IS INFANTRY OBSOLETE?

Evening Star, Issue 19351, 10 September 1926, Page 2

IS INFANTRY OBSOLETE?

nmir MACHINES OF THE FUTURE That military prophots have of late teen for the most part tank and aeroplane enthusiasts, tending; to overrate the relative importance of machinery in the next war, is the contention of Mr Victor Wallace Germains .(rifleman) in an article entitled, ‘An Infantryman Thinks About War,’ published in the ‘ National Review ’ for July. Mr Germains does not agree with the modern expert who is prepared to lay the infantryman “gently with the Viking on the poetic shelf.” “ We are constantly assured,” he says, “that the conditions of the World War, 1914-18, are never likely to recur again; that the post-war tank and the. post-war aeroplane have revolutionised' all our conceptions of warfare; that the next war is going to bo one, of movement, swilt, short, and decisive.” Mr Germains maintains that in essentials warfare will _ remain the same, and that the decision will rest, as in all past wars ■ since the Civil War of ,1642, on infantry. New inventionswill neutralise each other. M Super-tank,”, ho neutralisesuper-tank, super-aeroplane would neutralise super-aeroplane; mobile mechanicalised infantry columns would neutralise - one * another, and _ the result ? Trench warfare as in 1914, fought, of course, with more highly developed weapons, but trench warfare, the combat of infantry against infantry.” Their- very uses impose limits on the development of aeroplanes and tanka. Speed and mobility and the importance .of not presenting a large target to. .'the enemy must limit the eiae and armament of tanks. Such vehicles can never hope to carry the material required for battle to anything £ke the same extent as roads and rail-

ways, the possession of which remains strategically decisive. Tanks of possible size can never stand up to field guns ready for them. _ They remain the weapon of surprise. Moreover, the smaller and more mobile types can he countered by a heavier rifle, which will also be effective in enabling infantry to defend themselves against aircraft and in preventing these machines from coming low. Aeroplanes will also, thinks Mr Germains, bo restricted to their late roles of reconnaissance and raiding. There is no likelihood of gas moro_ deadly than that at present used being discovered. Such gases as are sufficiently volatile to spread and powerful enough to kill have been discovered. Mr Germains concludes that the main strategic purposes of war will be possible only to masses of infantry. “So long as the bulk of this world’s commerce is carried by ships and along roads and railroads,” be says, “ so long will the art of war resolve itself into the effort by one belligerent to seize and maintain control of the great centres of communication vital to the life of the adversary. Raids, however deadly, will only be of vital importance as supported by the main power of armies. For the rest, great battles will have to •be fought, battles with the entire strength of the nation concentrated for a smashing blow. In these battles the infantry will continue to bear a decisive part. Whether loaded on to mechanicalised transport and rushed to the qritical point; whether employed spade in hand, in digging lines of earthworks; whether creeping to the attack in the wake of a smoking barrage, it will be the breaking strain of the infantry which will bring the snapping point of victory or defeat.”