p ar t —are in constant consultation, preparing and testing plans based on perfect co-operation without regard to inter-service predjudices and jealousies, * , , I am able to state that the problem is being tackled on these lines, and it is hoped that the completion and initial implementation of an “ all-in ” plan of the scope and detail required will be achieved without too much delay.