JELLICOE AND JUTLAND

Evening Star, Issue 18810, 8 December 1924, Page 5

JELLICOE AND JUTLAND

CONTENT TO LEAVE VERDICT TO HISTORY. Press Association —By- Telegraph—Copyright. Australian and N.Z. Press Association. SYDNEY, December 8. (Received December 8, at 11.10 a.m.) Interviewed at Sutton Forest, Lord Jol’.icoe said that, although he was now retired from the active Navy list, he had no idea at present of entering personally into a controversy over the Jutland battle. He said ho was content to leave the verdict to history, which he believed would justify him. He had unbounded admiration for the work of the late Sir Julian Corbett. COMMENT IN 1 BRASSEY’S ANNUAL’ PLAN AND DEVELOPMENT PERFECT. In an article on the Jutland controversy, ' Brassey’s Annual ’ made the following comments on the deployment of the battle fleet “If that movement is to be understood, it is obviously necessary to admire what advantage it was that he (Admiral Jellicoo) sought, and hie loyalty and reticence have made this a very difficult question. In his book, ‘Tho Grand Fleet,’ he gave no details of his tactical conceptions, thinking, doubtless, that be had better pot say anything about the system of training on which the British Navy had been drilled. He had never explained how bo thought the Grand Fleet could best engage their opponents, and has referred, very briefly, to his battle orders and fleet instructions without divulging them, presumably be cause he assumed that the Admiralty ■would regard them as confidential though the war was over. Seeing how murti criticism he might have answered liy doing so, one is compelled to admire- his self-restraint and dignity; but they do not make an examination of his tactics easy. . . . THE DESIDERATA OF VICTORY. “For this three things were necessary: firstly, the battle line must bo formed at such a distance from the German fleet as to be out of torpedo range; secondly, it must bo so far from it that qur comparatively weak armor would resist tho German 12in shell, whilst our heavier projectiles fell upon their ships in a cascade; and thirdly, our flotillas must bo in a posture to beat off any attempt of the enemy’s destroyers to harass or throw out our tactical plan. “ Those three points must bo clearly borne in mind if tho Commandor-iu-Chief’s method of deployment is to be comprehensible at all. They are at once the key to the principles of leadership under which he acted, and a reply to a gnrd half of the criticism which has been d-vected against him. For, if we wish to form a right judgment upon his method of leadership, the question to decide is simply how far it conformed with the plan upon which he relied tor victory, and to what extent his deployment helped him to secure tho tactical advantage which he was seeking. In other words, it must be judged by its consequences. _ “At about a quarter past 5, Admiral Jellicoe, acting on the scanty and confusing messages ho had received from his advanced forces, decided to deploy on his easterly division. About ten minutes later, his ships were in lino ahead, with the three leading divisions steering about E.S.E., and tho remainder steering northeastwards to take up their positions astern of tho leader. Duo south of the centre of onr lino was Admiral Schccr’s leading division. Our wan was about 14,000yds from the enemy, our centre 17,500, and onr rear 15,000. Although hazo and funnel smoke made continuous firing impossible, wo then held the leading German division of four ships under an intermittent, hut converging fire, from nearly twice that number of _ British Dreadnoughts. In other words, within ten minutOvS of his fateful decision, the Com-rcander-in-Chicf was bringing down a crushing concentration of fire upon Ins opponent; and could bo certain every minute would increase his advantage, for our vessels were hindered by light, and not by their position; whilst (ho enemy could not hope to get his whole battle line into action for at least a quarter of an hour. The distance of onr lines from theirs was certainly rather less than would have been chosen had a deliberate choice been possible; as torpedo firing can be dangerous at 13,000yds. On the other hand, the advantage in the tactical position was entirely on one side; as, in tho first moments of the engagement, we had confronted about a tfciyd or a half of tho enemy’s battleships with the whole of our effective strength. Tho result was simply what was to bo expected; within ton minutes the whole German fleet was withdrawing from tho blast of our gunfire. No battle is ever fought exactly ‘ secundum artom’; but there is in Admiral Jellicoe’s deployment a conformity between design and execution which is reminiscent of tho finest, combination of Turenne and Marlborough. On a* handful of scrappy and confused reports he had secured to himself practically _ every advantage for which be was striving. . the DEPLOYMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

“We have now to examine the criticism which the Commander-in-Chicf’s assailants have advanced against him. They ha'o insisted that, by deploying differently, he would have brought his line closer to the enemy at the beginning of the action. The answer to this is twofold. No alternative system of deployment would have enabled the whole of our line to engage, as soon as it did; for, whether the deployment were made on the right wing or on the centre, only the leading division would have been ‘in action until the manoeuvre was completed; as it was, every one _of our ships was in a position from which it might have engaged, but for the ha/.e and funnel smoko whilst the movement was actually in progrss. _ Scondly, it was precisely this close initial action which Admiral Jellicoe wished to avoid, as it would have thrown away the advantages that ho was seeking by making the enemy’s gun-fire as effective as his, and by giving them every possible opportunity for throwing out and confusing the plan which he had deliberately chosen. The criticism of the Commander-in-Chief's assailants is, therefore, no criticism at all, but more lack of comprehension. His movements between 6 and 8 p.m. arc unintelligible if considered apart from the plan upon which ho was working, and it <5 precisely because his critics have examined the one and ignored the other that their contentions are almost meaningless to instructed naval opinion,”