AFTER THE WAR

Evening Star, Issue 21638, 6 February 1934, Page 7

AFTER THE WAR

BRITISH POLITICS HCW THE COALITION FELL RIDDELL'S MEMORIES It is on record that Hr Johnson once said that if ho thought Boswell was writing his life ho would take Boswell’s, writes J. B. Firth, in the London ‘ Daily 'Telegraph.’ After reading the .second volume of Lord Riddell's ‘ Intimate Diary ’ 1 can imagine Mr Lloyd George making a like observation. He is the hero of this book, as of its predecessor. But with tills difference, that the worship flags visibly. Doubtentered into the Paradise, and the diarist gave frank expression to his criticism. Friendship remained, hut glad, confident morning ” passed its high noon. The Diary ends with the fall of Mr Lloyd George after the Carlton Club meeting,' and here the omissions must be considerable, for that fateful meeting is only given a single bleak line of text. A few disconnected entries do service for 1923. Then the pen is thrown aside. The ‘‘ pang ” remained. It had been “ a wonderful time,” as both agreed when they shook hands at parting on the day of L.G.’s resignation, but the end of that long Premiership was pitiful. It was total eclipse. It should have ceased either at the Armistice or at Versailles. The inner story is indicated rather than told in these entries for those whose memories can adequately supply the necessary background. Others will read the Diary with delight for its wealth of anecdote and Boswellian fragments of conversation. Among a crowd of eager, sharpelbowed, jostling partisans the diarist smilingly noted down the best words that were spoken in season. In that epoch of conferences it was a great thing always to have a room leading out of the conference chamber, and better still to have a frequent place at table in “the social hour” when the great ones dined and talked. RETORT TO WILSON. The Versailles passages, however, sadly need their background, and perhaps the camera has caught the principal personages too often in undress. But the one man who consciously dressed for the part was President Wilson, and largely owing to Ids egotism or vanity he was the supreme failure. His character is continually canvassed in these pages—a sure sign that he had real greatness as well as grave defects. “ Ho is a cold creature,” said L.G. on one occasion. “He never congratulated me on my success in the House of Commons, and after the election ho never mentioned the matter.” But the President, convinced that the whole world revolved about him, cared for no one’s feelings but his own. When F. K. Smith called on him at Washington he did not ask him to sit down, and raised no topic of conversation until his visitor was about to leave. Then he inquired what subjects he had taught at Oxford and what tendency the young men were .showing. “ A great tendency to drink,” replied F.E. in a rage, and walked out of the room. Doubtless . the incident confirmed the President’s dislike of England. Wilson’s apologists say that we should forgive him everything because of his plan for the League of Nations. But it was not his plan. It was Smuts's. “ 1 gave him Smuts’s plan,” said L.G.. “ and begged him to consider it. He intimated that he did not-want any assistance, but after reading Sinuts’s memorandum swallowed it whole. ’ Bv far the most important passages in the Diary, however, are those which cast a beam of light upon the secret political history of the period at home. L.G., with his overwhelming Coalition majority, started 1919 with quasi-dic-tatorial power and unexampled prestige. He had the faithful Bonnr Law to justify Ids policies in Parliament and keep the great Conservative majority in good fettle. His weakest point—his Achilles’ heel—was that the Coalition Liberals were so few and the Conservatives might at any time revolt. A NEW PARTY. Hence almost from the start suggestions kept cropping up for consolidating the Coalition into a new National party. Lord Riddell’s entry dated September 10, 1919, says: “ Long talks with Bonar Law.and Guest regarding L.G. - s proposals to torm a pew party, consisting of the Conservatives, a section of the Liberals, and the Llq\d Georgites.” The various organisations were to be amalgamated inr.o a “ National Democratic Party. It came to nothing, hut whenever the rifts' in the Coalition began to widen it was started anew. Churchill and Birkenhead raised the question on public platforms. But response was chilly; In 1919, as Bonar Law said. Conservatives were willing to go step by step with L.G. but wore iinwil.ing to'hand themselves over to him bodv and soul. In 1922 L.G.’s prestige had sadly faded. Genoa —his last hope—was a failure. His pro-Greek policy in Asia Minor was in ruins. . , On one occasion Lord Riddell asked L.G. point blank: “Do you think it was wise to give Smyrna to- the Greeks?”—his own view, like that ot Foch, being that it was an act of madness. L.G. replied:— • ■ “I. have no doubt about it. You must decide whom you are going to back. The Turks nearly brought about our defeat in the war. Aou cannot trust them, and they are a decadent race. The Greeks are our friends, and they are a rising people. \\ e must secure Constantinople and the Hellespont. You cannot do that, effectively without crushing the Turkish power. Of course, the military favour the Turks. It is the Tory policy to support the Turks. Thev hate the Greeks. ’ He even declared that the British people and the dominions would have cheerfully gone to war if the lurks had not held back at Chanak. UNCERTAIN. It is to be observed, too, that L.G.’s own attitude was always uncertain. While the Coalition stood firm he inclined, to the Right. Witness a remarkable entry in the Diary early in 1920 i—- “ I notice that L.G. is steadily veering over to the Tory point of view. Fie constantly refers to the great services rendered by captains of industry, and defends the propriety of the large profits they take. He says one Loverhulme 'or Ellerman is worth more to the world than, say, 10,U00 sea captains, or 20;000 engine ‘ drivers, and should be remunerated accordingly. ’ • “ He seems convinced that Socialism is a mistaken policy. I have observed this conviction growing upon him during the (inst four years. point ot view has completely changed.” L.G. played with the idea of resignation, knowing well what was brewing. He always rejected it on the ground that he could not quit the ship in a gale. Rut really he hoped that the jealousies in the Tory camp would render him indispensable. Here is a curious fragment of conversation: — Riddell: Did Bonar Law show any disposition to take the Premiership himself?.

L.G.: It was interesting to see him. He kept taking up the crown and trying it on his head, and then when he felt it was a crown of thorns, he put it down again. And then he took it up again. PREMIER—“ SOME DAY.” For a moment L.G. thought that Lord Balfour might be disposed to become Premier again, and offered in that ■_;it to support him. Balfour, how- . had no such thought. Earlier in August, 1921, Lord Birkenhead ad solemnly disavowed the story that he was caballing against the P.M. Ha said:— “ I know my powers, and 1 feel J have a right to expect at some distant date to become Prime Minister, but this is not my time. If L.G. were displaced, Chamberlain would he sent for. Ho is leader of the Tory Party. lam a poor man, hut can honestly say that f would rather pay £20,000, if I had it, than that L.G. should be turned out. . . . All my interest lies in supporting him.” So it went ou. In February, 1922, at Lympae, Lord Riddell watched a curious scene : “ After lunch wo had some music. While this was going forward L.G. went to the writing table, obtained a bundle of notepaper, and sat down by the fire, busily writing in pencil. Ho crossed sheet after sheet, notwithstanding the music. Later in the evening he sent for me to go to his bedroom, and then handed me the result of his labour to read.” It was a long letter to Chamberlain offering to retire in his favour or in that of Bonar Law, if they would pledge themselves to carry on his European policy. L.G. was still revising the draft when Riddell left the next morning. Whether it was ever sent is not stated. Be that as it may, the Prime Minister staggered on till the Undersecretaries took the bit in their teeth and bolted, and induced Bonar’s consent to take up bis ■ tragic crown of thorns. THE MUD. So much for politics. One war extract must •be given. •It relates to Passchendaele and the cause why that appalling enterprise was persisted in so long. L.G. declared that it had nothing to do with the mutiny in the Fvouch army : “That was an afterthought, retain, who was in command of the French forces, was against Passchendaele. He said: ‘You have two enemies—the Boche and the boue (mudl. You may defeat the Boche, but the boue will defeat you-’ And it did. Haig was very bent on the operation. From the first I thought it would be disastrous. 1 called a meeting of the War Council and stated my. views, which 1 embodied in a memorandum. I said that the matter was one for the soldiers, and that it was not for a civilian to interfere.” On that justification it is fair to ask this; “ Would Mr Lloyd George have accepted it as satisfactory from Mr Asquith?” The last story for which I have room refers to Kitchener. One day he and Briand were walking by the seashore. Kitchener turned and said to Briand : “ I bate the sea.” “ Are you a bad sailor?” asked Briand, “ I don t mean that,” said K. “ 1 hate the sight of it. 1 hate its angry roll.” The words recurred to Briand as a portent when the • Hampshire went down, and the sea’s “ angry roll ” became the groat soldier’s eternal requiem. , ,