THE SUBMARINE

Evening Star, Issue 21631, 29 January 1934, Page 12

THE SUBMARINE

A BRITISH ADVOCATE ABOLITION BAD POLICY VALUABLE FOR DEFENCE In a recent issue of ‘ The Navy,’ the official organ of the Navy League, Lieu-tenant-commander Kenneth Edwards, R.N. (Rtd.), presents the case for the submarine, contending that total abolition is not to Britain’s advantage. The London Navy Treaty comes up for revision in 1935. Decisions must then bo come to regarding the future of this agreement, which comes into force on December 31, 1936, and will lapse the following day unless arrangements are made for its renewal, he writes. It is reported that Japan has already set up a committee to determine her attitude- to the various questions that will arise out of revision of the treaty. What is to be the attitude of the British Empire in this difficult but most important question, and what proposals are likely to be put forward by our representatives ? Speculation is already rife in this matter. That is all to the good, for speculation will bring home to the public the importance of the whole question of naval defence and the place of various categories in the general scheme.

One suggestion that is almost certain to be put forward by the British Commonwealth of Nations is that submarines shall be abolished, or, alternatively, if agreement cannot be reached on total abolition, that they should be limited in size so that they would be of use only for harbour defence. This is no new proposal. The abolition of submarines has been urged by Great Britain at Washington twelve years ago and at Geneva, and again at the London Naval Conference. But the proposal found no favour abroad.- It-, is now reported, however, that opinion among some <>i the other naval Powers is inclining move nearly towards the abolition of these craft. A swing of opinion in this direction is reported in Japan, a nation which originally set its face most rigidly against abolition. That Japan is likely to try to drive a bargain in 'this matter with a view to immunising herself from air attack through the abolition of the aircraft carrier need not be dealt with here. >

With the question of treaty revision looming large and the abolition of'submarines coming at least within the realms of possibility, it is as well that we should examine the use of these craft in the general scheme of the defence of our Empire and its sea communications, and form some conclusion as to whether total abolition will be entirely in our interests.

GERMANY’S UNSCRUPULOUS USE. There can be little doubt but that the movement for the abolition of submarines had its genesis in the unsavoury reputation of these' craft arising out of the unscrupulous manner in which they were used by Germany in the Great War. There can be no doubt that unrestricted submarine warfare is as infamous as it is likely to be effective against a nation wholly dependent upon sea communications—it came within twenty-one days of bringing us to our knees through starvation during the war. It is probable that it was chiefly on this account. that Great Britain advocated the abolition of submarines at Washington in 1922. From this narrow point of view there is ho doubt that we .were right, , for it must bo borne in ihind that the framing of rules fqp' tlio;; can never be> regarded asi.ehtireljy effective. "A nation in desperate'straits is likely to invoke all the nffians: in her power to avoid'destruction.; As submarines form a menace to seaborne trade it is obvious that their abolition would bo to our advantage, since we are far more dependent upon seaborne trade than any other nation upon earth. But there is another side to the picture, and it is essential that we should avoid looking only upon the narrow view. What is the part which submarines play in Empire defence, and is this part worth sacrificing for the sake of immunity of our trade from this particular method of attack?

Ocean-going submarines are peculiarly well fitted for various duties, apart from the harrying of trade. Among these are the close blockade of enemy harbours, advanced reconnaissance in waters normally controlled by the enemy", and the laying of small groups of mines in channels swept by the enemy. Small submarines are also invaluable. for the defence of harbours and bases and focal points by the establishment of defensive patrols.

It is considered that the characteristics of the ocean-going submarine, valuable though they are, might well be sacrificed for the immunity from a submarine attack that their abolition would give to our. more distant sea communications. SMALL SUBMARINES.

The alternative suggestion is that marines should bo limited.to 250 tons. A submarine of, this size ’’would be quite able to carry put . a defensive patrol in' the vicinity c f . its base. -It .could also prove a • menace to trade, in narrow waters, but it could not have sufficient sea-keeping qualities to enable it to undertake long voyages in order to harry ocean trade. The presence of a flotilla of such submarines at any strategical point would, moreover, have that deterrent effect which is by far the most valuable property, of the.submarine from the point of view of Empire, de-i fence. . The far outposts of the British Empire come under the nominal- protection of various outlying'cruiser squadrons. These squadrons, though adequate for police and flag-showing duties in peace time, are for the most part far too weak to give protection in war to the colonies or to the sea routes leading to and from them. Moreover, the outlying cruiser forces are fur removed from any reasonable supporting forces. For this reason a sudden outbreak of hostilities carries with it the danger that some nfleast of our distant cruiser forces may be “ mopped up ” by an erirorprising enemy before adequate covering forces can arrive to give them the support which is essential for t l- eir protection as well as for the protection of their charges. , It is in this question of support in all parts of the world that lies ,the crux of the problem of Empire defence and the reason why parity with any nation can never produce absolute security to the scattered commitments of the British Empire. Under present treaty limitations we can make no pretence of maintaining heavy supporting forces in the vicinity of our distant cruiser forces. i.

The best thing-that can be-done is' to establish our heavy forces in 1 a fairly central position.' This is what'is done to-day. But the measure of support afforded to, say,' the_ New' Zealand Squadron by heavy ships in the Mediterranean is negligible owing to the distance and the time taken to cover.

the distance. In this instance the nearest heavy ships could nob come to the rescue for a fortnight or three weeks. During this time an enterprising and energetic enemy might well strike a fatal blow to our security, our trade, and our prestige in that part of the world. TO DELAY ENEMY ACTION. What, then, is the solution? Larger naval forces are denied us by international _ agreement. We must therefore devise some form of defence which can be expected to delay enemy action until the arrival of supporting forces. This delaying action must amount to a powerful deterrent to the enemy to venture into waters nominally controlled by Empire forces. ‘ It can he achieved in some measure by the skilful use of mines, hut it can be achieved far more economically, efficiently, and successfully by the maintenance of submarine forces, even though the units are small. The known presence of even the smallest' submarines will always give an enemy to think before venturing his ships, in waters where they may be lurking. It is more than probable that an enemy will seek to discover the disposition of the submarines before venturing his main forces. This would gain time—the time that is of vital necessity to ns to enable our supporting squadrons to arrive in the vicinity.

This deterrent quality and the ability to enforce delay upon an enemy is by far the most valuable characteristic of the submarine from the point of view of Empire defence, and it is not, therefore, a quality to he lightly sacrificed upon the altar of disarmament in order to placate tile large body of public opinion which holds that the submarine is at once inhuman and unsuited to our needs. ,

There is, however, another very powerful argument in favour of the total abolition of all submarines. This is concerned with, personnel. Submarine personnel requires special training. So long as submarines of any size are permitted a large personnel fully trained in submarine work can be built up. Treaties and conventions are, more often than not, violated in war. A nation at war might well build large submarines for commerce destruction on the high seas and for overseas blockade. Submarines can, at a pinch, be rapidly constructed, as was amply proved by Germany in the Great War. But to build large numbers, of large submarines would be manifestly useless if no 1 personnel trained in their work 1 were available. There is no question that the only method of ensuring that no nation possesses a trained submarine personnel is the total abolition of the submarine throughout the world. This is a very powerful argument, and one which is no doubt much to the fore with those entrusted with the proposals to be made _by the British Commonwealth of Nations at the revision of the naval treaties. LIMITATION TO SMALL TYPE. It is not, however, considered that even this argument is sufficiently weighty entirely to" discount the deterrent value of the submarine in Empire defence. We can achieve no security for our world-wide commitments unless we have means of delaying enemy, actions pending the arrival of supports, and this is a necessity for which other things must if necessary be, : sacrificed. It is therefore considered that we should advocate, not the total: abolition of the submarine, but its limitation to small displacement. Our anti-submarine branch has reached a stage when it can effectively combat the submarine menace to trade in narrow waters, and the grouping or convoy ■ system would also protect our trade. As for nations using their trained submarine personnel in time of war to man _ hastily-constructed ocean-going submarines for unrestricted commerce destruction, we must rely upon world opinion and the question of neutrality to deter a nation from such a course. It was unrestricted submarine warfare that brought the United States into the war, and this should, serve as , a warning for the future.

■ Whether France, who in recent years has built up the most powerful submarine fleet in the world, will consent even to the limitation in size of these craft, remains to be seen. We cannot, however, trade on France’s liking for the submarine in order to make gestures which we believe will come to nothing. It behoves those entrusted with the defence of our Empire and its vast ramifications of trade routes to consider both sides of the question very carefully before putting forward any proposals, and to avoid at all costs being swayed by bigoted , opinion founded upon bitter experience and illinformed as to the value of the submarine to the Empire.