IS INFANTRY OBSOLETE?

Evening Star, Issue 19387, 22 October 1926, Page 4

IS INFANTRY OBSOLETE?

T- -4"- — MACHINES OF THE FUTURE. that, military prophets have of late been for the most part tank and aeroplane enthusiasts, tending to overrate tho relative importance of machinery in tho nest war, is tho contention of Mr Victor Wallace Germains (rifleman) in an article entitled 'An - Infantryman Thinks About War,’ published in tho ‘National Review’ for July. Mr.Germains docs not agree with the modern expert who is prepared ■to lay th< infantryman “gently -with tho Viking os tho poetic shell.'’ •‘‘Wo are constantly a« sured,” ha says, “that the conditions of the World War, 1914-18, nro never likely to rocur again; that tho post-*ar tank and .the post-war aeroplane have revolutionised all our. conceptions of warfare; that the next war is going to be one of movement, swift, short, and decisive.” Mr Germains maintains that in essentials warfare will remain tho same, and that the decision will rest, as in .ill past wars since tho Civil War of 1542, on infantry. New inventions will neutralise each other. "Super-tank,” ho declares, “would neutralise super-tank, superaeroplane would neutralise super-aeroplane, mobile. moehanicaliuod infantry columns would neutralise one another, and the results Trench warfare, as in 1914, fought, of course, with more highly-developed weapons, but trench warfare,, tho combat of infantry against infantry.” Their very uses impose limits on the development of aeroplanes and tanks. Speed and mobility and the importance of not presenting a large target to tho enemy must Limit the size and armament of tanks. Such vehicles can never hops to carry the materia! required for battle to anything like the same extent as roads and railways, tho possession of which remains strategically decisive. Tanks of possible sine can never, stand up to field guns ready for them. They remain tho weapon of surprise. Moreover, the smaller and more mobile types can be countered by a heavier- rifle, which will also bo effective in enabling infantry to defend themeedveagp.inst aircralt and in preventing these machines from coming low. AEROPLANES. Aeroplanes will also, thinks Mr Germains, be restricted to _their late roles of reconnaissance and raiding, There is no likelihood of gas more deadly than that at present used being discovered. Such gases as are sufficiently volatile to spread and powerful enough to till have been discovered Mr Germains concludes that the inair strategic purposes of war will be possibb only to masses of infantry, “So long w tin bulk of this world's commerce is carried b« ships and along roads and railroads,” in says, “so long will the art of- war resoln itself into the effort by ono belligerent to seize and maintain control of the great centres of communication vital to the life of the adversary. iNifc. however deadly, will only be of vital importance _ as supported by the main power of armies. For the rest, great battles will have to be fought, battles with the entire strength of the nation concentrated for a smashing blow. In these battles the infantry will continue to bear a decisive part. Whether loaded on to mccbanicaliscd transport and rushed to the critical point; whether employed spade in hands, in--digging lines of earthworks; whether creeping to the attack in the wake of a smoking barrage, it will be the breaking strain of the infantry which will bring the snapping point of victory or defeat.”