LEAGUE WILL FAIL

Evening Star, Issue 21631, 29 January 1934, Page 11

LEAGUE WILL FAIL

UNLESS BRITAIN ACTS PEACE AND ARMAMENTS NOEL BAKER'S WARNING Professor P'. J. Noel Baker, who was a member of the British delegation to the League of Nations Assembly in 1929, and who has been private secretary to Mr Arthur Henderson, the president of the Disarmament Conference, spoke in Manchester on the League and disarmament. He spoke first at a luncheon at the Reform Club, and then in the afternoon to the University League of Nations Society 4 where he stressed the importance of sanctions and of Article 16 of the Covenant, says the ‘ Manchester Guardian.’ At the Reform Club luncheon MiBaker said that he need make no apology for the League in Manchester, and least of all in the Manchester Reform Club. Up to 1931 the League bad certainly not failed, and even in the last two years it had many successes to its credit. They had just had a dispute with Persia. Thirty years ago they should have sent a gunboat to Persia; to-day instead they sent Sir John Simon to Geneva by aeroplane, and the whole thing had been settled inside six months. It was true that both Germany and Japan had left the League, but Litvinoff, the Soviet Foreign Minister, had told the disarmament Conference that Russia- would be prepared to take , part in a League boycott of an aggressor. This was an acceptance by Russia of the principles of the League. Then the United States spokesman at Geneva had said that it was the duty of all those who were working for peace to put their trust in the League. There had been, however, two great failures since September, 1931—Manchuria and the Disarmament Conference. “ I would say,” Mr Baker continued, “ that while I recognise the difficulties there may have been, these two questions, gave the greatest opportunity to statesmen which statesmen have ever had, the opportunity to establish world peace on a basis which could never be shaken.” STRAIGHTFORWARD. The Manchurian dispute was difficult because it was unexpected, but it was absolutely straightforward. It ga/e them a chance to say to a great Power that even in a remote part of the world international law must not be broken. There was no dispute in which they could have been so certain of sympathy and help from Russia and the United States, no dispute in which so few British interests would have been involved had things gone badly. He was convinced that there would have been no need to, use violent means, for there was no country in the world so susceptible to foreign opinions or so liable o be injured by a boycott of her trade as Japan. The Japanese Foreign Minister had declared publicly that to attack Manchuria would be < wrong, her civil Government had just defeated the naval staff and ratified the London Naval Agreement. It was a country which had to shoot its Prime Minister to stop him making .an agreement with the Chinese. They proceeded to arm Japan, and made speeches in Parliament saying that the merits of the case were by no means clear. After Shanghai had been invaded they said that they must remain on friendly terms with both sides. In effect they told the Japanese militarists that the path was clear lor any conquest they might care to make.. The Japanese delegate, at Geneva had even said that the British spokesman had explained in perfect English in a speech of half an hour_ just what he had been trying to say in bad English for a fortnight. The result of the handling of the Manchurian dispute had been to allow war to start again between Bolivia and Paraguay, a war which had been stopped by the League in 1928 and which only began again when it was clear that the attitude of the Council had changed. It had also, he thought, unleashed the forces in Germany which had been responsible for Hitler’s coming to power. DISARMAMENT.

Tho circumstances surrounding the Disarmament Conference had been far more favourable than they could have hoped. The ground for tho Conference had been extraordinarily well prepared by Lord Cecil and Mr Henderson. Who could haxe expected that Fascist Italy would begin by proposing the general

abolition of the weapons denied to Germany? Who could have thought that Russia and Germany would have come not to make trouble, but sincerely prer pared to help ? Who could have thought that the French Air Minister would propose, on certainly perfectly proper conditions, the total abolition of air forces, in which France leads the world? They had had a tremendous opportunity. What had their statesmen done with it? Mr Baker went on to quote Mr Chesterton’s lines: — They that rule in England, in. stately conclave met. Alas! alas! for England, they have no graves as yet. He would not confine the allusion to British statesmen, and he had thought of suggesting to Mr Chesterton that he might translate it into many languages. _ “ There is no one who has sat through eighteen months at Geneva,” Mr Baker continued, “ who could say that qur spokesman came with a constructive plan which they hoped to see adopted.” Their attitude had been more like that of the two British Ministers, one of whom in moving the Naval Estimates had said that he hoped they would never be so low again, and the other of whom, speaking of aerial disarmament, had said that if certain proposals were carried out they should have to rely on international goodwill for security and prosperity, “ a thing quite iuacceptable when alternative measures are available.” CAUSE OF WARS. The First Sea Lord, speaking at Sheffield recently, had said that, after all, armaments in themselves had not caused wars. He (the speaker) disagreed, and therefore regretted that they opposed Signor Grandi when he proposed the abolition of tho arms refused to Germany, regretted that they opposed Mr Hoover when ho suggested the cutting down of armaments by one-third, regretted that they did not support the French Air Minister when he proposed the abolition of military aviation, in favour of which Mr Baldwin had spoken in the House of Commons.; There had been two great failures at Geneva, but they were not failures of the League, because tho League had never been tried. What did those who said the League had failed propose as an alternative? Some favoured the Four Power Pact, which at best was merely an understanding working by the methods of old diplomacy. Others favoured isolation, an impossible policy. Others, again, wanted rearmament. They talked now of 4,000 aeroplanes and twenty cruisers. It would soon be fifty. And yet M. Daladier and Mr Baldwin had said that a new competition in armaments would bo the end of our civilisation. Mr Baker went on to say that he had recently been talking with leading Australians and New Zealanders. They were worried about Japan and were beginning new armament proposals after consultation ■ with our general staff. They wanted to be assured that in ease of trouble Britain would send their navy to their defence. Yet Australia had been unwilling to agree to a boycott of Japan because of Ivor woollen exports to that country. “ You cannot have it all ways,” Mr Baker continued, “you cannot_ ask for the British Navy and be unwilling to give up woollen exports to Japan. We could only send dur navy to Asia if the League keeps the peace in Europe. ■ I think that we are driven back from every angle to the Covenant of the League.” The League had not yet failed, but it would fail unless they made up their minds what they really meant to do about it, unless they were prepared to use its machinery, and to make sacrifices in doing so.